Quantitative dependability and interdependency models for large-scale cyber-physical systems

Cyber-physical systems link cyber infrastructure with physical processes through an integrated network of physical components, sensors, actuators, and computers that are interconnected by communication links. Modern critical infrastructures such as smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems are prominent examples of cyber-physical systems. Developed countries are entirely reliant on these critical infrastructures, hence the need for rigorous assessment of the trustworthiness of these systems. The objective of this research is quantitative modeling of dependability attributes -- including reliability and survivability -- of cyber-physical systems, with domain-specific case studies on smart grids and intelligent water distribution networks. To this end, we make the following research contributions: i) quantifying, in terms of loss of reliability and survivability, the effect of introducing computing and communication technologies; and ii) identifying and quantifying interdependencies in cyber-physical systems and investigating their effect on fault propagation paths and degradation of dependability attributes. Our proposed approach relies on observation of system behavior in response to disruptive events. We utilize a Markovian technique to formalize a unified reliability model. For survivability evaluation, we capture temporal changes to a service index chosen to represent the extent of functionality retained. In modeling of interdependency, we apply correlation and causation analyses to identify links and use graph-theoretical metrics for quantifying them. The metrics and models we propose can be instrumental in guiding investments in fortification of and failure mitigation for critical infrastructures. To verify the success of our proposed approach in meeting these goals, we introduce a failure prediction tool capable of identifying system components that are prone to failure as a result of a specific disruptive event. Our prediction tool can enable timely preventative actions and mitigate the consequences of accidental failures and malicious attacks --Abstract, page iii

Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS): A Review on Modelling, Simulation, and Analysis with Cyber Security Applications

Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a new kind of digital technology that increases its attention across academia, government, and industry sectors and covers a wide range of applications like agriculture, energy, medical, transportation, etc. The traditional power systems with physical equipment as a core element are more integrated with information and communication technology, which evolves into the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS). The CPPS consists of a physical system tightly integrated with cyber systems (control, computing, and communication functions) and allows the two-way flows of electricity and information for enabling smart grid technologies. Even though the digital technologies monitoring and controlling the electric power grid more efficiently and reliably, the power grid is vulnerable to cybersecurity risk and involves the complex interdependency between cyber and physical systems. Analyzing and resolving the problems in CPPS needs the modelling methods and systematic investigation of a complex interaction between cyber and physical systems. The conventional way of modelling, simulation, and analysis involves the separation of physical domain and cyber domain, which is not suitable for the modern CPPS. Therefore, an integrated framework needed to analyze the practical scenario of the unification of physical and cyber systems. A comprehensive review of different modelling, simulation, and analysis methods and different types of cyber-attacks, cybersecurity measures for modern CPPS is explored in this paper. A review of different types of cyber-attack detection and mitigation control schemes for the practical power system is presented in this paper. The status of the research in CPPS around the world and a new path for recommendations and research directions for the researchers working in the CPPS are finally presented.publishedVersio

Resilience assessment and planning in power distribution systems:Past and future considerations

Over the past decade, extreme weather events have significantly increased worldwide, leading to widespread power outages and blackouts. As these threats continue to challenge power distribution systems, the importance of mitigating the impacts of extreme weather events has become paramount. Consequently, resilience has become crucial for designing and operating power distribution systems. This work comprehensively explores the current landscape of resilience evaluation and metrics within the power distribution system domain, reviewing existing methods and identifying key attributes that define effective resilience metrics. The challenges encountered during the formulation, development, and calculation of these metrics are also addressed. Additionally, this review acknowledges the intricate interdependencies between power distribution systems and critical infrastructures, including information and communication technology, transportation, water distribution, and natural gas networks. It is important to understand these interdependencies and their impact on power distribution system resilience. Moreover, this work provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on planning solutions to enhance distribution system resilience and support power distribution system operators and planners in developing effective mitigation strategies. These strategies are crucial for minimizing the adverse impacts of extreme weather events and fostering overall resilience within power distribution systems.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figures, submitted for review to Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review

Cyber-Physical Power System Layers: Classification, Characterization, and Interactions

This paper provides a strategy to identify layers and sub-layers of cyber-physical power systems (CPPS) and characterize their inter- and intra-actions. The physical layer usually consists of the power grid and protection devices whereas the cyber layer consists of communication, and computation and control components. Combining components of the cyber layer in one layer complicates the process of modeling intra-actions because each component has different failure modes. On the other hand, dividing the cyber layers into a large number of sub-layers may unnecessarily increase the number of system states and increase the computational burden. In this paper, we classify system layers based on their common, coupled, and shared functions. Also, interactions between the classified layers are identified, characterized, and clustered based on their impact on the system. Furthermore, based on the overall function of each layer and types of its components, intra-actions within layers are characterized. The strategies developed in this paper for comprehensive classification of system layers and characterization of their inter- and intra-actions contribute toward the goal of accurate and detailed modeling of state transition and failure and attack propagation in CPPS, which can be used for various reliability assessment studies.Comment: Accepted in Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC) 202

Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid

The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies

On the identification and analysis of ICT-induced stability risks in cyber-physical energy systems

This thesis addresses emerging ICT-based stability risks for cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) in light of the increasingly complex task of coordinating modern generation and consumption assets in power grids. It does so by identifying cyber-physical services as the main drivers of interdependence first. It then provides a general approach on how to assess such a service's dependence on data in general and its sensitivity towards the high-level ICT error categories "latency", "data loss" and "data corruption" in particular. Based on these results, the service states "normal", "limited", and "failed" are introduced in order to summarise the findings in an abstract and more widely applicable as well as comparable manner. These aggregated service states are required as additional inputs for the main method which determines how disturbances propagate through modern CPESs. This method is first presented with a focus on static stability and is later extended to also incorporate dynamic stability phenomena. The resulting disturbance propagation, combined with the service states and the ENTSO-E state description for power systems, can be used to derive a summarising state trajectory which helps compare different CPES layouts and control designs concerning their stability.Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit neuartigen, IKT-basierten Stabilitätsrisiken für cyber-physikalische Energiesysteme (CPES) vor dem Hintergrund zunehmend komplexer Koordination neuartiger Verbraucher und Erzeugungsanlagen in modernen Energiesystemen. Dazu werden zunächst IKT-basierte Dienste als Haupttreiber wechselseitiger Abhängigkeiten zwischen der Energie- und IKT-Domäne im CPES identifiziert. Anschließend wird ein Ansatz zur Bewertung der Datenabhängigkeit solcher Dienste im Allgemeinen sowie ihrer Empfindlichkeit gegenüber erhöhter Kommunikationslatenz, Datenverlust und Datenkorruption im Speziellen vorgestellt. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnisse werden drei Betriebszustände für Dienste eingeführt. Diese lauten "normal", "eingeschränkt" und "fehlerhaft" und dienen der Abstraktion und Vergleichbarkeit der IKT-Abhängigkeit verschiedener Dienste. Im Anschluss wird eine Methode vorgestellt, die der Bestimmung der Ausbreitung von Störungen innerhalb des CPES dient. Die Methode wird zunächst mit einem Fokus auf statischer Stabilität erläutert und anschließend so erweitert, dass auch dynamische Stabilitätsphänomene berücksichtigt werden können. Die sich daraus ergebende Ausbreitung von Störungen kann in Verbindung mit den Betriebszuständen und der ENTSO-E-Zustandsbeschreibung für Stromversorgungssysteme zur Ableitung eines zusammenfassenden Zustandsverlaufs verwendet werden. Mit den so ermittelten Zustandsverläufen wird wiederum ein qualitativer Stabilitätsvergleich verschiedener CPES-Layouts und Regelungskonzepte ermöglicht

Survivability modeling for cyber-physical systems subject to data corruption

Cyber-physical critical infrastructures are created when traditional physical infrastructure is supplemented with advanced monitoring, control, computing, and communication capability. More intelligent decision support and improved efficacy, dependability, and security are expected. Quantitative models and evaluation methods are required for determining the extent to which a cyber-physical infrastructure improves on its physical predecessors. It is essential that these models reflect both cyber and physical aspects of operation and failure. In this dissertation, we propose quantitative models for dependability attributes, in particular, survivability, of cyber-physical systems. Any malfunction or security breach, whether cyber or physical, that causes the system operation to depart from specifications will affect these dependability attributes. Our focus is on data corruption, which compromises decision support -- the fundamental role played by cyber infrastructure. The first research contribution of this work is a Petri net model for information exchange in cyber-physical systems, which facilitates i) evaluation of the extent of data corruption at a given time, and ii) illuminates the service degradation caused by propagation of corrupt data through the cyber infrastructure. In the second research contribution, we propose metrics and an evaluation method for survivability, which captures the extent of functionality retained by a system after a disruptive event. We illustrate the application of our methods through case studies on smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems. Data, cyber infrastructure, and intelligent control are part and parcel of nearly every critical infrastructure that underpins daily life in developed countries. Our work provides means for quantifying and predicting the service degradation caused when cyber infrastructure fails to serve its intended purpose. It can also serve as the foundation for efforts to fortify critical systems and mitigate inevitable failures --Abstract, page iii