Democracy Between compromise and control

The slogan ‘take back control’ was widely credited as a key factor in the UK’s vote to leave the EU on June 23rd. That vote revealed many cleavages in how we understand our democracy. One significant one lies between understandings of democracy as the control of power by the majority, and a more subtle notion of democracy as the art of compromise. This latter understanding appears to be in retreat throughout the liberal democratic parts of the world, to say nothing of more fragile political environments

Endogenous Lobbying

In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

Endogenous Lobbying

In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.Endogenous lobbying, citizen-candidate model, representative democracy.

Teori Demokrasi dalam Wacana Ketatanegaraan Perspektif Pemikiran Hans Kelsen

In Hans Kelsen opinion, one of the essences of democracy is the possibility for compromising various aspirations with regard to the foundation of a state. The principle of compromise is the settlement of a conflict via certain procedure which is not fully in favor of a party and ignoring the rests. By this compromise, democracy performs as an approach in the process of achieving the hope perfectly

The Fragility of Constitutional Democracy

Is the survival of constitutional democracy in America at serious risk? Given the actions of the Trump administration, and given the decline of democracy and concomitant rise of authoritarianism the world over, there is genuine cause for alarm. In light of these fears, it is worth remembering that the authors of The Federalist Papers were notably pessimistic about the survival chances of republican government. To what extent have their constitutional design innovations contributed to present woes, and conversely, to what extent will the Constitution ensure the survival of democracy? This Essay argues that while the design of the Constitution is both helpful and harmful, much will ultimately turn on the political dimension. In particular, this Essay claims that the republic will survive only if the ongoing practices of democracy re-affirm its central values. But there are significant challenges to maintaining constitutional democracy. In addition to President Trump in the White House, current challenges include the decline in the democratic norms of civility and compromise, the rise of ideological warfare and hyperpartisanship, and the ever-deepening polarization between opposing camps—not only in government but also in the public at large. In the coming years, the continued vigilance and resistance of individuals and institutions will be crucially important to ensure the survival of constitutional democracy in America

A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation

Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This article helps fill that gap by offering a formal theory of three different modes of democratic deliberation: myopic discussion, constructive discussion, and debate. We show that myopic discussion suffers from indeterminacy of long run outcomes, while constructive discussion and debate are conclusive. Finally, unlike the other two modes of deliberation, debate is path independent and converges to a unique compromise position, irrespective of the initial status quo

The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development from Monarchy to Democracy

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of dierent production factors and the political con.icts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main production factor in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political power in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to oligarchy and .nally to democracy with full surage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political con.icts may lead to economic stagnation.economic development, Political Development, Democratization, Class Structure, land, Physical Capital, Human Capital, Monarchy, Oligarchy, democracy

Democracy, Deference, and Compromise: Understanding and Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo— cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption. Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive account of campaign finance jurisprudence that identifies various conceptions of corruption found in the case law. The Article then explains how these conceptions of corruption are animated by underlying disagreements about democracy and deference. More particularly, one group of Justices believes that preserving a robust process of public opinion formation is paramount in campaign finance cases, and that individual rights and political process concerns warrant intervention in defining corruption. The other group of Justices believes that the deployment of concentrated wealth in elections impairs legislative responsiveness to public opinion and that the Court should defer to legislative expertise in defining corruption. Having presented this account, the Article proposes a reform to accommodate both groups of Justices’ concerns in campaign finance cases. This reform, which I call the Compromise Methodology, instructs the Court to defer to the legislature’s understanding of the anticorruption interest when the campaign finance law in question protects either: (a) legislative responsiveness to public opinion; or (b) the process of public opinion formation. If the law protects neither of these concerns, then the Court intervenes and finds that the anticorruption interest cannot justify the law. Aside from this reframing of the anticorruption interest, the Compromise Methodology leaves the Court’s ordinary decision-making process intact. The Court can still determine whether a campaign finance law impacts individual rights and whether a law is sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption interest to withstand scrutiny. I argue that the Compromise Methodology locates valuable middle ground in campaign finance jurisprudence

Valuing Compromise for the Common Good

Pursuing the common good in a pluralist democracy is not possible without making compromises. Yet the spirit of compromise is in short supply in contemporary American politics. The permanent campaign has made compromise more difficult to achieve, as the uncompromising mindset suitable for campaigning has come to dominate the task of governing. To begin to make compromise more feasible and the common good more attainable, we need to appreciate the distinctive value of compromise and recognize the misconceptions that stand in its way. A common mistake is to assume that compromise requires finding the common ground on which all can agree. That undermines more realistic efforts to seek classic compromises, in which each party gains by sacrificing something valuable to the other, and together they serve the common good by improving upon the status quo. Institutional reforms are desirable, but they, too, cannot get off the ground without the support of leaders and citizens who learn how and when to adopt a compromising mindset