Institutional Cognition

We generalize a recent mathematical analysis of Bernard Baars' model of human consciousness to explore analogous, but far more complicated, phenomena of institutional cognition. Individual consciousness is limited to a single, tunable, giant component of interacting cogntivie modules, instantiating a Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, seem able to multitask, supporting several such giant components simultaneously, although their behavior remains constrained to a topology generated by cultural context and by the path-dependence inherent to organizational history. Surprisingly, such multitasking, while clearly limiting the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, does not eliminate it. This suggests that organizations (or machines) explicitly designed along these principles, while highly efficient at certain sets of tasks, would still be subject to analogs of the subtle failure patterns explored in Wallace (2005b, 2006). We compare and contrast our results with recent work on collective efficacy and collective consciousness

Institutional paraconsciousness and its pathologies

This analysis extends a recent mathematical treatment of the Baars consciousness model to analogous, but far more complicated, phenomena of institutional cognition. Individual consciousness is limited to a single, tunable, giant component of interacting cognitive modules, instantiating a Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, support several, sometimes many, such giant components simultaneously, although their behavior remains constrained to a topology generated by cultural context and by the path-dependence inherent to organizational history. Such highly parallel multitasking - institutional paraconsciousness - while clearly limiting inattentional blindness and the consequences of failures within individual workspaces, does not eliminate them, and introduces new characteristic dysfunctions involving the distortion of information sent between global workspaces. Consequently, organizations (or machines designed along these principles), while highly efficient at certain kinds of tasks, remain subject to canonical and idiosyncratic failure patterns similar to, but more complicated than, those afflicting individuals. Remediation is complicated by the manner in which pathogenic externalities can write images of themselves on both institutional function and therapeutic intervention, in the context of relentless market selection pressures. The approach is broadly consonant with recent work on collective efficacy, collective consciousness, and distributed cognition

A physiologically based approach to consciousness

The nature of a scientific theory of consciousness is defined by comparison with scientific theories in the physical sciences. The differences between physical, algorithmic and functional complexity are highlighted, and the architecture of a functionally complex electronic system created to relate system operations to device operations is compared with a scientific theory. It is argued that there are two qualitatively different types of functional architecture, and that electronic systems have the instruction architecture based on exchange of unambiguous information between functional components, and biological brains have been constrained by natural selection pressures into the recommendation architecture based on exchange of ambiguous information. The mechanisms by which a recommendation architecture could heuristically define its own functionality are described, and compared with memory in biological brains. Dream sleep is interpreted as the mechanism for minimizing information exchange between functional components in a heuristically defined functional system. The functional role of consciousness of self is discussed, and the route by which the experience of that function described at the psychological level can be related to physiology through a functional architecture is outlined

Theories of consciousness are solutions in need of problems

Doerig et al. point out a number of shortcomings with existing theories of consciousness and argue they should be systematically constrained by empirical data. In this commentary I suggest a further constraint - the potential functions of (the contents of) consciousness. One such candidate function in humans is the social sharing of reportable mental states. The social function of consciousness provides a general framework within which to understand the evolution and neurobiology of conscious awareness

A Heuristic Model of Consciousness with Applications to the Development of Science and Society

A working model of consciousness is fundamental to understanding of the interactions of the observer in science. This paper examines contemporary understanding of consciousness. A heuristic model of consciousness is suggested that is consistent with psycophysics measurements of bandwidth of consciousness relative to unconscious perception. While the self reference nature of consciousness confers a survival benefit by assuring the all points of view regarding a problem are experienced in sufficiently large population, conscious bandwidth is constrained by design to avoid chaotic behavior. The multiple hypotheses provided by conscious reflection enable the rapid progression of science and technology. The questions of free will and the problem of attention are discussed in relation to the model. Finally the combination of rapid technology growth with the assurance of many unpredictable points of view is considered in respect to contemporary constraints to the development of society

A Physiologically Based System Theory of Consciousness

A system which uses large numbers of devices to perform a complex functionality is forced to adopt a simple functional architecture by the needs to construct copies of, repair, and modify the system. A simple functional architecture means that functionality is partitioned into relatively equal sized components on many levels of detail down to device level, a mapping exists between the different levels, and exchange of information between components is minimized. In the instruction architecture functionality is partitioned on every level into instructions, which exchange unambiguous system information and therefore output system commands. The von Neumann architecture is a special case of the instruction architecture in which instructions are coded as unambiguous system information. In the recommendation (or pattern extraction) architecture functionality is partitioned on every level into repetition elements, which can freely exchange ambiguous information and therefore output only system action recommendations which must compete for control of system behavior. Partitioning is optimized to the best tradeoff between even partitioning and minimum cost of distributing data. Natural pressures deriving from the need to construct copies under DNA control, recover from errors, failures and damage, and add new functionality derived from random mutations has resulted in biological brains being constrained to adopt the recommendation architecture. The resultant hierarchy of functional separations can be the basis for understanding psychological phenomena in terms of physiology. A theory of consciousness is described based on the recommendation architecture model for biological brains. Consciousness is defined at a high level in terms of sensory independent image sequences including self images with the role of extending the search of records of individual experience for behavioral guidance in complex social situations. Functional components of this definition of consciousness are developed, and it is demonstrated that these components can be translated through subcomponents to descriptions in terms of known and postulated physiological mechanisms

