Cooperation, domination and colonisation: the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee

Do there exist instances of international (water) policy coordination which are so unequal that they should not even be considered 'cooperation'? This article argues, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that this is indeed so. Theoretically, it posits that 'cooperation' should be distinguished from 'policy coordination', and that situations of policy coordination without mutual adjustments or joint gains should instead be considered instances of 'domination'. And empirically, it illustrates the existence of such relations of domination through an analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC), using new evidence from JWC negotiation files, plus interviews with leading Israeli and Palestinian participants. Most startlingly, the article finds that under the constraints of JWC 'cooperation', the Palestinian Authority has been compelled to lend its formal approval to the large-scale expansion of Israeli settlement water infrastructures, activity which is both illegal under international law and one of the major impediments to Palestinian statehood. The article suggests the need for both the complete restructuring of Israeli-Palestinian water 'cooperation', and for further research on relations of domination, and the ideology of cooperation, within international (water) politics

The effects of contract detail and prior ties on contract change : a learning perspective

Despite the large literature on alliance contract design, we know little about how transacting parties change and amend their underlying contracts during the execution of strategic alliances. Drawing on existing research in the alliance contracting literature, we develop the empirical question of how contract detail and prior ties influence the amount, direction, and type of change in such agreements during the collaboration. We generated a sample of 115 joint ventures (JVs) by distributing a survey to JV board members or top managers and found that the amount of contract change is negatively associated with the level of detail in the initial contract but is positively associated with the number of prior ties between alliance partners. In relation to the direction of contract change, we find that the level of detail of the initial agreements negatively correlates with the likelihood of removing or weakening existing provisions and that prior collaborative experience positively correlates with the likelihood of strengthening of existing provisions or adding of new ones. We also find that prior ties affect the type of change in that JV parents prefer to change enforcement provisions more so than the coordination provisions in the contract. Our paper generates new insights on the complementarities between relational governance and transaction cost economics perspectives on alliance contracting

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with present technologies. It provides an alternative to existing approaches, which rely on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. This quantum mechanism applies to a variety of scenarios for which existing approaches are not feasible

Making Medical Homes Work: Moving From Concept to Practice

Explores practical considerations for implementing a medical home program of physician practices committed to coordinating and integrating care based on patient needs and priorities, such as how to qualify medical homes and how to match patients to them

Communication, coordination and networks

We study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network and time effects is more subtle. Under each time treatment, substantial variations are observed in both the rate of coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But, increasing the communication length improves both efficiency and equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We also identify behaviors that explain variations in the distribution of coordinated outcomes both within and across networks

Exiting Treaties

This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs