Edge Cache-based ISP-CP Collaboration Scheme for Content Delivery Services

With the explosive increase of mobile data traffic, content delivery issue in the Internet is a growing concern for both Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs). To improve content transmission efficiency and reduce network delay, many ISP-CP cooperation schemes are designed, parts of which are trying to introduce the idea of in-network caching. However, the combination influence of edge cache and content popularity is largely ignored in the existing solutions. Therefore, we propose a novel edge cache-based ISP-CP collaboration model for content delivery services, where the two important factors are simultaneously taken into account. Then, the model is analyzed to obtain the maximal network profit from the perspective of online and offline, respectively. Simulation results show that the profit gains of the proposed solution over the existing Internet models only considering cooperation between ISPs and CPs in the heterogeneous network environments

Contract-based cache partitioning and pricing mechanism in wireless network slicing

Abstract In the commercial caching system, both Infrastructure Provider (InP), who owns the infrastructure and wireless network resource and Service Providers (SPs), who provide service to its users based on the virtual resource provided by the InP, are beneficial in leasing and renting the cache space. By partitioning the cache space at the BS into slices and leasing each partition to the SPs, the InP can receive a payment. Meanwhile, the SPs can serve their users with faster download service with local caching. However, both SPs and InP are selfish and want to maximize their own benefits. In addition, in practice, there is asymmetric information between SPs and InP. Thus, some SPs may declare inaccurate private information to get more cache space or less payment. To deal with these problems, in this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on contract theory, in which the InP, the employer, who designs and offers contracts to SPs, the employees. In particular, SPs are specified into types based on their valuation parameters and request rates. Different from the traditional contract model with two feasible contract conditions, we impose cache capacity constraints, which induces the interaction among SPs and makes the contract design more complicated. We propose an algorithm that achieves the optimal contract so that the InP can motivate SPs to participate into renting caching space while maximize its utility. Simulation results show that the proposed approach not only ensures no SP has incentive to select another contract but also outperforms the baseline allocation algorithm