Citizens of Character - The Values and Character Dispositions of 14-16 Year Olds in the Hodge Hill Constituency

Citizens of Character explores the attitudes, dispositions, and values of 14-16 year old students in a particular urban environment - the six schools of the Hodge Hill constituency in Birmingham - and the extent to which the education system and the local environment advance or inhibit their sense of self, their values and their character development. These students constituted a heterogeneous group of religious and non-religious individuals. This project goes beyond the normal exploration and measurement of strengths of character in individuals and looks at the factors that build character in families and schools. This research has wider implications for the relationship between character and aspirations, social change, school cultures, citizenship, identity and religion. The study discusses what students understand by character. It set out to ascertain the moral values held by a group of students living in an inner-city area. The study sought to question who or what has influenced their moral values and examined which individuals, institutions and situations might have hindered or promoted their development. Some of the issues and concerns which arose - for example, relations with neighbours, the matter of local and national pride and questions of trust - may seem not to impinge upon character education as such but are relevant in a wider context

Essays on behavioural and organizational economics

This thesis consists of three self-contained experimental studies focusing on conformity behavior in the leader appointment process, self-group risk preferences of elected leaders and performance feedback mechanisms. In Chapter 1, I investigate discrimination against women in election settings and whether group dynamics undermine women’s chances to become leaders. I conduct a voting experiment which tests the effect of the candidate’s gender on voting behavior, and the role of conformity. Consistent with the predictions of a simple model, subjects tend to vote for candidates who exhibit similar (risk) preferences. Information on the gender of the candidates mitigates proximity concerns of the voter especially in favor of the male candidate. Yet, there is no conclusive result for the gender bias. The results also confirm that conformity is a significant factor in group decision-making. In Chapter 2, I analyze the mechanism which induces the difference between self and group risk attitudes of elected leaders. I focus on two motivations: a “leadership effect”, that is created by the competition and the sense of responsibility of the leadership status, and a “group concern” of the leader. The results show that elected leaders significantly become more risk-seeking when deciding on behalf of a group compared to their individual decisions. Meeting the expectations of group members seems the main driver of this observed behavioral change. In Chapter 3, in a setting where feedback is given strategically by a supervisor, we theoretically and experimentally analyze how employees interpret the received feedback in forming beliefs of themselves and whether feedback communicates the iv actual performance information truthfully. We found that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable is the most informative mechanism. We observed lying-aversion among principles: the results indicate a lying cost, and there is a tendency to send the true information where lying is profitable

Banal Behavior: A Study of Non-Choice

Both the classical and behavioral models of decision-making fall short of sufficiently explaining irrational individual decisions and paradoxical social phenomena. The theory of non-choice offers a more satisfying account of individual decision-making. A review of the deficiencies in the classical and behavioral models demonstrates the need for a new conception of choice. Drawing upon the philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Immanuel Kant, among others, choice is defined as the alignment of thought, will, and action. Stemming from this new model of choice is the theory of non-choice, defined as either the misalignment of the tripartite decision process or a decision made without thought. The new conceptions of choice and non-choice salvage human rationality and freedom in individuals’ decisions, even when the decision outcomes are against individuals’ self-interest. Redefining social norms as the collection of individual non-choices more thoroughly explains widespread, illogical social behavior. Cases of behavioral phenomena with negative externalities, including practices of female genital mutilation/cutting and foot-binding, are examined alongside those with positive externalities, including the voting paradox and organ donation. The concept of non-choice included in these case studies signals that individuals’ counter-preferential behavior is not necessarily caused by irrational decisions, nor motivated by evil or altruistic preferences; rather, it is banal behavior. The banality of evil and the banality of goodness on a large-scale have implications for assigning responsibility to individual action and for motivating pro-social decisions. Most significantly, the concept of non-choice offers normative guidance for the individual decision maker to salvage her rationality and freedom of choice amid the presence of coercive social norms

Collective decision-making under the influence of bribers and temporal constraints

