Complexity of coalition structure generation

We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem for all coalitional games provided that player types are known and the number of player types is bounded by a constant. As a corollary, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal partition for weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and for coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills. We also consider well-studied and well-motivated coalitional games defined compactly on combinatorial domains. For these games, we characterize the complexity of computing an optimal coalition structure by presenting polynomial-time algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inapproximability lower bounds.Comment: 17 page

Anytime coalition structure generation on synergy graphs

We consider the coalition structure generation (CSG) problem on synergy graphs, which arises in many practical applications where communication constraints, social or trust relationships must be taken into account when forming coalitions. We propose a novel representation of this problem based on the concept of edge contraction, and an innovative branch and bound approach (CFSS), which is particularly efficient when applied to a general class of characteristic functions. This new model provides a non-redundant partition of the search space, hence allowing an effective parallelisation. We evaluate CFSS on two benchmark functions, the edge sum with coordination cost and the collective energy purchasing functions, comparing its performance with the best algorithm for CSG on synergy graphs: DyCE. The latter approach is centralised and cannot be efficiently parallelised due to the exponential memory requirements in the number of agents, which limits its scalability (while CFSS memory requirements are only polynomial). Our results show that, when the graphs are very sparse, CFSS is 4 orders of magnitude faster than DyCE. Moreover, CFSS is the first approach to provide anytime approximate solutions with quality guarantees for very large systems (i.e., with more than 2700 agents

Coalition structure generation over graphs

We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : P(N) → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components values. This problem is generally NP-complete; in particular, it is hard for a defined class of valuation functions which are independent of disconnected members — that is, two nodes have no effect on each others marginal contribution to their vertex separator. Nonetheless, for all such functions we provide bounds on the complexity of coalition structure generation over general and minor free graphs. Our proof is constructive and yields algorithms for solving corresponding instances of the problem. Furthermore, we derive linear time bounds for graphs of bounded treewidth. However, as we show, the problem remains NP-complete for planar graphs, and hence, for any Kk minor free graphs where k ≥ 5. Moreover, a 3-SAT problem with m clauses can be represented by a coalition structure generation problem over a planar graph with O(m2) nodes. Importantly, our hardness result holds for a particular subclass of valuation functions, termed edge sum, where the value of each subset of nodes is simply determined by the sum of given weights of the edges in the induced subgraph

A hybrid algorithm for coalition structure generation

The current state-of-the-art algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation is IDP-IP—an algorithm that combines IDP (a dynamic programming algorithm due to Rahwan and Jennings, 2008b) with IP (a tree-search algorithm due to Rahwan et al., 2009). In this paper we analyse IDP-IP, highlight its limitations, and then develop a new approach for combining IDP with IP that overcomes these limitations

Optimal Coalition Structures in Cooperative Graph Games

Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is computationally to optimize and solve such games. One prominent such language is the simple yet expressive Weighted Graph Games (WGGs) representation [14], which maintains knowledge about synergies between agents in the form of an edge weighted graph. We consider the problem of finding the optimal coalition structure in WGGs. The agents in such games are vertices in a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of the weights of the edges present between coalition members. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We show that finding the optimal coalition structure is not only hard for general graphs, but is also intractable for restricted families such as planar graphs which are amenable for many other combinatorial problems. We then provide algorithms with constant factor approximations for planar, minor-free and bounded degree graphs.Comment: 16 pages. A short version of this paper is to appear at AAAI 201

Decentralised Coordination in RoboCup Rescue

Emergency responders are faced with a number of significant challenges when managing major disasters. First, the number of rescue tasks posed is usually larger than the number of responders (or agents) and the resources available to them. Second, each task is likely to require a different level of effort in order to be completed by its deadline. Third, new tasks may continually appear or disappear from the environment, thus requiring the responders to quickly recompute their allocation of resources. Fourth, forming teams or coalitions of multiple agents from different agencies is vital since no single agency will have all the resources needed to save victims, unblock roads, and extinguish the ?res which might erupt in the disaster space. Given this, coalitions have to be efficiently selected and scheduled to work across the disaster space so as to maximise the number of lives and the portion of the infrastructure saved. In particular, it is important that the selection of such coalitions should be performed in a decentralised fashion in order to avoid a single point of failure in the system. Moreover, it is critical that responders communicate only locally given they are likely to have limited battery power or minimal access to long range communication devices. Against this background, we provide a novel decentralised solution to the coalition formation process that pervades disaster management. More specifically, we model the emergency management scenario defined in the RoboCup Rescue disaster simulation platform as a Coalition Formation with Spatial and Temporal constraints (CFST) problem where agents form coalitions in order to complete tasks, each with different demands. In order to design a decentralised algorithm for CFST we formulate it as a Distributed Constraint Optimisation problem and show how to solve it using the state-of-the-art Max-Sum algorithm that provides a completely decentralised message-passing solution. We then provide a novel algorithm (F-Max-Sum) that avoids sending redundant messages and efficiently adapts to changes in the environment. In empirical evaluations, our algorithm is shown to generate better solutions than other decentralised algorithms used for this problem

Sharing rides with friends: a coalition formation algorithm for ridesharing

We consider the Social Ridesharing (SR) problem, where a set of commuters, connected through a social network, arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we focus on the associated optimisation problem of forming cars to minimise the travel cost of the overall system modelling such problem as a graph constrained coalition formation (GCCF) problem, where the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph (i.e., the social network). Moreover, we significantly extend the state of the art algorithm for GCCF, i.e., the CFSS algorithm, to solve our GCCF model of the SR problem. Our empirical evaluation uses a real dataset for both spatial (GeoLife) and social data (Twitter), to validate the applicability of our approach in a realistic application scenario. Empirical results show that our approach computes optimal solutions for systems of medium scale (up to 100 agents) providing significant cost reductions (up to -36.22%). Moreover, we can provide approximate solutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000 agents) and good quality guarantees (i.e., with an approximation ratio of 1.41 in the worst case) within minutes (i.e., 100 seconds