1,095 research outputs found
Towards Loop-Free Forwarding of Anonymous Internet Datagrams that Enforce Provenance
The way in which addressing and forwarding are implemented in the Internet
constitutes one of its biggest privacy and security challenges. The fact that
source addresses in Internet datagrams cannot be trusted makes the IP Internet
inherently vulnerable to DoS and DDoS attacks. The Internet forwarding plane is
open to attacks to the privacy of datagram sources, because source addresses in
Internet datagrams have global scope. The fact an Internet datagrams are
forwarded based solely on the destination addresses stated in datagram headers
and the next hops stored in the forwarding information bases (FIB) of relaying
routers allows Internet datagrams to traverse loops, which wastes resources and
leaves the Internet open to further attacks. We introduce PEAR (Provenance
Enforcement through Addressing and Routing), a new approach for addressing and
forwarding of Internet datagrams that enables anonymous forwarding of Internet
datagrams, eliminates many of the existing DDoS attacks on the IP Internet, and
prevents Internet datagrams from looping, even in the presence of routing-table
loops.Comment: Proceedings of IEEE Globecom 2016, 4-8 December 2016, Washington,
D.C., US
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Techniques for Detection of Malicious Packet Drops in Networks
The introduction of programmability and dynamic protocol deployment in routers, there would be an increase in the potential vulnerabilities and attacks . The next- generation Internet promises to provide a fundamental shift in the underlying architecture to support dynamic deployment of network protocols. In this thesis, we consider the problem of detecting malicious packet drops in routers. Specifically, we focus on an attack scenario, where a router selectively drops packets destined for another node. Detecting such an attack is challenging since it requires differentiating malicious packet drops from congestion-based packet losses. We propose a controller- based malicious packet detection technique that effectively detects malicious routers using delayed sampling technique and verification of the evidence. The verification involves periodically determining congestion losses in the network and comparing the forwarding behaviors of the adjoining routers to affirm the state of a router in the network. We provide a performance analysis of the detection accuracy and quantify the communication overhead of our system. Our results show that our technique provides accurate detection with low performance overhead
To NACK or not to NACK? Negative Acknowledgments in Information-Centric Networking
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is an internetworking paradigm that
offers an alternative to the current IP\nobreakdash-based Internet
architecture. ICN's most distinguishing feature is its emphasis on information
(content) instead of communication endpoints. One important open issue in ICN
is whether negative acknowledgments (NACKs) at the network layer are useful for
notifying downstream nodes about forwarding failures, or requests for incorrect
or non-existent information. In benign settings, NACKs are beneficial for ICN
architectures, such as CCNx and NDN, since they flush state in routers and
notify consumers. In terms of security, NACKs seem useful as they can help
mitigating so-called Interest Flooding attacks. However, as we show in this
paper, network-layer NACKs also have some unpleasant security implications. We
consider several types of NACKs and discuss their security design requirements
and implications. We also demonstrate that providing secure NACKs triggers the
threat of producer-bound flooding attacks. Although we discuss some potential
countermeasures to these attacks, the main conclusion of this paper is that
network-layer NACKs are best avoided, at least for security reasons.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figure
Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey
This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh
network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user
privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various
possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for
WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the
security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application
layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols,
user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation
protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the
chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms
and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible
attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with
regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed,
use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved
etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management
approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly
becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open
problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed
before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the
author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are
some text overlaps with the previous submissio
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