Jo estudio la connexió entre la corrupció i les característiques estructurals dels parlaments: nombre de seients, el nombre de partits representats, i regles de decisió adoptades. Amb l'aplicació d'enfocaments analítics i computacionals, a més de simulacions, mostro que el nombre mitjà de diputats que han de ser subornats disminueix a mesura que el nombre de partits augmenta, de manera que el suborn se sent encoratjat per un nombre cada vegada més gran de parts. També investigo dues formes en que pot afectar el temps a la presa de decisions. En primer lloc, suggereixo un procediment de votació iteratiu en el que el retard en prendre una decisió és costós. Amb dos electors, dues opcions i un ordre de votació fix, demostro que en l’únic equilibri perfecte en subjocs, l’elector que vota primer, obté la seva opció preferida a l'inici del procediment. Si l'ordre s'inverteix en algun moment, identifico la condició sota la qual el votant que vota segon pot obtenir la seva opció preferida al principi. En segon lloc, proposo un altre procediment de votació iterativa, permetent que els votants canvien els seus vots, però ara amb una data límit: una etapa que, si no s'ha pres una decisió, els resultats de la votació són pitjors. Mostro que (i) si hi ha temps suficient perquè tots els votants canviïn el seu vot, es prendrà una decisió, i (ii) si hi ha una alternativa preferida per la majoria dels votants, aquesta alternativa serà finalment triada. Afegeixo un estudi experimental que indica que fins i tot amb menys temps del necessari per a què cada votant pugui canviar el seu vot, els electors estaran d'acord amb una decisió de totes maneres.Estudio la conexión entre la corrupción y las características estructurales de los parlamentos: número de asientos, el número de partidos representados, y reglas de decisión adoptadas. Con la aplicación de enfoques analíticos y computacionales, además de simulaciones, muestro que el número medio de diputados que deben ser sobornados disminuye a medida que el número de partidos aumenta, por lo que el soborno se siente alentado por un número cada vez mayor de partes. También investigo dos formas en que puede afectar el tiempo en la toma de decisiones. En primer lugar, sugiero un procedimiento de votación iterativo en el que el retraso en tomar una decisión es costoso. Con dos electores, dos opciones y un orden de votación fijo, demuestro que en el único equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos, el elector que vota primero obtiene su opción preferida al inicio del procedimiento. Si el orden se invierte en algún momento, identifico la condición bajo la cual el votante que vota segundo puede obtener su opción preferida al principio. En segundo lugar, propongo otro procedimiento de votación iterativa, permitiendo que los votantes cambian sus votos, pero ahora con una fecha límite: una etapa que, si no se ha tomado una decisión, los resultados de la votación son peores. Muestro que (i) si hay tiempo suficiente para que todos los votantes cambien su voto, se tomará una decisión, y (ii) si hay una alternativa preferida por la mayoría de los votantes, esta alternativa será finalmente elegida. Añado un estudio experimental que indica que los electores estarán de acuerdo con una decisión aunque no haya tiempo sufficiente para que cada votante pueda cambiar su voto.I study the connection between corruption and structural characteristics of parliaments: number of seats, the number of parties represented, and decision rules adopted. Applying analytical and computational approaches, and running simulations, I show that the average number of deputies needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases, so bribery is encouraged by a growing number of parties. I also investigate two ways in which time may affect decision-making. First, I suggest an iterative voting procedure in which delay to reach a decision is costly. For two voters and two options, with a fixed voting order, I prove that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the voter who votes first obtains his most preferred option at the beginning of the procedure. If the fixed order is reversed once at some stage, I identify the condition under which the voter initially voting the second obtains this most preferred option, also at the beginning. Second, I propose another iterative voting procedure, allowing voters to change their votes, but now with a deadline: a stage such that, if no decision has been taken by then, the worst outcome results. I show that (i) if there is enough time for all the voters to change their vote, a decision will be taken, and (ii) if there is an alternative preferred by a majority of the voters, this alternative will be finally chosen. I add an experimental study indicating that even with less time necessary for every voter to change his vote, the voters will agree with a decision anyway

What makes voters turn out: the effects of polls and beliefs

We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections

Majoritarian democracy undermines truth-finding in deliberative committees

The aggregated judgments of many usually outperform individual estimates of vaguely known facts. Communication among individuals may, however, undermine this wisdom-of-crowd effect because it makes judgments mutually dependent. Deliberative democratic theory, on the other hand, suggests that communication promotes correct decisions. We investigate this puzzle about the positive and negative consequences of consensus formation on the wisdom of crowds using experimental methods. Subjects in small deliberative committees had to communicate and thereafter judge vaguely known facts. We varied the agreement rules in groups and compared the groups’ change of performance from initial to final estimates. Interestingly, groups’ performance worsened on average when they had to reach a majority decision. Groups came on average closer to the truth if they had to decide unanimously or if they did not have any restrictions to reach agreement. The low performance under majority rule is robust against different knowledge questions, group sizes and communication types. The majority rule may be worst because it makes people too focused to reach a majority so that valuable minority opinions are disregarded or not even voiced. This implies that majoritarian democracy may be less suitable for truth-finding than less or more restrictive quorum rules

Towards Unfair Political Practices Law: Learning lessons from the regulation of unfair commercial practices for online political advertising

