Reducing Validity in Epistemic ATL to Validity in Epistemic CTL

We propose a validity preserving translation from a subset of epistemic Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) to epistemic Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The considered subset of epistemic ATL is known to have the finite model property and decidable model-checking. This entails the decidability of validity but the implied algorithm is unfeasible. Reducing the validity problem to that in a corresponding system of CTL makes the techniques for automated deduction for that logic available for the handling of the apparently more complex system of ATL.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007

Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)

We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1; extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842, arXiv:1208.591

Interval-based Synthesis

We introduce the synthesis problem for Halpern and Shoham's modal logic of intervals extended with an equivalence relation over time points, abbreviated HSeq. In analogy to the case of monadic second-order logic of one successor, the considered synthesis problem receives as input an HSeq formula phi and a finite set Sigma of propositional variables and temporal requests, and it establishes whether or not, for all possible evaluations of elements in Sigma in every interval structure, there exists an evaluation of the remaining propositional variables and temporal requests such that the resulting structure is a model for phi. We focus our attention on decidability of the synthesis problem for some meaningful fragments of HSeq, whose modalities are drawn from the set A (meets), Abar (met by), B (begins), Bbar (begun by), interpreted over finite linear orders and natural numbers. We prove that the fragment ABBbareq is decidable (non-primitive recursive hard), while the fragment AAbarBBbar turns out to be undecidable. In addition, we show that even the synthesis problem for ABBbar becomes undecidable if we replace finite linear orders by natural numbers.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2014, arXiv:1408.556