4 research outputs found
An Optimal Game Theoretical Framework for Mobility Aware Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of
nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to
stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes. In order to provide sufficient
incentives, most of these methods pay nodes a premium over their actual costs
of participation. However, they lead to considerably large overpayments.
Moreover, existing methods ignore mobility of nodes, for simplicity. However,
owing to the mobile nature of MANETs, this assumption seems unrealistic. In
this paper, we propose an optimal game theoretical framework to ensure the
proper cooperation in mobility aware routing for MANETs. The proposed method is
based on the multi-dimensional optimal auctions which allows us to consider
path durations, in addition to the route costs. Path duration is a metric that
best reflects changes in topology caused by mobility of nodes and, it is widely
used in mobility aware routing protocols. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism
is optimal in that it minimizes the total expected payments. We provide
theoretical analysis to support our claims. In addition, simulation results
show significant improvements in terms of payments compared to the most popular
existing methods
Design of an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast protocol for ad hoc networks with rational nodes
Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol. © 2008 IEEE