Strategy-Proof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents. We present a randomized mechanism, called Equal Cost, which is group strategyproof and achieves a bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio is at most 2 for Max Cost and at most n for Social Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k > 2 facilities and any number of agents. Our result implies an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio for Max Cost jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of Equal Cost for strictly convex cost functions. We also present a randomized mechanism, called Pick the Loser, which applies to instances with k facilities and n = k+1 agents, and for any given concave cost function, is strongly group strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for Social Cost

Cosine Similarity Measure According to a Convex Cost Function

In this paper, we describe a new vector similarity measure associated with a convex cost function. Given two vectors, we determine the surface normals of the convex function at the vectors. The angle between the two surface normals is the similarity measure. Convex cost function can be the negative entropy function, total variation (TV) function and filtered variation function. The convex cost function need not be differentiable everywhere. In general, we need to compute the gradient of the cost function to compute the surface normals. If the gradient does not exist at a given vector, it is possible to use the subgradients and the normal producing the smallest angle between the two vectors is used to compute the similarity measure

A cost function for similarity-based hierarchical clustering

The development of algorithms for hierarchical clustering has been hampered by a shortage of precise objective functions. To help address this situation, we introduce a simple cost function on hierarchies over a set of points, given pairwise similarities between those points. We show that this criterion behaves sensibly in canonical instances and that it admits a top-down construction procedure with a provably good approximation ratio

Regularity for a log-concave to log-concave mass transfer problem with near Euclidean cost

If the cost function is not too far from the Euclidean cost, then the optimal map transporting Gaussians restricted to a ball will be regular. \ Similarly, given any cost function which is smooth in a neighborhood of two points on a manifold, there are small neighborhoods near each such that a Gaussian restricted to one is transported smoothly to a Gaussian on the otherComment: 12 page

(Average-) convexity of common pool and oligopoly TU-games

The paper studies both the convexity and average-convexity properties for a particular class of cooperative TU-games called common pool games. The common pool situation involves a cost function as well as a (weakly decreasing) average joint production function. Firstly, it is shown that, if the relevant cost function is a linear function, then the common pool games are convex games. The convexity, however, fails whenever cost functions are arbitrary. We present sufficient conditions involving the cost functions (like weakly decreasing marginal costs as well as weakly decreasing average costs) and the average joint production function in order to guarantee the convexity of the common pool game. A similar approach is effective to investigate a relaxation of the convexity property known as the average-convexity property for a cooperative game. An example illustrates that oligopoly games are a special case of common pool games whenever the average joint production function represents an inverse demand function

Theories of anterior cingulate cortex function : opportunity cost

The target article highlights the role of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in conflict monitoring, but ACC function may be better understood in terms of the hierarchical organization of behavior. This proposal suggests that the ACC selects extended goal-directed actions according to their learned costs and benefits and executes those behaviors subject to depleting resources

Analysis of the mean squared derivative cost function

In this paper, we investigate the mean squared derivative cost functions that arise in various applications such as in motor control, biometrics and optimal transport theory. We provide qualitative properties, explicit analytical formulas and computational algorithms for the cost functions. We also perform numerical simulations to illustrate the analytical results. In addition, as a by-product of our analysis, we obtain an explicit formula for the inverse of a Wronskian matrix that is of independent interest in linear algebra and differential equations theory.Comment: 28 page

Cost Structure of the Portuguese Water Industry: a Cubic Cost Function Application

The main scope of this paper is to confirm, or otherwise, the idea usually presented in national reports and strategic programmes for the water sector that the Portuguese water market is a natural monopoly. Based on a multi-product approach (considering the m3 of potable water delivered and wastewater collected as the outputs) we use a cubic functional specification to estimate water utilities cost function, and then to look for the presence of economies of scale and of scope. The estimated results show that the average production scale is below the estimated minimum efficient scale and that large utilities have moderate overall diseconomies of scale and scope. In addition, there are moderate economies of scope from the joint production of potable water and wastewater collection up to the minimum efficient scale, suggesting advantages in merging small and medium sized contiguous water utilities. Sufficient conditions for subadditivity of costs are not verified throughout the range of outputs, allowing us to conclude that the Portuguese water industry is not a natural monopoly for all output vectors.cubic function, multi-product cost function, water utilities, regulatory policy