London, Libel Capital No Longer? The Draft Defamation Act 2011 and the Future of Libel Tourism

[Excerpt] “In the past decade, London emerged as the forum of choice for “libel tourists”—strategic, often foreign, plaintiffs who bring defamation actions in a jurisdiction with plaintiff-friendly libel laws, even if they and the defamatory material at issue lack a substantial connection with that jurisdiction. England’s defamation laws and procedures make it significantly easier for claimants to commence and prevail in libel actions than do the laws and procedures of many other countries, particularly the United States. As a result, English courts have entertained several high-profile defamation cases involving foreign parties who have only tenuous connections to England, such as disputes between a Saudi billionaire and a U.S. journalist; a Russian businessman and a U.S. magazine; and a French director and a U.S. publisher. Cases like these have cemented London’s reputation as the “libel capital of the world.” The establishment of that notorious title, reflecting the notion that England does not value free expression as highly as other countries, has helped ignite a movement to reform English libel laws and procedures. On March 15, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice unveiled a draft bill entitled the Draft Defamation Act 2011, proposing a substantial overhaul of English libel laws as well as the procedures applied in libel actions. The Draft Act aims to combat the perception that England is a refuge for libel tourism by, among other reforms, requiring English courts to determine whether England is the most appropriate forum in which the action should be heard before exercising jurisdiction. The Draft Defamation Act comes less than one year after the enactment of the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”) Act of 2010 in the United States. The SPEECH Act prohibits U.S. courts, both state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing defamation judgments rendered by a foreign court unless that court applied a standard that was as protective of free speech as a U.S. court would have applied. In the context of libel tourism, this means that a libel tourist cannot force a U.S. author or publisher to comply with a foreign judgment unless a U.S. court finds that the judgment comported with First Amendment principles. This Note analyzes the efficacy of the Draft Defamation Act and its impact on the enforcement of English defamation judgments in U.S. courts. Specifically, it proposes that the Draft Act’s procedural clauses will effectively reduce the prevalence of libel tourism in England. Moreover, this Note argues that, in light of the Draft Act’s reforms as well as longstanding principles of international comity, U.S. courts should not narrowly construe the SPEECH Act to require exact congruence between U.S. and English defamation laws. Finally, this Note presents evidence suggesting that England’s problem of libel tourism could be supplanted by the new phenomenon of privacy tourism. Thus, in addition to modifying and enacting the Draft Defamation Act, English policymakers should consider reviewing and possibly reforming English privacy laws. This Note proceeds in four sections. Section II provides a background to issues related to libel tourism, including its prevalence in England and the U.S. response to it. Section III reviews the Draft Defamation Act’s procedural clauses related to libel tourism. Section IV analyzes the Draft Act’s potential to eradicate libel tourism and its effect on U.S. courts’ construction and application of the SPEECH Act. Section IV also proposes modifications to the Draft Act, including the adoption of a defamation-specific choice-of-law rule. Finally, Section V explores the interplay between English defamation and privacy laws, considering whether the Draft Act’s aim to eliminate libel tourism inadvertently opens the door to the development of privacy tourism

The NLRA Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or Diamond in the Rough

[Excerpt] This Article explores an underappreciated and promising NLRA protection of collective activity. It elaborates the NLRA’s role as a defense in state defamation cases. Specifically, this Article explains how the “NLRA defamation defense” frees defendants from some forms of defamation liability when the allegedly defamatory statements are made during labor disputes. The defense has no effect on defamation liability in what this Article refers to as “more egregious” state defamation law cases. However, the defense forecloses liability in “less egregious” state defamation law cases. It makes it harder for defamation plaintiffs to win their cases because it requires them to satisfy a heightened standard of proof. In this way, the NLRA defamation defense limits the ability of defamation lawsuits to serve as “a powerful weapon for shutting up those with whom [one] disagree[s]” in the labor context. In other words, it reduces the likelihood that state defamation law will chill the free flow of speech and collective activity with the threat of monetary awards, sometimes in the millions of dollars. While all parties to labor disputes who face defamation claims can take advantage of the NLRA defamation defense, this Article focuses on the use of the defense by employees and both traditional and non-traditional worker organizations to highlight an important aspect of the NLRA’s protection of collective activity

Defamation and Political Comment in Post-Soviet Russia

The law of defamation in Russia has a long history. Its roots are in the European tradition, but the discontinuity of its historical development has meant that there have been particular difficulties in reconfiguring the law for the new human rights era following Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998. Defamation law must now be been tested against the fundamental standards enshrined in the ECHR, to ensure that appropriate levels of protection are provided not only for reputation but, also, for freedom of expression. It has been left largely to the judiciary and judge-made law to manage this difficult transition. This article analyses the elements that make up the law of defamation in Russia and assesses the challenges that remain in adapting it to the twenty-first century.</jats:p

Can President Trump \u27Open Up\u27 the Libel Laws?

[Excerpt] Libel and slander are branches of the law of defamation. Defamation law authorizes remedies for reputational harm caused by some false statements of fact. A libel is a defamatory statement that is printed or written; a slander is a defamatory statement that is spoken. During the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump suggested that, if elected, he would open up our libel laws to facilitate lawsuits by public officials against news organizations

Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual’s reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunicative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If, however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander

Conviction of journalist for reporting about sex abuses in a Christian rehabilitation centre violated Article 10 ECHR

Analysis on judgment ECtHR on defamation and freedom of expression, conflicting right

Everyone’s a Critic: Defamation and Anonymity on the Internet

Internet publishing is easy and has become commonplace in ourtechnology-focused society. Although this type of publication can beexciting and helpful for those interested in communicating an idea, theissue of anonymous speech on the Internet has created some complications in the rather established tort of defamation. This article will discuss two approaches recently taken by two different courts in response to the Internet-anonymity issue and will evaluate them based on their ability to strike a balance between protecting free speech and protecting against defamation

European Court of Human Rights: Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Moldova

In a case against Moldova, the European Court has decided that a blanket immunity in defamation proceedings in order to guarantee the free speech rights of a president is to be considered as breaching the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has been called to examine many cases concerning limitation of the right of access to a court in defamation cases by operation of parliamentary immunity (see e.g. Iris 2003-3/2, Iris 2003-7/2 and Iris 2013-10/1), but this was the first occasion on which the Court had to address the immunity from a civil libel suit from which a president or a head of State benefits