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The Future of Retail Operations
Retailing consists of all the activities associated with the selling of goods to the final consumer. In this article, we review the research on retail operations published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Research (M&SOM) since 1999. We then discuss the current retail landscape and the new research directions it offers, in which M&SOM can play a prominent role
A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial Aircraft
This paper develops a multi-agent dynamic model of the commercial aircraft industry and then uses that model to analyze industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy. In the model, firms are differentiated in their products and cost structure, and entry, exit, prices, and quantity sold are endogenously determined in dynamic equilibrium. Re ecting the focus of the paper, demand and supply are modeled structurally, while investment is modeled in reduced form. The model utilizes a cost model of commercial aircraft production developed and estimated in a previous paper (Benkard (2000)), and a discrete choice model of commercial aircraft demand to determine static profits. I find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data, such as high concentration and pricing below the level of static marginal cost, are explained by this model. The model also replicates the stochastic evolution of the industry well. Many of these properties could not be explained with a static model. These results provide support for the structural dynamic modeling approach in general. I also find that the unconstrained Markov perfect equilibrium is quite efficient from a social perspective, providing only 9% less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain, but that the Markov perfect equilibrium shifts a substantial amount of welfare from consumers to producers. Finally, I provide simulation evidence that an anti-trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing with high probability.
Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. Previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of firms' pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, market dominance, and multiple equilibria, whereas a model with learning alone cannot.
Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb
We analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is determined by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we investigate monopoly and competition between firms, described via an open-loop differential game which in this setting is equivalent to but analytically more convenient than a closed-loop system. We derive a Nash equilibrium and examine the influence of advertising. We show for the monopoly case that a reduction of the space of all price paths in time to the space of time-constant prices is sensible since the latter in general contains Nash equilibria. We prove that the equilibrium price of the weakest active firm tends to marginal cost as the number of (non-identical) firms grows. Our model is consistent with observed market behavior such as product life cycles.bounded rationality, social learning, population game, differential game, product life cycle, monopoly, competition, pricing, advertising
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations
is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous
agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and
the entire joint distribution of strategies and types to influence the payoffs
of agents. We clarify regularity conditions for the unique existence of a
solution trajectory and for the existence of equilibrium. We confirm that
equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability in potential
games are extended from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting.
In particular, a wide class of admissible dynamics share the same set of
locally stable equilibria in a potential game through local maximization of the
potential
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