The market potential for privately financed long term care products in the UK

This paper considers the market potential for privately financed long term care products in the UK. It finds that since the present market is undeveloped there is scope to increase the range of products available to suit people with different means and circumstances. Currently the UK spends about £19 billion on long term care (LTC) of which around a third is privately funded and two thirds publicly funded. The cost of informal care for older people is estimated to be worth £58 billion a year making a total of £77 billion. The paper finds that very few people can afford to pay for LTC out of their own pockets from income alone, but that this number is increased if savings are taken into account and significantly increased if housing wealth is included as well. Insurance for LTC is normally considered to be part of the product mix usually associated with the private funding of LTC. However, as the US market demonstrates, LTC insurance products can be complex and difficult to understand and yet still not meet all needs, whilst US research suggests that policies are also over priced and unaffordable for many. In this paper the case is made for other kinds of products which produce an income at the point of need and therefore make a contribution towards LTC costs. These products include equity release, ‘top up insurance’, disability linked annuities, and immediate needs annuities. Although they may not cover all possible risks, and therefore all needs, they would bring much needed new money into LTC as well as lead to an increase in personal responsibility. With large numbers of older people on very low incomes not everybody would be able to afford these products and so the concept of LTC bonds is considered. These would work like premium bonds and pay prizes but would only be cashable at the point of need. Taken together all of the products considered would extend choice and there would be something to meet most circumstances. The government’s role would be five fold: (1) to facilitate the introduction of the LTC products and provide regulation; (2) to provide appropriate incentives for people to take them up; (3) to clarify the role of the state in terms of the minimum entitlement people can expect; (4) to make it easier to get advice and direction at points of initial contact, for example with social and health care services; and (5) to cover risks that the market cannot handle

What Turkey expects from logistics outsourcing ?

Copyright @ 2011 Yasar UniversityThe economies of the world have become increasingly interdependent, and organizations have come under tremendous pressure to maximize productivity and profitability. Creating value through outsourcing has emerged as a popular competitive strategy for firms of all sizes in all types of industries. The aim of this research is to investigate the use of third party logistics in Turkish companies from the users’ perspective to identify the types of logistics services outsourced, problems encountered in outsourcing these services, logistics costs, decision makers in outsourcing logistics activities, and information sources used in the decision-making process. A structured survey was selected as the tool for data collection. The field study involved face-to-face interviews with 204 companies out of top 500 companies ranked in terms of turnover that are registered with industrial associations and chambers of commerce in Turkey. Moreover, a decision support system based on Bayesian Causal Map is proposed for 3PLs in order to assist them in their service proposals for different sectors. This study is a first attempt to reveal and compare the outsourcing perception of the companies in different sectors, to expose the firms’ underlying motives as well as the respective importance of these motives for outsourcing logistics activities in Turkey. The use of Bayesian Causal Map based on the survey results provides an important guide to the 3PL providers to pick a suitable strategy and to prioritize their operational activities in different sectors in such a way to achieve a competitive advantage

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

QoE Modelling, Measurement and Prediction: A Review

In mobile computing systems, users can access network services anywhere and anytime using mobile devices such as tablets and smart phones. These devices connect to the Internet via network or telecommunications operators. Users usually have some expectations about the services provided to them by different operators. Users' expectations along with additional factors such as cognitive and behavioural states, cost, and network quality of service (QoS) may determine their quality of experience (QoE). If users are not satisfied with their QoE, they may switch to different providers or may stop using a particular application or service. Thus, QoE measurement and prediction techniques may benefit users in availing personalized services from service providers. On the other hand, it can help service providers to achieve lower user-operator switchover. This paper presents a review of the state-the-art research in the area of QoE modelling, measurement and prediction. In particular, we investigate and discuss the strengths and shortcomings of existing techniques. Finally, we present future research directions for developing novel QoE measurement and prediction technique

Sharing of Unlicensed Spectrum by Strategic Operators

Facing the challenge of meeting ever-increasing demand for wireless data, the industry is striving to exploit large swaths of spectrum which anyone can use for free without having to obtain a license. Major standards bodies are currently considering a proposal to retool and deploy Long Term Evolution (LTE) technologies in unlicensed bands below 6 GHz. This paper studies the fundamental questions of whether and how the unlicensed spectrum can be shared by intrinsically strategic operators without suffering from the tragedy of the commons. A class of general utility functions is considered. The spectrum sharing problem is formulated as a repeated game over a sequence of time slots. It is first shown that a simple static sharing scheme allows a given set of operators to reach a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for mutually beneficial sharing. The question of how many operators will choose to enter the market is also addressed by studying an entry game. A sharing scheme which allows dynamic spectrum borrowing and lending between operators is then proposed to address time-varying traffic and proved to achieve perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Numerical results show that the proposed dynamic sharing scheme outperforms static sharing, which in turn achieves much higher revenue than uncoordinated full-spectrum sharing. Implications of the results to the standardization and deployment of LTE in unlicensed bands (LTE-U) are also discussed.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Special Issue on Game Theory for Network