A single buyer-single supplier bargaining problem with asymmetric information : theoretical approach and software implementation

This paper is focused on the coordination of order and production policy between buyers and suppliers in supply chains. When a buyer and a supplier of an item work independently, the buyer will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer s EOQ may not lead to an optimal policy for the supplier. It can be shown that a cooperative batching policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the more powerful position to enforce his EOQ on the supplier, then no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative batching policy. To provide an incentive to order in quantities suitable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a side payment. One critical assumption made throughout in the literature dealing with incentive schemes to influence buyer s ordering policy is that the supplier has complete information regarding buyer s cost structure. However, this assumption is far from realistic. As a consequence, the buyer has no incentive to report truthfully on his cost structure. Moreover there is an incentive to overstate the total relevant cost in order to obtain as high a side payment as possible. This paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the bargaining power to enforce his EOQ on the supplier in case of a break-down in negotiations. An algorithm for the determination of an optimal set of contracts which are specifically designed for different cost structures of the buyer, assumed by the supplier, will be presented. This algorithm was implemented in a software application, that supports the supplier in determining the optimal set of contracts

Project network models with discounted cash flows. A guided tour through recent developments.

The vast majority of the project scheduling methodologies presented in the literature have been developed with the objective of minimizing the project duration subject to precedence and other constraints. In doing so, the financial aspects of project management are largely ignored. Recent efforts have taken into account discounted cash flow and have focused on the maximalization of the net present value (npv) of the project as the more appropriate objective. In this paper we offer a guided tour through the important recent developments in the expanding field of research on deterministic and stochastic project network models with discounted cash flows. Subsequent to a close examination of the rationale behind the npv objective, we offer a taxonomy of the problems studied in the literature and critically review the major contributions. Proper attention is given to npv maximization models for the unconstrained scheduling problem with known cash flows, optimal and suboptimal scheduling procedures with various types of resource constraints, and the problem of determining both the timing and amount of payments.Scheduling; Models; Model; Discounted cash flow; Cash flow; Project scheduling; Project management; Management; Net present value; Value; Problems; Maximization; Optimal;

The feasibility of an international tropical plywood futures contract

This paper explores the potential for futures contracts in tropical (hardwood) plywood, one of the few major internationally traded commodities for which there is no yet a futures market. Commodity characteristics and market structures and practices that have an impact on the feasibility of a futures market are examined in detail, and conclusions drawn as to the way forward if one wishes to create such a market.commodity futures market, plywood

Systematic Procedures to Determine Incentive / Disincentive Dollar Amounts for Highway Transportation Construction Projects, Research Report 11-22

The Federal Highway Administration has encouraged state transportation agencies to implement Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) contracting provisions for early project completion. Although general guidelines to determine the I/D dollar amount for a project are available, there is no systematic and practical tool in use to determine optimum I/D dollar amounts for I/D projects considering road user cost, agency cost, contractor’s acceleration cost, and contractor’s cost savings. Therefore, systematic procedures and models to assist project planners and engineers in determining an appropriate I/D dollar amount are essential to optimizing the use of I/D contracting techniques. This research performed a literature review related to the determination of daily I/D dollar amounts. Caltrans I/D project data were then collected and evaluated. Project performance data were analyzed with regard to project outcomes in two key areas: project time and project cost. Statistical analyses were performed to identify the impact of I/D dollar amount on project time and cost performance. Using Construction Analysis for Pavement Rehabilitation Strategies (CA4PRS) software, Caltrans I/D projects were analyzed to introduce three different levels of CA4PRS implementations for the I/D dollar amounts calculation. Based on the results of the I/D project case studies, the systematic procedures to determine appropriate I/D dollar amounts were developed using the CA4PRS schedule-traffic-cost integration process for the new I-5 rehabilitation project in LA. The proposed procedures were applied to a typical highway pavement rehabilitation project using HMA (hot mix asphalt) materials. Further research is needed to apply the proposed model to other types of highway projects, with adjustment for the type of project

Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Waste management and household effort: toward an enhanced ADF policy

Advanced Disposal Fees (ADF) are rather popular in waste management policies, but they cease any waste reduction effort at the household level. We propose a waved ADF policy which enhances this system by giving to the households the possibility to sign a waste reduction contract in counterpart of a lower fee. These contracts satisfy an incentive, a budget balancing and a participation constraints. For these feasible contracts, we show that this enriched ADF policy is welfare improving and always induces a waste reduction e¤ort.Waste Management, Disposal Fee Policy, Household Effort, Contracts

Tax buyouts

The paper studies a fiscal policy instrument that can reduce fiscal distortions without affecting revenues, in a politically viable way. The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), offered by the government to each citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a fixed price in exchange for a given reduction in her tax rate for a period of time. We introduce the tax buyout in a dynamic overlapping generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the US income, taxes and wealth distribution. Under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral but, by reducing distortions, it benefits a significant fraction of the population and leads to sizable increases in aggregate labor supply, income and consumption.Taxation

Least Present Value of Net Revenue: a new auction-mechanism for highway concessions

This paper presents a new mechanism for awarding tolled-highways, based on the variable-term concept proposed by Engel et al (1997). These authors claim that a mechanism based on bids for least-present-value of revenue (LPVR) eliminates the risk of demand and simplifies renegotiations. However, if maintenance and operation costs are non-negligible, it is proven that, under LPVR, bidders need to estimate future traffic to make their offers, so the risk of demand is still present. Moreover, LPVR does not guarantee the selection of the best concessionaire. An alternative mechanism (least-present-value of net revenue, LPVNR) is proposed. The idea is to use bids that do not force firms to estimate future traffic. Under LPVNR, firms must make offers on: (i) total amount of revenue, net of maintenance costs; (ii) annual operation and routine-maintenance costs; and (iii) cost of road re-pavement. The concession is awarded to the firm with the lowest total expected cost, and the selection rule is adapted to the information available. The new mechanism is simple, does not impose additional efforts from firms, and eliminates the risk of demand more effectively. Although initially conceived for the road sector, the idea of LPVNR could easily be extended to other infrastructure sectors.Highways, roads, concessions, auctions

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an informal agreement on additional payments or termination of future trade, contingent upon investments. Furthermore, we show that under an additional natural assumption, focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force of our result is a possibility that the threat-point effect is negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous theoretical/empirical analyses of the holdup problem.holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, repeated transactions, long-term relationships

Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agents information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing arrangement : the contracts with agents may be used to induce firms truthful communication in their collusion, and collusive market-share allocation may act to reduce the agents information rents.Optimal collusion, internal contract, privately-informed agents, price-fixing