A unified framework for information integration based on information geometry

We propose a unified theoretical framework for quantifying spatio-temporal interactions in a stochastic dynamical system based on information geometry. In the proposed framework, the degree of interactions is quantified by the divergence between the actual probability distribution of the system and a constrained probability distribution where the interactions of interest are disconnected. This framework provides novel geometric interpretations of various information theoretic measures of interactions, such as mutual information, transfer entropy, and stochastic interaction in terms of how interactions are disconnected. The framework therefore provides an intuitive understanding of the relationships between the various quantities. By extending the concept of transfer entropy, we propose a novel measure of integrated information which measures causal interactions between parts of a system. Integrated information quantifies the extent to which the whole is more than the sum of the parts and can be potentially used as a biological measure of the levels of consciousness

Adolescent Self-Disclosure and Loneliness: Private Self-Consciousness and Parental Influences

Using structural equation techniques, we tested a theoretical model designed to describe the causal relations existing among loneliness, self-disclosure to peers and parents, and specific antecedent variables. Participants were 350 high-school students who answered questions concerning themselves and their interpersonal relationships. Results generally indicated a good fit between the theoretical model and the observed relations. In addition to replicating the findings of previous studies concerning the relation between self-disclosure and loneliness, results also indicated an indirect relation between private self-consciousness and loneliness via peer self-disclosure; that is, high private self-conscious adolescents\u27 greater willingness to self-disclose to peers resulted in their feeling less lonely. Results are discussed in terms of current theory in related fields

Prisoners of our own consciousness? : the autonomy of the subject : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology

This thesis explores questions which have vexed both philosophers and sociologists. These are questions which, to varying degrees remain unanswered, but which, nonetheless, are basic questions pertaining to our existence. Just what is the nature of the 'subject'? Can we even say that the 'subject' exists? What is consciousness? What role does language play in defining the subject? What is 'truth'? Is there a 'truth'? How much autonomy does the subject have? The main question, though, posed in this thesis relates to whether we are: Prisoners of our own Consciousness? It is from a reading of the writings of certain late twentieth century French thinkers that the above questions are considered. The four writers: Jean Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Pierre Bourdieu, offer their views. Whilst Jean Paul Sartre advocates atheistic existentialism, the remaining three French theorists have been labelled post-structuralists, a term given, rather than claimed. Whilst Sartre, Foucault, Derrida and Bourdieu have differing views on the above questions, there are points of congruence. The elusiveness of the subject is one such point of agreement. There is also agreement amongst the four (less overtly expressed by Derrida) that freedom of the subject is a possibility. For Sartre, freedom is the very essence of humankind. The thinkers differ on the matter of 'truth'. Sartre believes in an absolute truth. Foucault deals with 'regimes of truth'. Derrida remains somewhat silent, except that he contends there is a justice, which does not exist but which is an ideal and is infinitely irreducible. Bourdieu unashamedly believes all scientists are seeking the truth, and he proposes a method which he believes will assist in the pursuit of that goal. Each of the four theorists contends, to some degree, that language and discourse are constructed by the social world and influence our perception of reality. Regarding the notion of being 'prisoners of our own consciousness?', the theorists under scrutiny, with the exception of Sartre, believe we are seriously constrained by language and discourse. Foucault and Bourdieu are of the opinion that knowledge may free us from this predicament. I suggest that humankind is neither free, nor non-free. Rather, that the 'subject' merely Is. I suggest that we are not prisoners because to endorse such a view, would be to accept that we are being detained from a realm which would be our 'normal' realm. Given that there is no realm other than the present, and given that constraints are consistent with the nature of humankind, we cannot be said to be prisoners. Further, it is argued that not only our consciousness defines us but also our unconsciousness. And both consciousness and unconsciousness, in turn, are defined by the social world in which we live

Machine Hyperconsciousness

Individual animal consciousness appears limited to a single giant component of interacting cognitive modules, instantiating a shifting, highly tunable, Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, can support several, often many, such giant components simultaneously, although they generally function far more slowly than the minds of the individuals who compose them. Machines having multiple global workspaces -- hyperconscious machines -- should, however, be able to operate at the few hundred milliseconds characteistic of individual consciousness. Such multitasking -- machine or institutional -- while clearly limiting the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, does not eliminate it, and introduces characteristic failure modes involving the distortion of information sent between global workspaces. This suggests that machines explicitly designed along these principles, while highly efficient at certain sets of tasks, remain subject to canonical and idiosyncratic failure patterns analogous to, but more complicated than, those explored in Wallace (2006a). By contrast, institutions, facing similar challenges, are usually deeply embedded in a highly stabilizing cultural matrix of law, custom, and tradition which has evolved over many centuries. Parallel development of analogous engineering strategies, directed toward ensuring an 'ethical' device, would seem requisite to the sucessful application of any form of hyperconscious machine technology