Neo-Nagelian reduction: a statement, defence, and application.

The thesis proposes, defends, and applies a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, called "Neo-Nagelian" reduction. There are numerous accounts of inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of science literature but the most well-known and widely-discussed is the Nagelian one. In the thesis I identify various kinds of problems which the Nagelian model faces. Whilst some of these can be resolved, pressing ones remain. In lieu of the Nagelian model, other models of inter-theoretic reduction have been proposed, chief amongst which are so-called "New Wave" models. I show these to be no more adequate than the original Nagelian model. I propose a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, Neo-Nagelian reduction. This model is structurally similar to the Nagelian one, but differs in substantive ways. In particular I argue that it avoids the problems pertaining to both the Nagelian and New Wave models. Multiple realizability looms large in discussions about reduction: it is claimed that multiply realizable properties frustrate the reduction of one theory to another in various ways. I consider these arguments and show that they do not undermine the Neo-Nagelian of reduction of one theory to another. Finally, I apply the model to statistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics is taken to be a reductionist enterprise: one of the aims of statistical mechanics is to reduce thermodynamics. Without an adequate model of inter-theoretic reduction one cannot assess whether it succeeds; I use the Neo-Nagelian model to critically discuss whether it does. Specifically, I consider two very recent derivations of the Second Law of thermodynamics, one from Boltzmannian classical statistical mechanics and another from quantum statistical mechanics. I argue that they are partially successful, and that each makes for a promising line of future research

Models, Simulations, and the Reduction of Complexity

Modern science is a model-building activity. But how are models contructed? How are they related to theories and data? How do they explain complex scientific phenomena, and which role do computer simulations play? To address these questions which are highly relevant to scientists as well as to philosophers of science, 8 leading natural, engineering and social scientists reflect upon their modeling work, and 8 philosophers provide a commentary

Models, Simulations, and the Reduction of Complexity

Modern science is a model-building activity. But how are models contructed? How are they related to theories and data? How do they explain complex scientific phenomena, and which role do computer simulations play? To address these questions which are highly relevant to scientists as well as to philosophers of science, 8 leading natural, engineering and social scientists reflect upon their modeling work, and 8 philosophers provide a commentary

Phase transitions in science: selected philosophical topics

This dissertation examines various philosophical issues associated with the physics of phase transitions. In particular, i) I analyze the extent to which classical phase transitions impose a challenge for reductionism, ii) I evaluate the widespread idea that an infinite idealization is essential to give an account of these phenomena, and iii) I discuss the possibility of using the physics of phase transitions to offer a reductive explanation of cooperative behavior in economics. Against prominent claims to the contrary, I defend the view that phase transitions do not undermine reductionism and that they are in fact compatible with the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. I argue that this conclusion follows even in the case of continuous phase transitions, where there are two infinite limits involved. My second claim is that the infinite idealizations involved in the physical treatment of phase transitions although useful are not indispensable to give an account of the phenomena. This follows from the fact that the thermodynamic limit provides us with a controllable approximation of the behavior of finite systems. My third claim is that the physics of phase transitions, in particular renormalization group methods, can constitute a promising way of giving a reductive explanation of stock market crashes. This will serve not only to motivate the use of statistical mechanical methods in the study of economic behavior, but also to contradict the claim that renormalization group explanations are always non-reductive explanations

Phase transitions in science: selected philosophical topics

This dissertation examines various philosophical issues associated with the physics of phase transitions. In particular, i) I analyze the extent to which classical phase transitions impose a challenge for reductionism, ii) I evaluate the widespread idea that an infinite idealization is essential to give an account of these phenomena, and iii) I discuss the possibility of using the physics of phase transitions to offer a reductive explanation of cooperative behavior in economics. Against prominent claims to the contrary, I defend the view that phase transitions do not undermine reductionism and that they are in fact compatible with the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. I argue that this conclusion follows even in the case of continuous phase transitions, where there are two infinite limits involved. My second claim is that the infinite idealizations involved in the physical treatment of phase transitions although useful are not indispensable to give an account of the phenomena. This follows from the fact that the thermodynamic limit provides us with a controllable approximation of the behavior of finite systems. My third claim is that the physics of phase transitions, in particular renormalization group methods, can constitute a promising way of giving a reductive explanation of stock market crashes. This will serve not only to motivate the use of statistical mechanical methods in the study of economic behavior, but also to contradict the claim that renormalization group explanations are always non-reductive explanations

