Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities. Even when markets are strongly complete, the Classical Core is argued not to be an appropriate concept. For the general case of incomplete markets, the Weak Sequential Core is the only concept that does not suffer from major defects.Incomplete Markets, Dynamic Core Concepts, Time and uncertainty

Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem

We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games.TU games, monotonicity, nucleolus per capita, core

Student Attitudes Toward Client Sponsors and Learning: An Analysis of the Effects of Incorporating a Client Sponsored Project in an Introductory Marketing Course

This study examines i) the effects of a client-sponsored project (CSP) on student attitudes toward a sponsoring client, ii) the effects of a CSP on student attitudes toward learning core marketing concepts, and iii) moderators of student attitudes toward learning core marketing concepts. Introductory marketing course students prepared marketing plans for a client-sponsor who awarded cash prizes. The CSP yielded i) positive student attitudes toward client sponsors and ii) beliefs that CSPs enhance learning of core marketing concepts and increase confidence in academic ability. Positive attitudes toward competition and instructor helpfulness strengthened student perceptions that the CSP enhanced learning

Cloud Process Execution Engine - Evaluation of the Core Concepts

In this technical report we describe describe the Domain Specific Language (DSL) of the Workflow Execution Execution (WEE). Instead of interpreting an XML based workflow description language like BPEL, the WEE uses a minimized but expressive set of statements that runs directly on to of a virtual machine that supports the Ruby language.Frameworks/Virtual Machines supporting supporting this language include Java, .NET and there exists also a standalone Virtual Machine. Using a DSL gives us the advantage of maintaining a very compact code base of under 400 lines of code, as the host programming language implements all the concepts like parallelism, threads, checking for syntactic correctness. The implementation just hooks into existing statements to keep track of the workflow and deliver information about current existing context variables and state to the environment that embeds WEE

Cooperation under incomplete contracting

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities

XinuPi3: Teaching Multicore Concepts Using Embedded Xinu

As computer platforms become more advanced, the need to teach advanced computing concepts grows accordingly. This paper addresses one such need by presenting XinuPi3, a port of the lightweight instructional operating system Embedded Xinu to the Raspberry Pi 3. The Raspberry Pi 3 improves upon previous generations of inexpensive, credit card-sized computers by including a quad-core, ARM-based processor, opening the door for educators to demonstrate essential aspects of modern computing like inter-core communication and genuine concurrency. Embedded Xinu has proven to be an effective teaching tool for demonstrating low-level concepts on single-core platforms, and it is currently used to teach a range of systems courses at multiple universities. As of this writing, no other bare metal educational operating system supports multicore computing. XinuPi3 provides a suitable learning environment for beginners on genuinely concurrent hardware. This paper provides an overview of the key features of the XinuPi3 system, as well as the novel embedded system education experiences it makes possible

Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria: An Investigation of Core Concepts

A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors - representing the outcomes of each of the criteria - depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.

Centrality metrics and localization in core-periphery networks

Two concepts of centrality have been defined in complex networks. The first considers the centrality of a node and many different metrics for it has been defined (e.g. eigenvector centrality, PageRank, non-backtracking centrality, etc). The second is related to a large scale organization of the network, the core-periphery structure, composed by a dense core plus an outlying and loosely-connected periphery. In this paper we investigate the relation between these two concepts. We consider networks generated via the Stochastic Block Model, or its degree corrected version, with a strong core-periphery structure and we investigate the centrality properties of the core nodes and the ability of several centrality metrics to identify them. We find that the three measures with the best performance are marginals obtained with belief propagation, PageRank, and degree centrality, while non-backtracking and eigenvector centrality (or MINRES}, showed to be equivalent to the latter in the large network limit) perform worse in the investigated networks.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figure