Managed Competition in U.S. Telecommunications

The 1996 Telecommunications Act represents a major turn in U.S. policy towards 'deregulation.' Instead of tying price deregulation to the opening of entry in a market that has been regulated for decades, the Act creates a maze of new regulatory responsibilities for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the states. Incumbent local telephone companies, who were being freed from cost-based regulation prior to 1996, are now subject to detailed regulation of their wholesale services. Specifically, they must 'unbundle' their network facilities into a large number of components and lease these components or 'elements' to entrants at cost. Moreover, the Bell companies are not permitted to compete with long distance companies until they satisfy regulators that they have complied with a large number of interconnection requirements. This complex new regulatory regime has been the source of three years of regulatory battles and legal challenges and has needlessly delayed facilities-based entry into telecommunications. It would be far better if the FCC and the states were to pursue a strategy of full deregulation. The regulators should announce a date sufficiently far in the future at which all rate and entry regulation will cease, much as the Congress did for airlines in 1978. This would place potential competitors and customers on notice that fully flexible rates will be in place on this date and that new opportunities could be available for both. It also would reduce the value of rent seeking before the regulatory commissions and the never-ending cycle of rulemakings and court appeals.

The relationship between regulation and competition policy for network utilities

Should regulation of potentially competitive elements of network utilities be left with sector regulators or solely subject to normal competition laws? Britain evolved licenses for network activities overseen by regulators while the EU places more emphasis on making sector regulation consistent with competition law. The paper discusses the appropriateness of the competition law approach for telecoms and electricity. Post-modern utilities like telecoms, in which facilities-based competition is possible, lend themselves to the approach laid out in the Communications Directives, and its application to mobile call termination is discussed. Electricity, where collective dominance is more likely, does not fit comfortably into this approach. Instead, licence conditions retain advantages where it may be necessary to modify market rules in a timely and well-informed manner, as exemplified by the English Electricity Pool

Hit and Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal in the Supreme Court Decision in Trinko

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm at “cost plus a reasonable profit” prices which could combine them at will, add retailing services and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant in local telecommunications, leased parts of Verizon’s network. Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The Supreme Court held that Trinko’s complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that Verizon had two monopolies in local telecommunications: a monopoly of the local telecommunications network, as well as a monopoly in retail local telecommunications services. The 1996 Act allowed for competition in retail services and also imposed cost-based pricing on leases of Verizon’s network. Verizon, unable to increase the lease price on its network, reverted to raising-rivals-costs strategies against its retail competitors. Thus, Verizon used its monopoly of the network infrastructure to disadvantage entrants in retail. In doing so, Verizon lost short term profits that it would have earned from leasing its network to entrants, since the 1996 Act had set the lease price at cost plus “reasonable profit.” Thus, Verizon is liable if the “sacrifice principle” is applied. According to the sacrifice principle, a defendant is liable if its conduct “involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power.”Vertical Leverage, Refusal to Deal, Monopoly, Sacrifice Principle, Trinko

Privatising Network Industries

privatization, regulation, competition, telecoms, electricity, gas, water, rail

Human Resource and Employment Practices in Telecommunications Services, 1980-1998

[Excerpt] In the academic literature on manufacturing, much research and debate have focused on whether firms are adopting some form of “high-performance” or “high-involvement” work organization based on such practices as employee participation, teams, and increased discretion, skills, and training for frontline workers (Ichniowski et al., 1996; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995). Whereas many firms in the telecommunications industry flirted with these ideas in the 1980s, they did not prove to be a lasting source of inspiration for the redesign of work and employment practices. Rather, work restructuring in telecommunications services has been driven by the ability of firms to leverage network and information technologies to reduce labor costs and create customer segmentation strategies. “Good jobs” versus “bad jobs,” or higher versus lower wage jobs, do not vary according to whether firms adopt a high- involvement model. They vary along two other dimensions: (1) within firms and occupations, by the value-added of the customer segment that an employee group serves; and (2) across firms, by union and nonunion status. We believe that this customer segmentation strategy is becoming a more general model for employment practices in large-scale service | operations; telecommunications services firms may be somewhat more | advanced than other service firms in adopting this strategy because of certain unique industry characteristics. The scale economies of network technology are such that once a company builds the network infrastructure to a customer’s specifications, the cost of additional services is essentially zero. As a result, and notwithstanding technological uncertainty, all of the industry’s major players are attempting to take advantage of system economies inherent in the nature of the product market and technology to provide customized packages of multimedia products to identified market segments. They have organized into market-driven business units providing differentiated services to large businesses and institutions, small businesses, and residential customers. They have used information technologies and process reengineering to customize specific services to different segments according to customer needs and ability to pay. Variation in work and employment practices, or labor market segmentation, follows product market segmentation. As a result, much of the variation in employment practices in this industry is within firms and within occupations according to market segment rather than across firms. In addition, despite market deregulation beginning in 1984 and opportunities for new entrants, a tightly led oligopoly structure is replacing the regulated Bell System monopoly. Former Bell System companies, the giants of the regulated period, continue to dominate market share in the post-1984 period. Older players and new entrants alike are merging and consolidating in order to have access to multimedia markets. What is striking in this industry, therefore, is the relative lack of variation in management and employment practices across firms after more than a decade of experience with deregulation. We attribute this lack of variation to three major sources. (1) Technological advances and network economics provide incentives for mergers, organizational consolidation, and, as indicated above, similar business strategies. (2) The former Bell System companies have deep institutional ties, and they continue to benchmark against and imitate each other so that ideas about restructuring have diffused quickly among them. (3) Despite overall deunionization in the industry, they continue to have high unionization rates; de facto pattern bargaining within the Bell system has remained quite strong. Therefore, similar employment practices based on inherited collective bargaining agreements continue to exist across former Bell System firms

Antitrust Review of the AT&T/TMobile Transaction

In August 2011, the United States brought a landmark antitrust lawsuit to prevent the merger of two of the nation\u27s four largest mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. But why are so many elected officials asking the Obama administration to intercede in the Department of Justice\u27s lawsuit to force a settlement? Why are they approving a merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation, and higher taxes for their constituents? Does it have anything to do with the money they are receiving from AT&T and T-Mobile? This Article examines the recent lobbying efforts in the AT&T/T-Mobile merger. AT&T spent $11.69 million on political lobbying in the first six months of 2011. In addition to hefty campaign contributions, it lobbied lawmakers with$52 steaks and $15 gin-and-cucumber puree cocktails. But lobbyists, as this Article outlines, are not the problem. The problem is the combination of lax campaign finance rules and antitrust law\u27s prevailing legal standard, a flexible fact specific rule of reason