15,828 research outputs found

    Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information

    Get PDF
    Recruitment is often delegated to senior employees. Delegated recruitment, however, is vulnerable to moral hazard because senior employees may avoid recruiting the best candidates who could threaten their future seniority. We find that seniors will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to the candidates’ ‘type’. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering ‘tenure’ or guaranteed seniority to the senior employee is neither always desirable for the owner nor necessary to ensure good recruitment. If there is information asymmetry between the owner and the senior employee regarding additional aspects of firm operations, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure may be needed to ensure that the best candidate is selected. Offering tenure may then be desirable for the owner.recruitment, delegation, moral hazard, long term contract

    Financial Market Regulation: The Case of Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area

    Get PDF
    The objective of the present work is to sketch a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory arrangements and supervisory agencies in the European financial markets. This proposal is formulated in light of the evolution of the role of intermediaries and aims at speeding the ongoing process of integration of financial markets in the Euro area. It is based on previous experiences in the matter of financial regulation at both national and international level. We start by reviewing objectives and theoretical models for the regulation of financial systems. We then move to highlight some features of financial market regulation in Italy that we consider somehow problematic as a consequence of the recent evolution in the financial intermediaries, instruments and markets. A proposal is then formulated for a new configuration for supervising the domestic financial market through the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities. This perspective would thus entrust the three objectives of supervision -- stability, transparency and proper behaviour, competition -- to three distinct authorities designed to oversee the entire financial market regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. We think that our proposal could be transferred (with some benefit) to the Euro area. This requires to explicitly address what is probably the weakest point and the more evident problem of the European Union construction, that of who takes care of financial stability. In particular, one has to re-examine the issue of the need for a lender of last resort and of the proper relationship of the European Central Bank with other financial market regulators. We propose to establish a European System of Financial Supervisors, with three distinct independent authorities (plus the ECB) at the European level. They will provide incentives for and co-ordinate the work of the three corresponding national authorities in each member country.

    Devolution and the New Zealand Resource Management Act

    Get PDF
    Many past and potential New Zealand reforms involve significant devolution, i.e. the transfer of authority to make decisions on behalf of society from a higher to a lower level of government. In particular the Resource Management Act (RMA), the health and education reforms, and decisions about the institutions for addressing Maori issues have led to significant devolution of authority. Employment policy and social welfare are areas where devolution is an important policy option. The role and function of local government also is inherently an issue of the appropriate level of devolution. Many of these reforms have now been in place for a number of years, so it is appropriate to review our experience of devolution, identify the successes, and attempt to address the problems that have arisen. Two papers address issues of when and how we should devolve authority from central to local government. This paper looks at devolution both from a general theoretical standpoint and from the perspective of the New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), with residential land use as an illustration. Although the RMA is discussed throughout both papers, the framework developed applies to any area of policy for which devolution decisions are being considered. The second paper, Treasury Working Paper 98/7a, applies the framework to the optimal pattern of devolution for policies relating to kiwi protection.

    Policy Issues for the Water and Sanitation Sectors

    Get PDF
    Given the importance of water and sanitation loans in the Bank's portfolio of infrastructure projects and the significance of the measures that are underway throughout the region, this discussion paper aims to identify those particular features of the water and sanitation sector which distinguish it from other infrastructure services and which will consequently merit special attention by countries engaging in such reforms. Included are a discussion of institutional problems facing state-owned providers of public services and policy responses to three key economic issues: optimal sector structure, the scope for privatization, and the redesign social policy.Water management, Water Supply and Sanitation, Public Utilities, water supply & sanitation, LAC, water sector, water policies

    Containing systemic risk : paradigm-based perspectives on regulatory reform

    Get PDF
    Financial crises can happen for a variety of reasons: (a) nobody really understands what is going on (the collective cognition paradigm); (b) some understand better than others and take advantage of their knowledge (the asymmetric information paradigm); (c) everybody understands, but crises are a natural part of the financial landscape (the costly enforcement paradigm); or (d) everybody understands, yet no one acts because private and social interests do not coincide (the collective action paradigm). The four paradigms have different and often conflicting prudential policy implications. This paper proposes and discusses three sets of reforms that would give due weight to the insights from the collective action and collective cognition paradigms by redrawing the regulatory perimeter to internalize systemic risk without promoting dynamic regulatory arbitrage; introducing a truly systemic liquidity regulation that moves away from a purely idiosyncratic focus on maturity mismatches; and building up the supervisory function while avoiding the pitfalls of expanded official oversight.Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Labor Policies

    Designing community care systems with AUML

    Get PDF
    This paper describes an approach to developing an appropriate agent environment appropriate for use in community care applications. Key to its success is that software designers collaborate with environment builders to provide the levels of cooperation and support required within an integrated agent–oriented community system. Agent-oriented Unified Modeling Language (AUML) is a practical approach to the analysis, design, implementation and management of such an agent-based system, whilst providing the power and expressiveness necessary to support the specification, design and organization of a health care service. The background of an agent-based community care application to support the elderly is described. Our approach to building agent–oriented software development solutions emphasizes the importance of AUML as a fundamental initial step in producing more general agent–based architectures. This approach aims to present an effective methodology for an agent software development process using a service oriented approach, by addressing the agent decomposition, abstraction, and organization characteristics, whilst reducing its complexity by exploiting AUML’s productivity potential. </p

    Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area: A Four-Peak Proposal

    Get PDF
    In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

    Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

    Get PDF
    In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision - microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition - should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.Financial regulation, supervisory authorities, european financial integration
    corecore