Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network, a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes

Channel access optimization with adaptive congestion pricing for cognitive vehicular networks: an evolutionary game approach

Cognitive radio-enabled vehicular nodes as unlicensed users can competitively and opportunistically access the radio spectrum provided by a licensed provider and simultaneously use a dedicated channel for vehicular communications. In such cognitive vehicular networks, channel access optimization plays a key role in making the most of the spectrum resources. In this paper, we present the competition among self-interest-driven vehicular nodes as an evolutionary game and study fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium and the evolutionary stability. To deal with the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium, we design a delayed pricing mechanism and propose a discretized replicator dynamics with this pricing mechanism. The strategy adaptation and the channel pricing can be performed in an asynchronous manner, such that vehicular users can obtain the knowledge of the channel prices prior to actually making access decisions. We prove that the Nash equilibrium of the proposed evolutionary dynamics is evolutionary stable and coincides with the social optimum. Besides, performance comparison is also carried out in different environments to demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of our method over the distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning scheme in current literature in terms of the system convergence, stability and adaptability

Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks with RF Energy Harvesting and Transfer

Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transfer techniques have recently become alternative methods to power the next generation of wireless networks. As this emerging technology enables proactive replenishment of wireless devices, it is advantageous in supporting applications with quality-of-service (QoS) requirement. This article focuses on the resource allocation issues in wireless networks with RF energy harvesting capability, referred to as RF energy harvesting networks (RF-EHNs). First, we present an overview of the RF-EHNs, followed by a review of a variety of issues regarding resource allocation. Then, we present a case study of designing in the receiver operation policy, which is of paramount importance in the RF-EHNs. We focus on QoS support and service differentiation, which have not been addressed by previous literatures. Furthermore, we outline some open research directions.Comment: To appear in IEEE Networ

Project Final Report – FREEDOM ICT-248891

This document is the final publishable summary report of the objective and work carried out within the European Project FREEDOM, ICT-248891.This document is the final publishable summary report of the objective and work carried out within the European Project FREEDOM, ICT-248891.Preprin

Smart Grid Communications: Overview of Research Challenges, Solutions, and Standardization Activities

Optimization of energy consumption in future intelligent energy networks (or Smart Grids) will be based on grid-integrated near-real-time communications between various grid elements in generation, transmission, distribution and loads. This paper discusses some of the challenges and opportunities of communications research in the areas of smart grid and smart metering. In particular, we focus on some of the key communications challenges for realizing interoperable and future-proof smart grid/metering networks, smart grid security and privacy, and how some of the existing networking technologies can be applied to energy management. Finally, we also discuss the coordinated standardization efforts in Europe to harmonize communications standards and protocols.Comment: To be published in IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial

Device-to-device communications: a performance analysis in the context of social comparison-based relaying

Device-to-device (D2D) communications are recognized as a key enabler of future cellular networks which will help to drive improvements in spectral efficiency and assist with the offload of network traffic. Among the transmission modes of D2D communications are single-hop and relay assisted multi-hop transmission. Relay-assisted D2D communications will be essential when there is an extended distance between the source and destination or when the transmit power of D2D user equipments (UEs) is constrained below a certain level. Although a number of works on relay-assisted D2D communications have been presented in the literature, most of those assume that relay nodes cooperate unequivocally. In reality, this cannot be assumed since there is little incentive to cooperate without a guarantee of future reciprocal behavior. Cooperation is a social behavior that depends on various factors, such as peer comparison, incentives, the cost to the donor and the benefit to the recipient. To incorporate the social behavior of D2D relay nodes, we consider the decision to relay using the donation game based on social comparison and characterize the probability of cooperation in an evolutionary context. We then apply this within a stochastic geometric framework to evaluate the outage probability and transmission capacity of relay assisted D2D communications. Through numerical evaluations, we investigate the performance gap between the ideal case of 100% cooperation and practical scenarios with a lower cooperation probability. It shows that practical scenarios achieve lower transmission capacity and higher outage probability than idealistic network views which assume full cooperation. After a sufficient number of generations, however, the cooperation probability follows the natural rules of evolution and the transmission performance of practical scenarios approach that of the full cooperation case, indicating that all D2D relay nodes adopt the same dominant cooperative strategy based on social comparison, without the need for enforcement by an external authority