Short versus long term benefits and the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations

COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND THE EXTENDED COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY

The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non- contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the “programmazione negoziata” in Italy. In the final part of the paper the lattercoase theorem, economic policy, transition, property rights, cooperation, coordination

Kantian Dignity and Marxian Socialism

This paper offers an account of human dignity based on a discussion of Kant's moral and political philosophy and then shows its relevance for articulating and developing in a fresh way some normative dimensions of Marx’s critique of capitalism as involving exploitation, domination, and alienation, and the view of socialism as involving a combination of freedom and solidarity. What is advanced here is not Kant’s own conception of dignity, but an account that partly builds on that conception and partly criticizes it. The same is the case with the account of socialism in relation to Marx’s work. As articulated, Kantian dignity and Marxian socialism turn out to be quite appealing and mutually supportive

Self-organisation or Selfcreation? From Social Physics to Realist Dynamics

The currently fashionable theory of self-organisation has its origins in statistical physics. Many believe that the underlying physics model, which is based on inanimate systems, can be employed to explain and predict the emergence of social structures, even of history itself. Some are even convinced that it will be possible to construct a social physics to displace the social sciences. The purpose of this article is to test those claims by reviewing some of the physical studies that have been made of human society, and its conclusion is that those claims cannot be substantiated. The underlying problem is that self-organisation is a one-dimensional theoretical concept that focuses exclusively upon supply-side interactions, from which order and complexity are said to ‘emerge’. But there is a better way. By systematic observation of living systems, both human and non-human, it has been possible to derive a general dynamic theory that embraces a more complex reality, involving a creative exchange between decision-making individuals and the changing needs of their society. I have called this interaction between the dynamic forces of demand and supply in living systems, the process of ‘strategic exchange’. And it is this strategic exchange that determines all other structural relationships in society, including the interaction between its constituent members. It is important in the social sciences, therefore, to move on from social physics to realist dynamics.agent-based modelling, complexity theory, dynamic-strategy theory, power laws, realist dynamics, self-organised criticality, Snooks-Panov algorithm, social physics, strategic demand

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.Environmental Economics&Policies,Fisheries&Aquaculture,Common Property Resource Development,Economic Theory&Research,Ecosystems and Natural Habitats

Discussing the common(s) in neoliberal Capitalism: from Ontology to Politics

This article intends to think the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and the common(s). First, it ties to define the common both in ontological and political terms, stressing the similarities and differences between the common, commons and common goods. Then, it characterizes their relationship with neoliberal capitalism in terms of dispossession, expropriation and configuration. Finally, it discusses if the common can be thought as an alternative form of cooperation and self-government with regards to neoliberalism and to what extent it can be posed as a complete alternative to the state

If you can't be with the one you love, love the one you're with: How individual habituation of agent interactions improves global utility

Simple distributed strategies that modify the behaviour of selfish individuals in a manner that enhances cooperation or global efficiency have proved difficult to identify. We consider a network of selfish agents who each optimise their individual utilities by coordinating (or anti-coordinating) with their neighbours, to maximise the pay-offs from randomly weighted pair-wise games. In general, agents will opt for the behaviour that is the best compromise (for them) of the many conflicting constraints created by their neighbours, but the attractors of the system as a whole will not maximise total utility. We then consider agents that act as 'creatures of habit' by increasing their preference to coordinate (anti-coordinate) with whichever neighbours they are coordinated (anti-coordinated) with at the present moment. These preferences change slowly while the system is repeatedly perturbed such that it settles to many different local attractors. We find that under these conditions, with each perturbation there is a progressively higher chance of the system settling to a configuration with high total utility. Eventually, only one attractor remains, and that attractor is very likely to maximise (or almost maximise) global utility. This counterintutitve result can be understood using theory from computational neuroscience; we show that this simple form of habituation is equivalent to Hebbian learning, and the improved optimisation of global utility that is observed results from wellknown generalisation capabilities of associative memory acting at the network scale. This causes the system of selfish agents, each acting individually but habitually, to collectively identify configurations that maximise total utility