Flight-to-Quality or Flight-to-Liquidity? Evidence From the Euro-Area Bond Market

Do bond investors demand credit quality or liquidity? The answer is both, but at different times and for different reasons. Using data on the Euro-area government bond market, which features a unique negative correlation between credit quality and liquidity across countries, we show that the bulk of sovereign yield spreads is explained by differences in credit quality, though liquidity plays a non-trivial role especially for low credit risk countries and during times of heightened market uncertainty. In contrast, the destination of large flows into the bond market is determined almost exclusively by liquidity. We conclude that credit quality matters for bond valuation but that, in times of market stress, investors chase liquidity, not credit quality.

On the Pricing of Performance Sensitive Debt

Performance sensitive debt (PSD) contracts link a loan's interest rate to a measure of the borrower's credit relevant performance, e.g., if the borrower becomes less credit worthy, the interest rate increases according to a predetermined schedule. We derive and empirically test a pricing model for PSD contracts and find that interest increasing contracts are priced reflecting a substantial risk of shocks to borrower credit quality. Borrowers using such contracts are of an overall higher credit quality compared to borrowers using interest decreasing contracts. These contracts are priced as if no risk of shocks to borrower credit quality is present.Performance sensitive debt; cash flow ratios; credit ratings

Incentives to Issue Low-Quality Securitized Products in the OTD Business Model

We consider an economy in which a lender finances loans to borrowers by issuing a securitized product to investors and in which the credit quality of the product can depend on whether the lender screens borrowers. In the presence of asymmetric information between the lender and investors regarding the credit quality of potential borrowers, overvaluation from the lender's perspective can occur for low-quality securitized products, which inefficiently induces the lender not to screen borrowers and hence to issue the securitized products of low credit quality. This is likely to occur when the probability of being in a bad state (i.e., the presence of low-quality borrowers) is low, or when the seeds of recession begin emerging in a booming economy.Originate-to-distribute, Securitization, Asymmetric information, Screening, Verification

Drive ‘Til You Qualify: Credit Quality and Household Location

A deeper understanding of the credit-sorting process is essential when considering the extent to which home foreclosures are driven by price contagion or an underlying spatial pattern of mortgage quality. Adapting household location theory, we find that credit constrained households follow “drive-\u27til-you-qualify” behavior leading to rising credit quality with distance from the CBD while unconstrained households exhibit declining credit quality. Individual level mortgage loan-to-income data for the 100 largest MSAs show credit constrained behavior either throughout the urban area or concentrated in the suburbs. Meta analysis of the credit sorting estimates identify MSA characteristics associated with each pattern

On the term structure of default premia in the Swap and Libor markets

Existing theories of the term structure of swap rates provide an analysis of the Treasury-swap spread based on either a liquidity convenience yield in the Treasury market, or default risk in the swap market. While these models do not focus on the relation between corporate yields and swap rates (the LIBOR-Swap spread), they imply that the term structure of corporate yields and swap rates should be identical. As documented previously (e.g. in Sun, Sundares and Wang (1993)) this is counter-factual. Here, we propose a simple model of the (complex) default risk imbedded in the swap term structure that is able to explain the LIBOR-swap spread. Whereas corporate bonds carry default risk, we argue that swaps should bear less default risk. In fact, we assume that swap contracts are free of default risk. Because swaps are indexed on "refreshed"-credit-quality LIBOR rates, the spread between corporate yields and swap rates should capture the market's expectations of the probability of deterioration in credit quality of a corporate bond issuer. We model this feature and use our model to estimate the likelihood of future deterioration in credit quality from the LIBOR-swap spread. The analysis is important because it shows that the term structure of swap rates does not reflect the borrowing cost of a standard LIBOR credit quality issuer. It also has implications for modeling the dynamics of the swap term structure.Credit risk; asset pricing; international finance

An Alternative Methodology for Estimating Credit Quality Transition Matrices

This study presents an alternative way of estimating credit transition matrices using a hazard function model. The model is useful both for testing the validity of the Markovian assumption, frequently made in credit rating applications, and also for estimating transition matrices conditioning on firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates that influence the migration process. The model presented in the paper is likely to be useful in other applications, though we would hesitate to extrapolate numerical values of coefficients outside of our application. Transition matrices estimated this way may be an important tool for a credit risk administration system, in the sense that with them a practitioner can easily forecast the behavior of the clients´ratings in the future and their possible changes of stateFirms; macroeconomic variables; firm-specific covariates; hazard function; transition intensities. Classification JEL: C4; E44; G21; G23; G38.

Securitization and credit quality

Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than other financial intermediaries. As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than otherwise similar non-securitized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on loans’ relative credit quality employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that, at issuance, banks do not seem to select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. Following securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group. We find tentative evidence suggesting that poorer performance by securitized loans might be linked to banks’ reduced monitoring incentives. From our findings it follows that current iniciatives on risk retention by the originator, and more detailed loan-by-loan information on loan credit quality would be useful to reap out the benefits of securitization

The Corporate Choice between Public Debt, Bank Loans, Traditional Private Debt Placements, and 144A Debt Issues

The main purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the corporate choice between different forms of debt financing. By analyzing the most comprehensive sample of U.S. corporate debt issues to date, I find that firms that issue 144A debt have significantly lower credit quality and higher information asymmetry than firms that issue traditional non-bank private debt. Further, the study shows that traditional private placements, rather than bank loans, are the favorite private debt source for firms with good credit quality. I also show that the firm characteristics of traditional private debt issuers have significantly changed after 1990 through to 2003. My results suggest the following pecking order of debt choices which is conditional on credit quality. High credit quality firms prefer public bond offerings and small firms, with good credit quality, are more likely to issue traditional private debt. A large group of firms characterized by moderate credit quality make extensive use of bank loans and poor credit quality firms preferentially issue 144A debt

Restructuring Risk in Credit Default Swaps: An Empirical Analysis

This paper estimates the price for restructuring risk in the U.S. corporate bond market during 1999-2005. Comparing quotes from default swap (CDS) contracts with a restructuring event and without, we find that the average premium for restructuring risk represents 6% to 8% of the swap rate without restructuring. We show that the restructuring premium depends on firm-specific balance-sheet and macroeconomic variables. And, when default swap rates without a restructuring event increase, the increase in restructuring premia is higher for low-credit-quality firms than for high-credit-quality firms. We propose a reduced-form arbitrage-free model for pricing default swaps that explicitly incorporates the distinction between restructuring and default events. A case study illustrating the model's implementation is provided.