Conferring resistance to digital disinformation: the innoculating influence of procedural news knowledge

Despite the pervasiveness of digital disinformation in society, little is known about the individual characteristics that make some users more susceptible to erroneous information uptake than others, effectively dividing the media audience into prone and resistant groups. This study identifies and tests procedural news knowledge as a consequential civic resource with the capacity to inoculate audiences from disinformation and close this “resistance gap.” Engaging the persuasion knowledge model, the study utilizes data from two national surveys to demonstrate that possessing working knowledge of how the news media operate aids in the identification and effects of fabricated news and native advertising.Accepted manuscrip

Semi-Annual Report to Congress for the Period of April 1, 2009 to September 30, 2009

[Excerpt] I am pleased to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress, which highlights the most significant activities and accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General (DOL-OIG), for the six-month period ending September 30, 2009. During this reporting period, our investigative work led to 214 indictments, 221 convictions, and $123.1 million in monetary accomplishments. In addition, we issued 22 audit and other reports. OIG audits and investigations continue to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and integrity of DOL’s programs and operations. We also continue to investigate labor racketeering and/or organized crime influence against unions, employee benefit plans, and workers. From an audit perspective, the OIG is highly engaged in ensuring the integrity of DOL activities related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funding. During this reporting period, we issued five reports to that end. Among our findings are that DOL implemented procedures for the accounting of Recovery Act financial activity, acted quickly to implement the premium-assistance provisions for workers who temporarily maintain their health insurance at group rates after losing their jobs, and effectively implemented the temporary program for additional unemployment compensation for eligible recipients. We also identified areas for improvement related to financial and performance reporting and programmatic coordination with states. An audit found shortcomings with DOL’s new iCert system, which is designed to identify inaccuracies in H-1B labor condition applications (LCAs) for foreign workers. We found that, because of missing electronic checks, manual reviews of the LCAs by analysts are necessary. However, increases in the volume of applications may result in analysts not being able to perform a 100 percent review. This increases the risk of LCAs being improperly certified. Our audits also continue to reveal that some Job Corps centers do not comply with requirements for reporting performance for student attendance and accountability. We also found that, at three centers, a contractor had not ensured compliance with procedures to address student misconduct. An audit of the handling of injured Federal employees’ reemployment status at two Federal workers’ compensation district offices found that the Department did not ensure that consistent intervention actions were taken toward removing cases from the periodic roll. This increased the risk of claimants continuing to receive full Federal Employee’s Compensation Act benefits after they were able to return to work or after their compensation could have been reduced. Our investigations continue to combat organized crime and/or labor racketeering involving the monies in union- sponsored benefit plans, internal union corruption, and labor-management relations. A major OIG investigation disclosed more than 30 years of organized crime control of the International Longshoremen’s Association Local 1235, which represents port workers in New Jersey. In another investigation, the business manager for the Electrical Workers Local Union No. 3, who was a former New York State assemblyman, was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on racketeering, bank fraud, and false statement charges involving a number of schemes carried out for personal gain. OIG investigations also identified vulnerabilities and fraud in DOL programs, such as the foreign labor certification (FLC) program. One OIG investigation led to the recent sentencing of Viktar Krus and his co-conspirators to various periods of incarceration for fraudulently obtaining visas for more than 3,800 foreign nationals and defrauding the government of$7.4 million in payroll taxes. Because of our investigative expertise, the OIG is a member of the International Organized Crime (IOC) strategy headed by the U.S. Attorney General. The IOC is committed to combating crime by international organized groups. Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to former DOL Inspector General Gordon S. Heddell, who is now serving as the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Defense. During his leadership of more than eight years, the DOL-OIG consistently achieved significant results similar to those presented in this report. As Acting Inspector General, I look forward to continuing to work with the Secretary of Labor and her management team in ensuring the effectiveness of DOL in delivering services and protecting the rights and benefits of American workers and retirees

The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated Trafficking

In this report, researchers at the USC Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership & Policy (CCLP) reveal how those involved in human trafficking have been quick to adapt to the 21st-century global landscape. While the rapid diffusion of digital technologies such as mobile phones, social networking sites, and the Internet has provided significant benefits to society, new channels and opportunities for exploitation have also emerged. Increasingly, the business of human trafficking is taking place online and over mobile phones. But the same technologies that are being used for trafficking can become a powerful tool to combat trafficking. The precise role that digital technologies play in human trafficking still remains unclear, however, and a closer examination of the phenomenon is vital to identify and respond to new threats and opportunities.This investigation indicates that mobile devices and networks have risen in prominence and are now of central importance to the sex trafficking of minors in the United States. While online platforms such as online classifieds and social networking sites remain a potential venue for exploitation, this research suggests that technology facilitated trafficking is more diffuse and adaptive than initially thought. This report presents a review of current literature, trends, and policies; primary research based on mobile phone data collected from online classified sites; a series of firsthand interviews with law enforcement; and key recommendations to policymakers and stakeholders moving forward