Emerging in the Image of God: From Evolution to Ethics in a Second Naïveté Understanding of Christian Anthropology

Through a careful integration of theological, philosophical, and the natural scientific sources, the biblical concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil have the potential to remain important and appropriate descriptors of the human condition, including the possibility and necessity of human morality. This study employs French philosopher Paul Ricoeur\u27s notion of second naïveté understanding to demonstrate the hermeneutical significance of contemporary biocultural evolutionary theory for reinterpreting and reappropriating these ancient symbols of Christian anthropology as terms equipped to encapsulate a morally fruitful and intellectually honest conceptual framework for constructing, conducting, and evaluating theological anthropology and ethics today. Forging and polishing this hermeneutical lens for the purpose of recasting a biblically-based picture of humanity involves alloying these ancient concepts with others from the interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics, evolutionary psychology, and emergence. Viewed through this lens, the dissertationing chapters of Genesis describe human beings as creatures wrought of the creation and embedded within it to the same extent as all other creatures. Though ordinary in every other aspect, human creatures are unique in that they have emerged with an ambivalent condition of freedom through which they bear the vocation to re-present the creative beneficence of the God who shares power and does not create through violence. I defend this thesis in seven chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce the research topic, goals, and hermeneutical procedure for this study. Chapters 2 and 3 describe biocultural evolution and evolutionary psychology within a non-reductive emergentist perspective as sources and resources for contemporary theological anthropology. In chapter 4, I propose an articulation of the doctrine of the imago Dei within this evolutionary worldview. Chapter 5 situates the knowledge of good and evil vis-à-vis biocultural evolution and recent biblical studies. I then construct a proposal in chapter 6 for how this second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil dissertations up new frameworks and frontiers for fundamental theological ethics. Finally, chapter 7 offers a summative and prospective conclusion to this study and its likely impact on my future research

The nature of engineering and science knowledge in curriculum: a case study in thermodynamics

Abstract The study explores the nature of disciplinary knowledge differences and similarities between the sciences and the engineering sciences as these appear in curriculum texts. The work is presented as a case study of curriculum knowledge in thermodynamics, and the epistemic properties are investigated in four sub-cases in mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, physics and chemistry. Data was collected from prescribed undergraduate textbooks in the four disciplinary fields. The work is theoretically informed by two fields of scholarly work: the sociology of educational knowledge (in particular the work of Basil Bernstein) and the applied philosophies of science and engineering science, in order to develop a theoretical framework for analysis of the data. The framework allows the study to move beyond the typical binary classification of the sciences as 'hard-pure' and engineering sciences as 'hard-applied' disciplines. Starting from broad teleological considerations, the philosophical concepts of specialisation, idealisation and normativity are explored and developed into modalities and modal continua of variance to allow investigation of the epistemic differences and similarities in the recontextualised disciplinary knowledge from these contiguous conceptual fields. The empirical study identifies important differences in thermodynamics curriculum knowledge in terms of specialisation, normativity and idealisation across the broad disciplinary fields, rendering more complex Bernstein's notions of singulars and regions. The epistemic modalities and modes provide a way to conceive in more detail how the professional engineering science knowledge is orientated towards its field of practice. Curriculum knowledge in the engineering sciences is shown to be remarkably different from the knowledge in the sciences: both mechanical and chemical engineering knowledge emphasise particulars, rather than universals, have stronger normative aspects, and employ a limited form of idealisation in their commitment to physical realisability. By contrast, knowledge in the sciences is more universal, normativity is incidental, and idealisation is used expansively. In addition, the research findings suggest a negative correlation between idealisation and normativity as epistemic modalities: a commitment to normative concerns in the engineering sciences constrains the extent to which knowledge idealisation is pursued, compared to what is observed in the bodies of science curriculum knowledge. Furthermore, over and above differences in curriculum knowledge between the broad fields of science and engineering science, discernible variation exists between the engineering sciences investigated, raising cautions against a monolithic view of curricular epistemic properties across broad disciplinary areas