1,032 research outputs found
Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement which greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firmsâ behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing quantitative evidence that links these actions to an anticompetitive market outcome. We apply our approach to incidents on the Italian gasoline market where the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to a policy of sticky pricing and large price changes which facilitated price alignment and coordination of price changes. Antitrust policy has to distinguish such active promotion of a collusive strategy from passive (best response) alignment. Our results imply the necessity of stronger legal instruments which target unilateral conduct that aims at bringing about collusion
Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market
This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) collusion
Do research joint ventures serve a collusive function?
Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge
gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes
members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are
rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. We examine
this by exploiting variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects
the collusive benefits but not the research synergies associated with a RJV. We use data on
RJVs formed between 1986 and 2001 together with firm-level information from Compustat
to estimate a RJV participation equation. After correcting for the endogeneity of R&D
and controlling for RJV characteristics and firm attributes, we find the decision to join is
impacted by the policy change. We also find the magnitude is significant: the policy change
resulted in an average drop in the probability of joining a RJV of 34% among telecommunications
firms, 33% among computer and semiconductor manufacturers, and 27% among
petroleum refining firms. Our results are consistent with research joint ventures serving a
collusive function
(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach
Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.Competition, Petrol, Variance filter analysis, Gibbs sampling, Markov chain Monte Carlo.
Cartel detection in procurement markets
Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms with an elevated risk of cartelization. We argue that customers of hard core cartels can have both incentives and possibilities to detect such agreements on their own initiative through the use of market-specific data sets. We apply a unique data set of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers and show that a price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition authority. The results not only suggest that monitoring procurement markets through screening tools has the potential of substantial cost reductions - thereby improving the competitive position of the respective user firms - but also allow the conclusion that competition authorities should view customers of potentially cartelized industries as important allies in their endeavour to fight hard core cartels. --business economics,procurement,antitrust policy,cartels,detection,screening
The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels
I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firmsâ core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.cartels, enforcement, law and economics
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We examine solutions to mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions.Auctions, Collusion; Multiple Object Auctions; Spectrum Auctions
Oligopsony Power: Evidence from the U.S. Beef Packing Industry
Replaced with revised version of paper 08/24/09.Margin, Beef Packing, Fed Cattle Prices, Markov Regime Switching, Industrial Organization,
Antitrust
This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful.
- âŠ