Computer-aided proofs for multiparty computation with active security

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a general cryptographic technique that allows distrusting parties to compute a function of their individual inputs, while only revealing the output of the function. It has found applications in areas such as auctioning, email filtering, and secure teleconference. Given its importance, it is crucial that the protocols are specified and implemented correctly. In the programming language community it has become good practice to use computer proof assistants to verify correctness proofs. In the field of cryptography, EasyCrypt is the state of the art proof assistant. It provides an embedded language for probabilistic programming, together with a specialized logic, embedded into an ambient general purpose higher-order logic. It allows us to conveniently express cryptographic properties. EasyCrypt has been used successfully on many applications, including public-key encryption, signatures, garbled circuits and differential privacy. Here we show for the first time that it can also be used to prove security of MPC against a malicious adversary. We formalize additive and replicated secret sharing schemes and apply them to Maurer's MPC protocol for secure addition and multiplication. Our method extends to general polynomial functions. We follow the insights from EasyCrypt that security proofs can be often be reduced to proofs about program equivalence, a topic that is well understood in the verification of programming languages. In particular, we show that in the passive case the non-interference-based definition is equivalent to a standard game-based security definition. For the active case we provide a new NI definition, which we call input independence

Complex Analysis of Intelligent Systems

Logic gates can be written in terms of complex differential operators where the inputs and outputs are analytic functions with several variables. Using the polar representation of complex numbers, we arrive at an immediate connection between the oscillatory behavior of the system and logic gates. We explain the universal programming language (UPL) used by physical objects to process information. To assure the causality structure in UPL, we introduce the concept of layers that characterizes the computations for each time scale.Comment: 18 pages; comments are welcome

The Guarded Lambda-Calculus: Programming and Reasoning with Guarded Recursion for Coinductive Types

We present the guarded lambda-calculus, an extension of the simply typed lambda-calculus with guarded recursive and coinductive types. The use of guarded recursive types ensures the productivity of well-typed programs. Guarded recursive types may be transformed into coinductive types by a type-former inspired by modal logic and Atkey-McBride clock quantification, allowing the typing of acausal functions. We give a call-by-name operational semantics for the calculus, and define adequate denotational semantics in the topos of trees. The adequacy proof entails that the evaluation of a program always terminates. We introduce a program logic with L\"ob induction for reasoning about the contextual equivalence of programs. We demonstrate the expressiveness of the calculus by showing the definability of solutions to Rutten's behavioural differential equations.Comment: Accepted to Logical Methods in Computer Science special issue on the 18th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS 2015