The Perilous Dialogue

The master metaphor in the national security dialogue is, indeed, “security or freedom”. It dominates the counterterrorist discourse both in the United States and abroad. Transcripts from debates in Ireland’s Dáil Éireann, Turkey’s Büyük Millet Meclisi, and Australia’s Parliament are filled with reference to the need to weigh the value of liberty against the threat posed by terrorism. Perhaps nowhere is this more pronounced than in the United Kingdom, where, for decades, counterterrorist debates have turned on this framing. Owing in part, though, to different constitutional structures, what “security or freedom” means in America differs from what it means in Britain. In the United States, we tend to treat “security” and “freedom” as distinct phenomena: policy considerations set against pre-existing, political rights. Security becomes linked to decisions taken by the executive to preserve life—e.g., heightening protection against terrorist attacks by restricting entitlements specified in the Bill of Rights. Thus, Judge Richard Posner argues that in dangerous times, we must adjust constitutional rights to meet the demands of security. Professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner propose “a basic tradeoff between security and liberty.” As Professor Holmes points out, the tradeoff framework is not limited to those who come down more heavily on the security side of the equation; civil libertarians also refer to the framework, arguing for the protection of rights in the face of security demands. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, scholars and policy makers tend to consider security versus freedom as a case of competing rights: the right to life or the right to freedom from fear set against the right to move freely. As Prime Minister Tony Blair announced on 9/11, the exercise of state power would be necessary to protect “the basic civil liberty that people have to go about their business free form [sic] terror.” This framing—competing rights in tension—reflects Britain’s constitutional structure. Measures introduced by Parliament do not have to conform to a written constitution. While some documents, such as the 1215 Magna Carta, or the 1689 Bill of Rights, carry special significance, they are part of a broader system that encompasses legal and non-legal rules. The multiplicity and fluidity of rights, and the constant effort to balance them, reflect Britain’s relationship with Europe, where the European Convention on Human Rights (incorporated into British domestic law through the 1998 Human Rights Act) and European Communities law weave together to create a complex system of rights and rules protecting them. Despite the manner in which the United States and United Kingdom interpret “security or freedom,” reflective of their respective constitutional differences, in both countries the dichotomy between rights and security dominates the counterterrorist discourse. And in both regions, because the dichotomy ignores in its narrow terms of reference the far-reaching effects of counterterrorism, it stifles the debate. The “hydraulic” assumption inherent in the “security or freedom” framework overlooks the possibility that rules—indeed, the rule of law itself—provide security. There are multiple types of securities and liberties at stake. And the framework distorts the “real tradeoffs” that are being made, such as the risks inevitably entailed in the allocation of limited resources. Most importantly, “security or freedom” fails to capture the single most important characteristic of counterterrorist law: increased executive power that shifts the balance of power between the branches of government. This article suggests that at each point where the legislature would be expected to push back against the executive’s power—at the introduction of measures, at the renewal of temporary provisions, and in the exercise of oversight—its ability to do so is limited. The judiciary’s role is similarly restricted: constitutional structure and cultural norms narrow the courts’ ability to check the executive at anything but the margins. With the long-term political and economic effects of this expanded executive strength masked by the immediacy of the “security or freedom” dichotomy, the true costs of anti-terror legislation in the United States and in the United Kingdom have gone uncalculated. Over the past four decades, both countries have seen the relationship between governmental branches altered, individual rights narrowed, and the relationship of the citizens to the state changed. Counterterrorist law has alienated important domestic and international communities, created bureaucratic inefficiencies, and interrupted commercial activity. As these two countries set global counterterrorist norms through important multilateral and bilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (“UN”), the UN Security Council, the G7/G8, and the Financial Action Task Force, the risk increases that these detrimental effects will be transferred to other constitutional democracies. American and British provisions, moreover, have evolved outside the specter of terrorist groups actually using weapons of mass destruction to inflict mass casualties. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and I would add biological weapons to Professor Holmes’s concern about fissile material—together with a growing willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, may drive the two countries to take increasingly severe measures. Such provisions could lead to a shift in the basic constitutional structure of both countries

No Security Through Obscurity: Changing Circumvention Law to Protect our Democracy Against Cyberattacks

Cybersecurity is increasingly vital in a climate of unprecedented digital assaults against liberal democracy. Russian hackers have launched destabilizing cyberattacks targeting the United States’ energy grid, voting machines, and political campaigns. America\u27s existing inadequate cyber defenses operate according to a simple assumption: hide the computer code that powers critical infrastructure so that America\u27s enemies cannot exploit undiscovered weaknesses. Indeed, the intellectual property regime relies entirely on this belief, protecting those who own the rights in computer code by punishing those who might access and copy that code. This “security through obscurity” approach has failed. Rightsholders, on their own, cannot develop effective countermeasures to hacking because there are simply too many possibilities to preempt. The most promising solution, therefore, is to open the project of cybersecurity to as many talented and ethical minds as possible. Openness, not civil remedies and secrecy, is a greater means of ensuring safety. This Article proposes that we adopt a “defense in depth” approach to security that will increase transparency by modifying anticircumvention laws and by facilitating communication between the security community and product vendors