1,567 research outputs found
Deferred on-line bipartite matching
We present a new model for the problem of on-line matching on bipartite graphs.
Suppose that one part of a graph is given, but the vertices of the other part are
presented in an on-line fashion. In the classical version, each incoming vertex is either irrevocably matched to a vertex from the other part or stays unmatched
forever. In our version, an algorithm is allowed to match the new vertex to a group
of elements (possibly empty). Later on, the algorithm can decide to remove some
vertices from the group and assign them to another (just presented) vertex, with
the restriction that each element belongs to at most one group. We present an optimal (deterministic) algorithm for this problem and prove that its competitive
ratio equals
The weighted stable matching problem
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete
but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to
compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known
to be NP-hard in general. Our contribution is two fold: a polyhedral
characterization and an approximation algorithm. Previously Chen et al. have
shown that the stable matching polytope is integral if and only if the subgraph
obtained after running phase one of Irving's algorithm is bipartite. We improve
upon this result by showing that there are instances where this subgraph might
not be bipartite but one can further eliminate some edges and arrive at a
bipartite subgraph. Our elimination procedure ensures that the set of stable
matchings remains the same, and thus the stable matching polytope of the final
subgraph contains the incidence vectors of all stable matchings of our original
graph. This allows us to characterize a larger class of instances for which the
weighted stable matching problem is polynomial-time solvable. We also show that
our edge elimination procedure is best possible, meaning that if the subgraph
we arrive at is not bipartite, then there is no bipartite subgraph that has the
same set of stable matchings as the original graph. We complement these results
with a -approximation algorithm for the minimum weight stable matching
problem for instances where each agent has at most two possible partners in any
stable matching. This is the first approximation result for any class of
instances with general weights.Comment: This is an extended version of a paper to appear at the The Fourth
International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2017
Stable Secretaries
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the
classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study
the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an
on-line fashion, to one of multiple positions. Secretaries are ranked according
to talent, as in the original formulation, and in addition positions are ranked
according to attractiveness. To evaluate an online matching mechanism, we use
the notion of blocking pairs from stable matching theory: our goal is to
maximize the number of positions (or secretaries) that do not take part in a
blocking pair. This is compared with a stable matching in which no blocking
pair exists. We consider the case where secretaries arrive randomly, as well as
that of an adversarial arrival order, and provide corresponding upper and lower
bounds.Comment: Accepted for presentation at the 18th ACM conference on Economics and
Computation (EC 2017
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