Privileging Professional Insider Trading

This Article explores insider trading law\u27s increasingfocus on personal relationships, and the way in which thelaw has come to privilege professional overnonprofessional insider trading. The Article discusseshow, in an effort to expand insider trading liability, thegovernment has sought to impose legal duties of loyaltyand confidentiality on a host of personal relationships not otherwise subject to law-effectively basing civil andcriminal penalties on corruption in purely personalrelationships. At the same time, courts have adopted abusiness property rationale regardingthe use of nonpublicinformation and declined to prevent companies fromdisclosing valuable nonpublic information to select marketprofessionals, who may then lawfully trade. The currentlegal framework thus permits trading on tips byprofessional investors, while penalizing this same tradingby others. This problem is demonstrated by the divergentoutcomes in United States v. Newman and Salman v.United States. After Newman and Salman, personalrelationships are likely to be an increasing focus ofenforcement. Because of the disparate treatment oftrading on tips by professional versus nonprofessionaltraders, however, this focus does little to advance overallmarket fairness

Sigmund J. Beck advanced bankruptcy roundtable

Meeting proceedings of a seminar by the same name, held August 14-15, 2020

Corporate market responsibility for orderly financial markets: systemic risk and regulation following Citigroup, sovereign funds, and the credit crunch

How are companies responsible for helping to ensure orderly financial markets? In economic theory, the question is redundant, because orderly markets result from normal business activity, with support from regulators. Within the last few years, however, several episodes have suggested differently. Citigroup investment bank was fined for destabilising bond markets, despite being absolved of criminal conduct. Sovereign wealth funds were compelled to sign a code-of-conduct, to safeguard "free and open markets", despite having brought economic benefits globally. The US and UK governments described the most profitable financial decade in generations as an "age of irresponsibility", after it led to a crisis. These three episodes are the empirical focus of this thesis. The thesis develops a grounded theory of corporate market responsibility (CMR)- an expectation by regulators and other actors that firms will help to regulate systemic risk in financial markets through discretionary activities that supplement regulatory requirements. This expectation explains the controversies, and may help us to anticipate and understand similar episodes in future. Further, it is argued that observing CMR conduct - which relates to risk management, investment policy, and proactive improvement - decreases regulatory risk for financial firms, while not observing it increases regulatory risk. The primary reason for this is that CMR conduct is perceived to reduce systemic risk, and state actors regard market governance as a shared responsibility with firms. In addition to framing these controversies, CMR theory contributes to our understanding of several concepts in decentralised governance and regulatory capitalism. It illustrates a substantive model of meta-regulation - that is, the regulation of corporate self-regulation. As such, it illustrates substantive limits for private authority and its legitimacy. The observation of CMR also reveals new dimensions of sociological processes in financial governance, particularly markets' social embedded ness, and actors' reliance on performative market models. Finally, CMR illustrates a governance model combining incentives with ethics, as regulators seek to de-legitimise regulatory arbitrage by firms. The analysis concludes by arguing that CMR is increasingly relevant for other substantive contexts such as the hedge funds industry and private markets like 'dark pools'

Corporate market responsibility for orderly financial markets: systemic risk and regulation following Citigroup, sovereign funds, and the credit crunch

How are companies responsible for helping to ensure orderly financial markets? In economic theory, the question is redundant, because orderly markets result from normal business activity, with support from regulators. Within the last few years, however, several episodes have suggested differently. Citigroup investment bank was fined for destabilising bond markets, despite being absolved of criminal conduct. Sovereign wealth funds were compelled to sign a code-of-conduct, to safeguard "free and open markets", despite having brought economic benefits globally. The US and UK governments described the most profitable financial decade in generations as an "age of irresponsibility", after it led to a crisis. These three episodes are the empirical focus of this thesis. The thesis develops a grounded theory of corporate market responsibility (CMR)- an expectation by regulators and other actors that firms will help to regulate systemic risk in financial markets through discretionary activities that supplement regulatory requirements. This expectation explains the controversies, and may help us to anticipate and understand similar episodes in future. Further, it is argued that observing CMR conduct - which relates to risk management, investment policy, and proactive improvement - decreases regulatory risk for financial firms, while not observing it increases regulatory risk. The primary reason for this is that CMR conduct is perceived to reduce systemic risk, and state actors regard market governance as a shared responsibility with firms. In addition to framing these controversies, CMR theory contributes to our understanding of several concepts in decentralised governance and regulatory capitalism. It illustrates a substantive model of meta-regulation - that is, the regulation of corporate self-regulation. As such, it illustrates substantive limits for private authority and its legitimacy. The observation of CMR also reveals new dimensions of sociological processes in financial governance, particularly markets' social embedded ness, and actors' reliance on performative market models. Finally, CMR illustrates a governance model combining incentives with ethics, as regulators seek to de-legitimise regulatory arbitrage by firms. The analysis concludes by arguing that CMR is increasingly relevant for other substantive contexts such as the hedge funds industry and private markets like 'dark pools'

Ciccarello v. Davies Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 46340

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/8671/thumbnail.jp

AICPA professional standards as of June 1, 2018, Volume 1: U.S. Auditing standards-AICPA (Clarified), U.S. Attestation Standards -- AICPA (Clarified)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_prof/1560/thumbnail.jp

AICPA professional standards as of June 1, 2017, Volume 1: U.S. Auditing standards-AICPA (Clarified), U.S. Attestation Standards -- AICPA (Clarified)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_prof/1555/thumbnail.jp

Codification of statements on auditing standard, Numbers 122 to 133, as of January 2018

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_prof/1563/thumbnail.jp