Data assurance in opaque computations

The chess endgame is increasingly being seen through the lens of, and therefore effectively defined by, a data ‘model’ of itself. It is vital that such models are clearly faithful to the reality they purport to represent. This paper examines that issue and systems engineering responses to it, using the chess endgame as the exemplar scenario. A structured survey has been carried out of the intrinsic challenges and complexity of creating endgame data by reviewing the past pattern of errors during work in progress, surfacing in publications and occurring after the data was generated. Specific measures are proposed to counter observed classes of error-risk, including a preliminary survey of techniques for using state-of-the-art verification tools to generate EGTs that are correct by construction. The approach may be applied generically beyond the game domain

Component Approach to Software Development for Distributed Multi-Database System

The paper deals with a component based approach for software development in a distributed environment for the database retrieval operations. A Core Component for a distributed multi-database system has been proposed. The core Component is modeled using three interfaces User, Administrator and Databases Handler. The User Interface is the starting point of access for the Core Component. The Administrator interface deals with access control privileges for users and local databases. The Database Handler facilitates global schema management and site management.Assertion, Core Component, Component Based Software Development, Multi-Database, Schema

Integrity Control in Relational Database Systems - An Overview

This paper gives an overview of research regarding integrity control or integrity constraint handling in relational database management systems. The topic of constraint handling is discussed from two points of view. First, constraint handling is discussed by identifying a number of important research issues, and by treating each issue in detail. Second, a number of projects is described that have resulted in the realization of database management systems supporting integrity constraints; the various projects are compared with respect to a number of system characteristics. Together, both approaches give a broad overview of the state of the art in the field at this moment

Protocols for Integrity Constraint Checking in Federated Databases

A federated database is comprised of multiple interconnected database systems that primarily operate independently but cooperate to a certain extent. Global integrity constraints can be very useful in federated databases, but the lack of global queries, global transaction mechanisms, and global concurrency control renders traditional constraint management techniques inapplicable. This paper presents a threefold contribution to integrity constraint checking in federated databases: (1) The problem of constraint checking in a federated database environment is clearly formulated. (2) A family of protocols for constraint checking is presented. (3) The differences across protocols in the family are analyzed with respect to system requirements, properties guaranteed by the protocols, and processing and communication costs. Thus, our work yields a suite of options from which a protocol can be chosen to suit the system capabilities and integrity requirements of a particular federated database environment

Integrity Constraint Checking in Federated Databases

A federated database is comprised of multiple interconnected databases that cooperate in an autonomous fashion. Global integrity constraints are very useful in federated databases, but the lack of global queries, global transaction mechanisms, and global concurrency control renders traditional constraint management techniques inapplicable. The paper presents a threefold contribution to integrity constraint checking in federated databases: (1) the problem of constraint checking in a federated database environment is clearly formulated; (2) a family of cooperative protocols for constraint checking is presented; (3) the differences across protocols in the family are analyzed with respect to system requirements, properties guaranteed, and costs involved. Thus, we provide a suite of options with protocols for various environments with specific system capabilities and integrity requirement