Online political advertising operates in a tense forcefield between political and commercial elements and thus presents regulators with a difficult conundrum: because online political advertising is political rather than commercial speech, it is destined to follow a different regulatory tradition than commercial advertising. And yet many of the tools used, players involved and concerns triggered by modern online political advertising strategies very much resemble the tools, players and concerns in online commercial targeting. Commercial advertising is subject to consumer law and unfair advertising regulation, including rules about unfair commercial practices. Unfair commercial practices law and other rules about commercial advertising, however, are explicitly not applicable to forms of non-commercial political or ideological advertising. An important reason why this is so is the different level of protection of political and commercial speech under fundamental rights law standards. And yet with the ongoing commercial turn in advertising, the traditional division between forms of commercial and political advertising is no longer that self-evident. Also, it cannot be denied that commercial advertising law has a long tradition of thinking of where and how to draw the line between lawful advertising and unlawful persuasion through withholding or misleading consumers about the information they need to take informed decisions, or abusing superior knowledge, exerting undue psychological pressure and engaging in other forms of unfair behaviour. The question this article explores is whether there are lessons to be learned from the regulation of commercial advertising for the pending initiatives at the national and the European level to regulate online political advertising, and online political targeting in specific

THE EFFECTS OF ISSUE LINKAGE ON STATE BARGAINING STRATEGIES: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING

This project addresses the relationship between institutional design and cooperation in international bargaining. In particular, it addresses the question of how the institutional structure within which states bargain impacts states' decisions to adopt cooperative, rather than non-cooperative, bargaining strategies. The project draws on the issue linkage literature to analyze one central feature of institutional bargaining structure, "offsetting distributional patterns." When states place importance on different issues included in a bargain and their relative valuation of these issues becomes more disparate, distributional patterns are said to be more "offsetting." In such circumstances, states are more likely to adopt cooperative, rather than zero-sum, bargaining strategies. This relationship exists even if, on each issue, states have antithetical interests. The linkage of issues with more offsetting distributional patterns serves to transform the zero-sum game on each issue into a positive-sum game of linked issues. To build this theoretical argument, the project draws on an abstract, formalized logic analyzing two players bargaining over two issues. It demonstrates that the more offsetting are the distributional patterns of the linked issues, the more likely players are to truthfully reveal their interests - an important step which facilitates the adoption of cooperative bargaining strategies in the incomplete information setting that characterizes much international bargaining. Combined with the incentives created by the issue linkage structure, truthful revelation leads states to adopt cooperative, rather than non-cooperative, bargaining strategies. To empirically test this argument, the project first presents empirical measurement rules for the central variables of interest. Interview evidence with state representatives in the European Union is coded using these rules to construct a large-N dataset on which MLE analyses are conducted to test the central hypothesis relating issue linkage and offsetting distributional patterns to states' adoption of cooperative bargaining strategies. The interview evidence is then employed to construct in-depth case studies to highlight the hypothesized causal mechanisms and observable implications of the theoretical argument. Both the statistical results from the MLE analysis and empirical evidence from the case studies serve to support the project's central hypothesis

Enhancing Tax Compliance of Individuals: Effective Audit Systems and Anti-Tax-Evasion Mechanisms

This thesis expands the understanding of tax compliance of individuals. The three essays provide novel insights that might be especially relevant for governments combating tax evasion. The first essay studies the design of effective audit systems to promote compliance. In particular, it analyzes the effects of (1) increasing the detection probability of non-compliance, (2) monetary incentives to promote compliance (bonuses and penalties), and the interaction of (1) and (2). In conclusion, compliance decreases with audit systems that penalize non-compliance (or reward compliance) with a low detection probability compared to a situation without any audits. Only a penalty system with a high detection probability ensures higher compliance than without audits. The second essay analyzes three mechanisms that might affect tax compliance: 1) prefilling of deductions in tax returns, 2) restricting tax evasion opportunities by either disallowing or 3) limiting the deductibility of expenditures. In conclusion, prefilling reduces tax evasion compared to blank forms. Contrary, cutting the number of tax evasion opportunities by disallowing the deductibility of expenditure items is ineffective. In fact, individuals shift their tax evasion activities from the disallowed item to non-restricted items. However, this evasion-shift-effect seems to be avoidable by just limiting the deductibility of expenditures. The third essay reviews the non-monetary costs of tax evasion. Backed up with a theoretical framework of non-monetary costs of tax evasion, the chapter emphasizes the importance of non-monetary costs of tax evasion. In particular, it explains the influence of social norm, trust, fairness, participation rights, complexity and knowledge, patriotism, and moral emotions on tax compliance behavior