Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

Whether an idea, information, infection, or innovation diffuses throughout a society depends not only on the structure of the network of interactions, but also on the timing of those interactions. Recent studies have shown that diffusion can fail on a network in which people are only active in "bursts", active for a while and then silent for a while, but diffusion could succeed on the same network if people were active in a more random Poisson manner. Those studies generally consider models in which nodes are active according to the same random timing process and then ask which timing is optimal. In reality, people differ widely in their activity patterns -- some are bursty and others are not. Here we show that, if people differ in their activity patterns, bursty behavior does not always hurt the diffusion, and in fact having some (but not all) of the population be bursty significantly helps diffusion. We prove that maximizing diffusion requires heterogeneous activity patterns across agents, and the overall maximizing pattern of agents' activity times does not involve any Poisson behavior

Behavioral Communities and the Atomic Structure of Networks

We develop a theory of `behavioral communities' and the `atomic structure' of networks. We define atoms to be groups of agents whose behaviors always match each other in a set of coordination games played on the network. This provides a microfoundation for a method of detecting communities in social and economic networks. We provide theoretical results characterizing such behavior-based communities and atomic structures and discussing their properties in large random networks. We also provide an algorithm for identifying behavioral communities. We discuss applications including: a method of estimating underlying preferences by observing behavioral conventions in data, and optimally seeding diffusion processes when there are peer interactions and homophily. We illustrate the techniques with applications to high school friendship networks and rural village networks

Clinical trial of an AI-augmented intervention for HIV prevention in youth experiencing homelessness

Youth experiencing homelessness (YEH) are subject to substantially greater risk of HIV infection, compounded both by their lack of access to stable housing and the disproportionate representation of youth of marginalized racial, ethnic, and gender identity groups among YEH. A key goal for health equity is to improve adoption of protective behaviors in this population. One promising strategy for intervention is to recruit peer leaders from the population of YEH to promote behaviors such as condom usage and regular HIV testing to their social contacts. This raises a computational question: which youth should be selected as peer leaders to maximize the overall impact of the intervention? We developed an artificial intelligence system to optimize such social network interventions in a community health setting. We conducted a clinical trial enrolling 713 YEH at drop-in centers in a large US city. The clinical trial compared interventions planned with the algorithm to those where the highest-degree nodes in the youths' social network were recruited as peer leaders (the standard method in public health) and to an observation-only control group. Results from the clinical trial show that youth in the AI group experience statistically significant reductions in key risk behaviors for HIV transmission, while those in the other groups do not. This provides, to our knowledge, the first empirical validation of the usage of AI methods to optimize social network interventions for health. We conclude by discussing lessons learned over the course of the project which may inform future attempts to use AI in community-level interventions

Innovation and Strategic Network Formation

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas can be acquired by private investment or via social learning. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities on other firms, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and even average firm profits would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another