Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium

Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: a refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case

Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: a refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium

Passing the buck

Shifting the responsibility for a necessary but costly action to someone else is often called Passing the Buck. Examples of such behavior in politics are environmental and budget problems which are left to future generations. Small group examples are (not) washing the dishes or (not) dealing with a difficult customer. Under the assumption of altruistic preferences, rational behavior in this game is derived and confronted with experimental data. By comparison, the sequence of possible decision makers in the normal Passing the Buck game is substituted with an expert who alone is competent to fix the problem. It turned out that the marginal probabilities of shifting the responsibility are in good accordance with the theoretical model, although with completely different parameter distributions for experts and non-experts. The structure of the individual decisions, however, is best described by a random parameter model (Cox et al., 2007). --public goods,volunteer's dilemma,responsibility

Experiments in Identity Economics

This dissertation furthers our understanding of the influence of identity on behavior using experimental methods. My first project investigates the influence of social norms on behavior by testing for the presence of a gender gap in competitive preferences across two populations that vary in culture. Using a laboratory experiment in which subjects select among a competitive and non-competitive payment scheme, we find a stark contrast across the two populations with one exhibiting the previously found gender gap in competitive preferences while the other exhibits no such gap. Our results suggest that nurture in the form of social norms may explain the persistence of the gender disparity in labor market outcomes rather than nature. My second project looks at group behavior more generally by studying the mechanism underlying in-group bias in trust. Using a laboratory experiment that separately identifies the ways in which the decision to trust differs from a similarly risky decision, we study how individuals’ willingness to trust depends on the identity of their counterpart. We find that individuals exhibit little to no preference over relative earnings whether the subject’s counterpart is a member of their group or another group. On the other hand, individuals are significantly less likely to take a risk when its outcome is determined by a member of another group as opposed to a member of their own group. Our results imply that the in-group bias in trust is the result of differences in the perceived emotional cost of betrayal rather than altruistic preferences towards the in-group. My final project returns to studying gender norms but does so in the context of social interaction. We study the strength of gender norms in low promotability task allocation and completion through the introduction of heterogeneous costs into a laboratory setting. We find that explicit cost differences produce an overall gender gap that is similar in magnitude to previous studies, but that the gap among low cost individuals is smaller. In an additional treatment, we find that when managers who request another participant to complete the task are introduced that the inclusion of explicit cost differences crowds out the previously found gender bias. Taken together, our results suggest that gender beliefs play a large role in the gender disparity in low promotability task allocation but that making managers aware of opportunity cost differences among their employees may alleviate this trend. My three projects illustrate that identity is influential in the development of individual preferences. Individuals recognize and conform to the behavioral prescriptions of the groups to which they belong leading to large differences in behavior between and across groups. My results suggest that a deeper understanding of the influence of norms and identity-based behavioral prescriptions is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of heterogeneity in behavior

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research