Regulatory tradeoffs in designing concession contracts for infrastructure networks

Network activities typically involve collecting a good or service (such as electric utilities, phone services, and rail transportation) from many producers or distributing them to many users. Producers and users are often widely scattered, geographically. Close financial integration of networks is justified on the basis of economies of scope and scale and the benefits from pooling and coordinating. In many countries, network operators are completely integrated publicly-owned firms (private firms being deemed insufficiently efficient or equitable). Challengers of this practice contend that the inefficiency resulting from lack of competition outweighs the gain from economic integration. With reform, some competitive mechanisms can be introduced even when monopoly seems the best option for delivering a service. But conflicts between policymakers'objectives -including efficiency, equity, speed, speed of reform, and signaling- influence the design of concession contracts for infrastructure network services (including communications and transportation services). Competition begins with the unbundling of various stages of delivery. Then competitive bidding is popular, with the public authority keeping property rights on productive assets but conceding their operation to a private firm. The winner gets the right to maximize profits, within limits (having to provide universal services, for example, and avoid price discrimination). In liberalizing the delivery of a service, policymakers must consider not only efficiency but also social and fiscal feasibility. The authors discuss how relevant information asymmetry is in contract design and the award and regulatory processes. They also discuss how to design pricing to accommodate the obligation to provide universal service. To illustrate, they describe Argentina's experiment in liberalization, which is increasingly viewed as a model for changing private sector and government involvement in infrastructure services. Beginning in 1989, Argentina began privatizing utilities and transport services, because the government had decided that it could no longer afford to subsidize those services or finance the investments needed for their effective operation. To introduce competition, the government unbundled services and introduced competitive bidding. It also created sector-specific regulatory agencies to protect consumers from private monopolies and to protect the private concessionaires from government micromanagement. Making concession-based reform and contracted-based regulation of private monopolists sustainable will require strengthening regulatory agencies, clarifying their terms of reference and accountability, and better separating the responsibilities of sector ministers and regulators.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Knowledge Economy,Economic Theory&Research

Reducing air pollution from urban passenger transport : a framework for policy analysis

This paper develops a simple framework to analyze various pollution control strategies that have been used or are proposed in the urban passenger transport sector. The context is the declining quality of air in urban areas, which is among the serious problems associated with the rapid motorization of societies the world over. The paper examines the point of impact of different policy levers and provides a categorization of different instruments that should assist policy makers when choosing between them. A distinguishing feature of this framework is its explicit recognition of behavioral incentives, in particular, the fact that offsetting changes in consumer behavior can often undermine the original intent of particular policies. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic framework we have used to examine transport emissions. Section III reviews pollutant characteristics and their impact. The resulting policy choices are discussed in more detail in section IV. Several urban transport projects supported by the World Bank are then reviewed in section VI, and section V concludes the report.Montreal Protocol,Environmental Economics&Policies,Air Quality&Clean Air,Roads&Highways,Public Health Promotion,Roads&Highways,Urban Transport,Transport and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Airports and Air Services

Regulatory Policies and Reforms in the Power and Downstream Oil Industries

This paper looks at the regulatory reforms in the electricity and downstream oil industries, two important inputs to the production process that were heavily regulated by the government. While electricity has strong externalities as well as economies of scale and scope, the oil industry does not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics nor does it display economic features that would warrant government regulation. The paper also analyzes the economic theories underlying these reforms: why is regulation necessary, what are the different forms of regulation, and how can these policy reforms bring about competition? It also identifies the emerging issues and problems associated with the regulatory reforms. Given our little experience in the effective use of public regulation in a market-driven setting, research is needed to provide a deeper understanding of these issues within the context of our economic, institutional, and political structure. This is necessary in order to come up with possible approaches to overcome our weaknesses and shore up weak administrative and enforcement capacities.electricity and power, economic regulation, regulatory reform, downstream oil

Regulating privatized rail transport

Traditionally, transport regulation has been viewed as an exercise in second-best optimization, acknowledging the existence of huge information problems. Then the rail industry was deeply restructured worldwide to halt erosion of the sector's share of transportation markets. Restructuring took different forms in different countries, ranging from simple reorganization measures to extreme restructuring -with the private sector increasingly participating in the sector and with the provision of infrastructure separated from the provision of services. The authors argue that regulation of the rail industry cannot remain unaffected by these changes. New regulatory scenarios and issues have emerged. For example, contracts have to be defined for private participation and quality surveillance instruments must be defined. Traditional price controls have to be adapted to, and mechanisms designed to manage and plan infrastructure investments in, the new environment. Restructuring has brought new problems, too. Where licenses have been used, for example, several concessionaires have been unable to meet the objectives spelled out in the concession contract. Contracts should be flexible enough to take account of novel situations that may affect company performance. And yet, for the system to be credible, there cannot be systematic, unjustified deviations from the franchise objectives. Regulation of the sector should be simple and flexible, with license contracts designed to include the private sector and with industry organization adapted to local circumstances. Regulation should be governed by principles that foster competition and market mechanisms, wherever possible. At the same time, it should provide a stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. Otherwise, regulators should refrain from intervening in the market-unless the goal of economic efficiency (subject to the socially demanded levelof equity) is in jeopardy.Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Decentralization,Enterprise Development&Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Railways Transport,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Water and Industry,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Regulatory Policies and Reforms in the Power and Downstream Oil Industries

This paper looks at the regulatory reforms in the electricity and downstream oil industries, two important inputs to the production process that were heavily regulated by the government. While electricity has strong externalities as well as economies of scale and scope, the oil industry does not exhibit natural monopoly characteristics nor does it display economic features that would warrant government regulation. The paper also analyzes the economic theories underlying these reforms: why is regulation necessary, what are the different forms of regulation, and how can these policy reforms bring about competition? It also identifies the emerging issues and problems associated with the regulatory reforms. Given our little experience in the effective use of public regulation in a market-driven setting, research is needed to provide a deeper understanding of these issues within the context of our economic, institutional, and political structure. This is necessary in order to come up with possible approaches to overcome our weaknesses and shore up weak administrative and enforcement capacities.electricity and power, economic regulation, regulatory reform, downstream oil

Market-based Instruments for Environmental Policymaking in Latin America and the Caribbean: Lessons from Eleven Countries

This report is a summary of country studies in Latin America and the Caribbean, addressing the use of market-based instruments (MBIs) and command-and-control (CAC) measures for environmental management in the region. Even though MBIs can significantly add efficiency to existing CAC mechanisms, the scope of MBIs should match the countries institutional capacity to implement them. Gradual and flexible reforms are likely to succeed within the current regional context of continued institutional changes. A key function of MBIs is usually revenue collection, though it does not necessarily lead to successful environmental management. The study suggests that revenues should be channeled to local authorities for an effective MBI's implementation. The report also critiques the regular practice of international donor agencies in recommending the solutions suitable for developed countries, without considering the institutional conditions in developing countries. Further, the study explores both the successes and difficulties experienced in the region regarding regulations, macro-policies, and MBIs; the institutional frameworks of the countries under review; and, the issues considered in the design of MBIs, in order to promote a beneficial dialogue among them

Health Insurance Exchanges: Organizing Health Insurance Marketplaces to Promote Health Reform Goals

Examines whether and how the proposed health insurance exchange to organize an efficient marketplace would address problems individuals and employers face in buying insurance and thereby increase coverage. Considers lessons learned from earlier efforts

Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Health Care Cost Containment and Coverage Expansion

Examines the relationship between expanding insurance coverage and controlling medical costs. Analyzes combinations of cost containment options and coverage expansion models for their compatibility and implications for the feasibility of proposed reforms