Detection and Isolation of Link Failures under the Agreement Protocol

In this paper a property of the multi-agent consensus dynamics that relates the failure of links in the network to jump discontinuities in the derivatives of the output responses of the nodes is derived and verified analytically. At the next step, an algorithm for sensor placement is proposed, which would enable the designer to detect and isolate any link failures across the network based on the observed jump discontinuities in the derivatives of the responses of a subset of nodes. These results are explained through elaborative examples.Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 201

Digraphs with distinguishable dynamics under the multi-agent agreement protocol

This work studies the ability to distinguish digraphs from the output response of some observing agents in a multi-agent network under the agreement protocol. Given a fixed observation point, it is desired to find sufficient graphical conditions under which the failure of a set of edges in the network information flow digraph is distinguishable from another set. When the latter is empty, this corresponds to the detectability of the former link set given the response of the observing agent. In developing the results, a powerful extension of the all-minors matrix tree theorem in algebraic graph theory is proved which relates the minors of the transformed Laplacian of a directed graph to the number and length of the shortest paths between its vertices. The results reveal an intricate relationship between the ability to distinguish the responses of a healthy and a faulty multi-agent network and the inter-nodal paths in their information flow digraphs. The results have direct implications for the operation and design of multi-agent systems subject to multiple link losses. Simulations and examples are presented to illustrate the analytic findings

Detecting Topology Variations in Dynamical Networks

This paper considers the problem of detecting topology variations in dynamical networks. We consider a network whose behavior can be represented via a linear dynamical system. The problem of interest is then that of finding conditions under which it is possible to detect node or link disconnections from prior knowledge of the nominal network behavior and on-line measurements. The considered approach makes use of analysis tools from switching systems theory. A number of results are presented along with examples

Failure Analysis in Multi-Agent Networks: A Graph-Theoretic Approach

A multi-agent network system consists of a group of dynamic control agents which interact according to a given information flow structure. Such cooperative dynamics over a network may be strongly affected by the removal of network nodes and communication links, thus potentially compromising the functionality of the overall system. The chief purpose of this thesis is to explore and address the challenges of multi-agent cooperative control under various fault and failure scenarios by analyzing the network graph-topology. In the first part, the agents are assumed to evolve according to the linear agreement protocol. Link failures in the network are characterized based on the ability to distinguish the agent dynamics before and after failures. Sufficient topological conditions are provided, under which dynamics of a given agent is distinguishable for distinct digraphs. The second part of this thesis is concerned with the preservation of structural controllability for a multi-agent network under simultaneous link and agent failures. To this end, the previously studied concepts of link and agent controllability degrees are first exploited to provide quantitative measures for the contribution of a particular link or agent to the controllability of the overall network. Next, the case when both communication links and agents in the network can fail simultaneously is considered, and graphical conditions for preservation of controllability are investigated

Distributed estimation over a low-cost sensor network: a review of state-of-the-art

Proliferation of low-cost, lightweight, and power efficient sensors and advances in networked systems enable the employment of multiple sensors. Distributed estimation provides a scalable and fault-robust fusion framework with a peer-to-peer communication architecture. For this reason, there seems to be a real need for a critical review of existing and, more importantly, recent advances in the domain of distributed estimation over a low-cost sensor network. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art solutions in this research area, exploring their characteristics, advantages, and challenging issues. Additionally, several open problems and future avenues of research are highlighted

Model checking security protocols : a multiagent system approach

Security protocols specify the communication required to achieve security objectives, e.g., data-privacy. Such protocols are used in electronic media: e-commerce, e-banking, e-voting, etc. Formal verification is used to discover protocol-design flaws. In this thesis, we use a multiagent systems approach built on temporal-epistemic logic to model and analyse a bounded number of concurrent sessions of authentication and key-establishment protocols executing in a Dolev-Yao environment. We increase the expressiveness of classical, trace-based frameworks by mapping each protocol requirement into a hierarchy of temporal-epistemic formulae. To automate our methodology, we design and implement a tool called PD2IS. From a high-level protocol description, PD2IS produces our protocol model and the temporal-epistemic specifications of the protocol’s goals. This output is verified with the model checker MCMAS. We benchmark our methodology on various protocols drawn from standard repositories. We extend our approach to formalise protocols described by equations of cryptographic primitives. The core of this extension is an indistinguishability relation to accommodate the underlying protocol equations. Based on this relation, we introduce a knowledge modality and an algorithm to model check multiagent systems against it. These techniques are applied to verify e-voting protocols. Furthermore, we develop our methodology towards intrusion-detection techniques. We introduce the concept of detectability, i.e., the ability of protocol participants to detect jointly that the protocol is being attacked. We extend our formalisms and PD2IS to support detectability analysis. We model check several attack-prone protocols against their detectability specifications

Model Checking Security Protocols: A Multiagent System Approach

Security protocols specify the communication required to achieve security objectives, e.g., data-privacy. Such protocols are used in electronic media: e-commerce, e-banking, e-voting, etc. Formal verification is used to discover protocol-design flaws. In this thesis, we use a multiagent systems approach built on temporal-epistemic logic to model and analyse a bounded number of concurrent sessions of authentication and key-establishment protocols executing in a Dolev-Yao environment. We increase the expressiveness of classical, trace-based frameworks by mapping each protocol requirement into a hierarchy of temporal-epistemic formulae. To automate our methodology, we design and implement a tool called PD2IS. From a high-level protocol description, PD2IS produces our protocol model and the temporal-epistemic specifications of the protocol’s goals. This output is verified with the model checker MCMAS. We benchmark our methodology on various protocols drawn from standard repositories. We extend our approach to formalise protocols described by equations of cryptographic primitives. The core of this extension is an indistinguishability relation to accommodate the underlying protocol equations. Based on this relation, we introduce a knowledge modality and an algorithm to model check multiagent systems against it. These techniques are applied to verify e-voting protocols. Furthermore, we develop our methodology towards intrusion-detection techniques. We introduce the concept of detectability, i.e., the ability of protocol participants to detect jointly that the protocol is being attacked. We extend our formalisms and PD2IS to support detectability analysis. We model check several attack-prone protocols against their detectability specifications