A Hybrid Simulation Methodology To Evaluate Network Centricdecision Making Under Extreme Events

Currently the network centric operation and network centric warfare have generated a new area of research focused on determining how hierarchical organizations composed by human beings and machines make decisions over collaborative environments. One of the most stressful scenarios for these kinds of organizations is the so-called extreme events. This dissertation provides a hybrid simulation methodology based on classical simulation paradigms combined with social network analysis for evaluating and improving the organizational structures and procedures, mainly the incident command systems and plans for facing those extreme events. According to this, we provide a methodology for generating hypotheses and afterwards testing organizational procedures either in real training systems or simulation models with validated data. As long as the organization changes their dyadic relationships dynamically over time, we propose to capture the longitudinal digraph in time and analyze it by means of its adjacency matrix. Thus, by using an object oriented approach, three domains are proposed for better understanding the performance and the surrounding environment of an emergency management organization. System dynamics is used for modeling the critical infrastructure linked to the warning alerts of a given organization at federal, state and local levels. Discrete simulations based on the defined concept of community of state enables us to control the complete model. Discrete event simulation allows us to create entities that represent the data and resource flows within the organization. We propose that cognitive models might well be suited in our methodology. For instance, we show how the team performance decays in time, according to the Yerkes-Dodson curve, affecting the measures of performance of the whole organizational system. Accordingly we suggest that the hybrid model could be applied to other types of organizations, such as military peacekeeping operations and joint task forces. Along with providing insight about organizations, the methodology supports the analysis of the after action review (AAR), based on collection of data obtained from the command and control systems or the so-called training scenarios. Furthermore, a rich set of mathematical measures arises from the hybrid models such as triad census, dyad census, eigenvalues, utilization, feedback loops, etc., which provides a strong foundation for studying an emergency management organization. Future research will be necessary for analyzing real data and validating the proposed methodology

Asymptotic Security of Control Systems by Covert Reaction: Repeated Signaling Game with Undisclosed Belief

This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in an asymptotic manner by rendering reactions against potentially harmful actions covert. The behaviors of the attacker and the defender are analyzed through a repeated signaling game with an undisclosed belief under covert reactions. In the typical setting of signaling games, reactions conducted by the defender are supposed to be public information and the measurability enables the attacker to accurately trace transitions of the defender's belief on existence of a malicious attacker. In contrast, the belief in the game considered in this paper is undisclosed and hence common equilibrium concepts can no longer be employed for the analysis. To surmount this difficulty, a novel framework for decision of reasonable strategies of the players in the game is introduced. Based on the presented framework, it is revealed that any reasonable strategy chosen by a rational malicious attacker converges to the benign behavior as long as the reactions performed by the defender are unobservable to the attacker. The result provides an explicit relationship between resilience and information, which indicates the importance of covertness of reactions for designing secure control systems.Comment: 8 page

The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight

The idea of cost-benefit analysis has been spreading internationally for centuries — at least since an American named Benjamin Franklin wrote a letter in 1772 to his British friend, Joseph Priestley, recommending that Priestley weigh the pros and cons of a difficult decision in what Franklin dubbed a “moral or prudential algebra” (Franklin 1772) (more on this letter below). Several recent studies show that the use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), for both public projects and public regulation of private activities, is now unfolding in countries on every habitable continent around the world (Livermore and Revesz 2013; Quah and Toh 2012; De Francesco 2012; Livermore 2011; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone 2011). This global diffusion of BCA is intermingled with the global diffusion of regulatory capitalism, in which privatized market actors are supervised by expert regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur 2005; Simmons et al. 2008), and with the international spread of ex ante regulatory precautions to anticipate and prevent risks despite uncertainty (Wiener et al. 2011)

A Survey of Interdependent Information Security Games

Risks faced by information system operators and users are not only determined by their own security posture, but are also heavily affected by the security-related decisions of others. This interdependence between information system operators and users is a fundamental property that shapes the efficiency of security defense solutions. Game theory is the most appropriate method to model the strategic interactions between these participants. In this survey, we summarize game-theoretic interdependence models, characterize the emerging security inefficiencies, and present mechanisms to improve the security decisions of the participants. We focus our attention on games with interdependent defenders and do not discuss two-player attackerdefender games. Our goal is to distill the main insights from the state-of-the-art and to identify the areas that need more attention from the research community

Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems

summary:This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched Stackelberg game framework is proposed to analyze the interdependent decision-making processes. A receding-horizon switched Stackelberg strategy for the controller is derived subsequently, which, together with the corresponding best response of the attacker, constitutes the switched Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system under the switched Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed if the switching signal exhibits a certain average dwell time. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in this paper

Airborne Directional Networking: Topology Control Protocol Design

This research identifies and evaluates the impact of several architectural design choices in relation to airborne networking in contested environments related to autonomous topology control. Using simulation, we evaluate topology reconfiguration effectiveness using classical performance metrics for different point-to-point communication architectures. Our attention is focused on the design choices which have the greatest impact on reliability, scalability, and performance. In this work, we discuss the impact of several practical considerations of airborne networking in contested environments related to autonomous topology control modeling. Using simulation, we derive multiple classical performance metrics to evaluate topology reconfiguration effectiveness for different point-to-point communication architecture attributes for the purpose of qualifying protocol design elements