How to Generate Security Cameras: Towards Defence Generation for Socio-Technical Systems

Recently security researchers have started to look into automated generation of attack trees from socio-technical system models. The obvious next step in this trend of automated risk analysis is automating the selection of security controls to treat the detected threats. However, the existing socio-technical models are too abstract to represent all security controls recommended by practitioners and standards. In this paper we propose an attack-defence model, consisting of a set of attack-defence bundles, to be generated and maintained with the socio-technical model. The attack-defence bundles can be used to synthesise attack-defence trees directly from the model to offer basic attack-defence analysis, but also they can be used to select and maintain the security controls that cannot be handled by the model itself.Comment: GraMSec 2015, 16 page

Guide to Australia’s national security capability

This paper provides a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes in a range of environments, including domestically, at the border, offshore and in cyberspace. Introduction The period since 2001 has been transformative for Australia’s national security and our national security challenges continue to evolve. To meet these challenges, we need new ways to coordinate and develop our capability and to shape the national security environment. Significant advances have been made in recent years to build greater collaboration and interoperability across the national security community. However, the increasing complexity of national security threats requires an even more consistent and connected approach to capability planning that complements existing individual agency arrangements. To that end, the Government has developed a security classified National Security Capability Plan to provide a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes. This Guide offers an overview of Australia’s national security capability planning. It identifies the functions performed by the national security community and how these achieve the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy (2013). Capability planning is one of the tools that support Government to better consider how capabilities can be directed to meet national security objectives. This ensures that capability investment is focussed and that Government can give appropriate consideration to redirecting existing capabilities to meet new or emerging risks and opportunities. It also highlights areas where agencies’ capabilities are interdependent, identifying focus areas for collaboration and interoperability. Having a better understanding of our capabilities will help us to make more informed decisions about what we need. Australia’s national security arrangements are underpinned by a number of agencies working across areas such as diplomacy, defence, development, border protection, law enforcement and intelligence. Australia’s national security agencies include: Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) Australian Federal Police (AFP) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO) Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Department of Defence (Defence) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) Office of National Assessments (ONA). The Capability Plan brings together, for the first time, a single view of the capabilities maintained by these agencies with the exception of Defence capabilities. Defence has a separate established capability planning process that includes the Defence White Paper (2013) and Defence Capability Plan (2012). Defence is a key contributor to Australia’s national security arrangements including leading the coordination and delivery of national security science and technology and works in close cooperation with other national security agencies. Defence capabilities will continue to be managed through existing mechanisms, principally the Defence Capability Plan. For the first time, the Capability Plan, and the accompanying Guide to Australia’s National Security Capability, presents a unified picture of the capabilities that exist across non-Defence national security agencies. Together with other strategic planning tools, this work informs the broader national security planning cycle and supports the objectives and implementation of overarching policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. The Capability Plan complements the Defence Capability Plan and does not seek to duplicate it. It should also be noted that the Guide has not been designed to signal specific initiatives or tender opportunities. Such processes will continue to be managed by individual agencies

UNDER WHOSE UMBRELLA? THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The tragic events which occurred during the ‘90s in the Balkans have reiterated the need for the European Union (EU) to assume a much more assertive role in managing security concerns in Europe, including the development of European defence capabilities. In 1998, at Saint Malo, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This project has been generated due to the EU’s need to adopt a strategic framework within which to develop a global defence and security component, as well as due to a growing necessity for the EU to contribute effectively to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) efforts of conducting defence, international crisis management and peacekeeping operations at an international level in conflict-prone areas. In recent years, ESDP has undergone a spectacular evolution, being now among the major issues discussed in Brussels. However, the creation of the ESDP has been greeted with caution by some NATO members being perceived primarily as a threat to the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose of this paper is to examine the difficulties the ESDP has encountered since its inception and also to what extent it has affected the EU-NATO and the EU-US nexus.European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European security architecture

Facing west, facing north: Canada and Australia in East Asia

This report, published by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), calls for Canada and Australia to deepen their regional security cooperation in East Asia. The risk of regional instability is growing, due to China’s re-emergence, continued speculation about US strategic engagement in Asia and increased competition over disputed maritime boundaries. These developments provide opportunities for collaboration between countries like Canada and Australia. Non-traditional security threats, including natural disasters, climate change, food security and cyber security, point to a range of areas where the two countries can work more closely together. The report contains several policy recommendations for Canada and Australia to: strengthen regional security bolster regional governance mechanisms enhance bilateral defence cooperation boost defence industry and economic cooperation

