Human Conscious Experience is Four-Dimensional and has a Neural Correlate Modeled by Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity

In humans, knowing the world occurs through spatial-temporal experiences and interpretations. Conscious experience is the direct observation of conscious events. It makes up the content of consciousness. Conscious experience is organized in four dimensions. It is an orientation in space and time, an understanding of the position of the observer in space and time. A neural correlate for four-dimensional conscious experience has been found in the human brain which is modeled by Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Spacetime intervals are fundamentally involved in the organization of coherent conscious experiences. They account for why conscious experience appears to us the way it does. They also account for assessment of causality and past-future relationships, the integration of higher cognitive functions, and the implementation of goal-directed behaviors. Spacetime intervals in effect compose and direct our conscious life. The relativistic concept closes the explanatory gap and solves the hard problem of consciousness (how something subjective like conscious experience can arise in something physical like the brain). There is a place in physics for consciousness. We describe all physical phenomena through conscious experience, whether they be described at the quantum level or classical level. Since spacetime intervals direct the formation of all conscious experiences and all physical phenomena are described through conscious experience, the equation formulating spacetime intervals contains the information from which all observable phenomena may be deduced. It might therefore be considered expression of a theory of everything

Construction and validation of the self-conscious emotions at work scale

The present study reports on the construction and validation of a new assessment instrument for self-conscious emotions in the work context, namely the Self-Conscious Emotions at Work Scale (SCEWS). In eight typical self-conscious work scenarios respondents have to indicate their emotional reaction in terms of 20 appraisals, subjective experiences, and action tendencies that are relevant and representative for the domain of self-conscious emotions. In total 512 students and 467 working adults completed the SCEWS and reported the frequency of positive emotions, anger, anxiety and sadness. In both samples a three-factorial structure emerged with a guilt, a shame/humiliation, and an anger in self-conscious situations factor. These three self-conscious emotion factors correlated differentially and in a predicted way with the frequency of emotions. Guilt-proneness was predicted to be psychologically constructive and correlated to the frequency of positive emotions. The proneness to shame/humiliation was expected to relate to internalising psychopathological tendencies, and positively correlated to a frequency of anxiety and sadness. Proneness to anger in self-conscious situations was expected to relate to externalising psychopathological tendencies and correlated with the frequency of anger in general. The present study demonstrates that self-conscious emotions can be validly measured in the work context. The new instrument allows for the systematic study of the role of self-conscious emotions in work and organisational behaviour

Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought

Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the HOT necessarily representsthe subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental ownership

Intravenous conscious sedation in patients under 16 years of age. Fact or fiction?

Recently published guidelines on the use of conscious sedation in dentistry have published varying recommendations on the lower age limit for the use of intravenous conscious sedation. There are a large number of dentists currently providing dental treatment for paediatric patients under intravenous conscious sedation. The 18 cases reported here (age range 11-15 years), were successfully managed with intravenous conscious sedation. The experience in this paper is not sufficient evidence to recommend the wholesale use of intravenous conscious sedation in patients who are under 16 years. The fact that a range of operators can use these techniques on paediatric patients would suggest that further study should be carried out in this population. The guidance should be modified to say there is insufficient evidence to support the use of intravenous conscious sedation in children, rather than arbitrarily selecting a cut off point at age 16 years

Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'

This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of conscious process

The biological cost of consciousness

Some philosophers maintain that consciousness as subjective experience has no biological function. However, conscious brain events seem very different from unconscious ones. The cortex and thalamus support the reportable qualitative contents of consciousness. Subcortical structures like the cerebellum do not. Likewise, attended sensory stimuli are typically reportable as conscious, while memories of those stimuli are not so reportable until they are specifically recalled. 

Reports of conscious experiences in normal humans always involve subjectivity and an implicit observing ego. Unconscious brain events are not reportable, even under optimal conditions of report. While there are claimed exceptions to these points, they are rare or poorly validated. 

Normal consciousness also implies high availability (rapid conscious access) of the questions routinely asked of neurological patients in the Mental Status Examination, such as common sense features of personal identity, time, place, and social context. Along with “current concerns,” recent conscious contents, and the like, these contents correspond to high frequency items in working memory. While working memory contents are not immediately conscious, they can be rapidly re-called to consciousness. 

The anatomy and physiology of reportable conscious sensorimotor contents are ultraconserved over perhaps 200 million years of mammalian evolution. By comparison, full-fledged language is thought to arise some 100,000 years ago in homo sapiens, while writing, which enables accel-erated cultural development, dates between 2.5 and 6 millennia. Contrary to some claims, therefore, conscious waking precedes language by hundreds of millions of years. 

Like other major adaptations, conscious and unconscious brain events have distinctive biological pros and cons. These involve information processing efficiency, metabolic costs and benefits, and behavioral pros and cons. The well known momentary limited capacity of conscious contents is an example of an information processing cost, while the very large and energy-hungry corticothalamic system makes costly metabolic demands. 

After a century of scientific neglect, fundamental concepts like “conscious,” “unconscious,” “voluntary” and “non-voluntary” are still vitally important, because they refer to major biopsychological phenomena that otherwise are difficult to discuss. 
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