2 research outputs found
Cryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang's Password Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards
In 2005, Yang, Wang, and Chang proposed an improved timestamp-based password
authentication scheme in an attempt to overcome the flaws of Yang-Shieh_s
legendary timestamp-based remote authentication scheme using smart cards. After
analyzing the improved scheme proposed by Yang-Wang-Chang, we have found that
their scheme is still insecure and vulnerable to four types of forgery attacks.
Hence, in this paper, we prove that, their claim that their scheme is
intractable is incorrect. Also, we show that even an attack based on Sun et
al._s attack could be launched against their scheme which they claimed to
resolve with their proposal.Comment: 3 Page
A review and cryptanalysis of similar timestamp-based password authentication schemes using smart cards
The intent of this paper is to review some timestampbased password authentication schemes using smart cards which have similar working principles. Many of the proposed timestampbased password authentication schemes were subsequently found to be insecure. Here, we investigate three schemes with similar working principles, show that they are vulnerable to tricky forgery attacks, and thus they fail to ensure the level of security that is needed for remote login procedure using smart cards. Though there are numerous works available in this field, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time we have found some critical flaws in these schemes that were not detected previously. Along with the proofs of their flaws and inefficiencies, we note down our solution which could surmount all sorts of known attacks and thus reduces the probability of intelligent forgery attacks. We provide a detailed literature review how the schemes have been developed and modified throughout years. We prove that some of the schemes which so far have been thought to be intractable are still flawed, in spite of their later improvements