Changes in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Associate Professor Marie Söderberg, European Institute of Japanese Studies

At the moment, very substantial reforms in the field of security are being undertaken in Japan. “The New National Defence Program Guidelines for 2005 and After”, as well as the “Midterm Defence Program Fiscal Year 2005-2009” both talk about a thorough restructuring of the Self Defence Forces to make them able to respond effectively to new threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as provide a more proactive Japanese policy with various initiatives to improve the international security environment. There is a definite strengthening of the Japanese-US security relation, where Japan is being asked to and is willing to take a bigger role. The declaration by North Korea that they now possess nuclear weapons is considered an imminent threat to Japan. This, in connection with the abduction issue (see below) is played up in Japanese mass media and is being used by certain groups to create changes in Japan’s defence posture. These are changes that the Japanese consider necessary to counter the larger threat in the long term, the rise of China. This paper will start with a short historic overview of the Japanese defence posture since World War II and give a short presentation of the kinds of threats Japan feels it is facing since September 11, 2001, and in the future. Then we will continue with Japanese-North Korean relations, and Japanese-Chinese relations. The recent strengthening of the Japanese-US security cooperation, and its implications for Japanese defence posture, as well as regional cooperation, will be covered. We will conclude with what these changes imply for Europe, as well as the role Europe could play in securing peace and stability in Asia.Security policy; Foreign policy; Japan; Japan-North Korea; Japan-China; Japan-Europe

New conflicts across the Middle East mean that defence strategy making is more important than ever: history shows that we cannot afford to think of defence in solely monetary terms.

British defence and security policy has recently come under attack for lacking strategic vision. In a historical study of British strategy-making, Gwyn Prins pulls out key lessons for current defence strategists, finding that it is often best to leave the Treasury out of strategy-making.

Creating a Regional Security Community in Southern Latin America: The Institutionalisation of the Regional Defence and Security Policies

Interdependence, collective identities and common institutions are the preconditions for the evolution of a pluralistic security community. While the interaction of the states of Southern Latin America already meets the first two criteria, this article focuses on the third one, particularly the common institutions of the regional defence and security sector. The bilaterally organised defence cooperation has been attested democratic deficiencies because military actors are over-proportionally represented in these committees. Military nationalism and an exaggerated notion of national sovereignty in the military academies of the region can be regarded as cooperation hampering qualifiers. Non-military threats (organised crime, transnational terrorism) have centripetal effects on the subregional cooperation, which is structured multilaterally and shows a relatively high degree of institutionalisation.security community, regional cooperation, defence and security policies, Latin America, Mercosur, Argentina, Brazil, Chile

Agenda for change: strategic choices for the next government

The next government has a primary requirement to be well briefed on the challenges inherent in Australia’s strategic circumstances and the policy options available to it. ASPI is publishing this report to layout our strategic choices and to provide recommendations. Contributors are Peter Jennings on strategic policy, Mark Thomson and Andrew Davies on defence, Anthony Bergin and Kristy Bryden on homeland security, Russell Trood on foreign policy and Ryan Stokes on economic security. This body of ideas makes a compelling contribution to the discussions which ought always to characterise the Australian strategic and defence debate

Security and defence of mobile systems under impact

The Group “Dynamics and Fracture of Structural Elements” offers its experience in Solid Mechanics analysis for the study of the impact protection of vehicles, aircrafts and persons. The Group activities have a strong research component, in which numerical simulation tools as well as sophisticated experimental techniques are employed. This technological offer could be of interest to automobile companies (impact and collision security), aeronautical companies (impact of external body on fuselage, attack, and fragments o ice) and defence companies (special armours for mobile systems and persons).Contrato Programa de Comercialización e Internacionalización. Sistema Regional de Investigación Científica e Innovación Tecnológica. (Comunidad de Madrid; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy

Australia’s new government must make tough decisions in defence policy. Australia’s broad national interests and the challenging strategic environment in Indo-Pacific Asia make it essential to modernise the Australian Defence Force. The nation’s defence capabilities remain underfunded and its strategic edge in the region is eroding. The gap between the nation’s interests and capabilities is widening, and it is getting harder to meet the demands of the US alliance. Australia’s new government needs to restore focus and funding to defence.Key findings: The Australian government will need a first-principles review to identify the military strategy and force structure required to protect and advance the nation’s interests. The Australian government must increase defence funding in order to modernise the Australian Defence Force\u27s capabilities. Otherwise it will need to make drastic cuts to planned defence capability. The government must also think deeply about the role of the US alliance in Australia\u27s security, and take the initiative in shaping that alliance in Australia’s interests