Spinoza on conatus, inertia and the impossibility of self-destruction

Suicide or self-destruction means in ordinary language “the act of killing oneself deliberately” (intentionally or on purpose). Indeed, that’s what we read in the Oxford dictionary and the Oxford dictionary of philosophy , which seems to be confirmed by the etymology of the term “suicide”, a term introduced around mid-17th century deduced from the modern Latin suicidium, ‘act of suicide’. Traditionally, suicide was regarded as immoral, irreligious and illegal in Western culture. However, during the 17th century this Christian view started to change as a consequence of the rise of modern science . Generally speaking, Spinoza does not write much on death. His name does even not occur in the Oxford Philosophy of Death, although he had had very particular ideas on the nature of death. However, he even had much more particular ideas on suicide. Moreover, he states in the fourth proposition of the third part of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that self-destruction is simply impossible: Nulla res, nisi à causâ externâ, potest destrui

Is Spinoza’s theory of Finite Mind Coherent? – Death, Affectivity and Epistemology in the Ethics

In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy

Spinoza

"Spinoza", second edition. Encyclopedia entry for the Springer Encyclopedia of EM Phil and the Sciences, ed. D. Jalobeanu and C. T. Wolfe

Affective Disorders of the State: A Spinozan Diagnosis and Cure

The problems of contemporary states are in large part “affective disorders”; they are failures of states to properly understand and coordinate the emotions of the individuals within and in some instances outside the state. By excluding, imprisoning, and marginalizing members of their societies, states create internal enemies who ultimately enervate their own power and the possibility of peace and freedom within the state. Spinoza’s political theory, based on the notion that the best forms of state are those that coordinate the power and emotions of those within a state, offers us both a diagnosis of and a cure for these affective disorders. In this paper I will outline Spinoza’s notion of the power of the state as a function of the power and coordination of the emotions of its citizens, and show that when the state contracts an affective disorder, such as excessive crime, rebellion, terrorism, etc. the state has failed to properly empower, include and coordinate the passions of the multitude of its citizens and subjects

Algunos aspectos no cartesianos del racionalismo de Spinoza y de Leibniz. Sobre la naturaleza de los cuerpos

Tras recordar en la primera parte algunos vestigios de la herencia neoplatónica y cabalística de la tradición animista en las obras de Spinoza y del joven Leibniz, analizo en la segunda parte aspectos del conatus, que son comunes a ambos filósofos: mens idea corporis y mens harmonia conatuum respectivamente. Por fin, en una tercera parte, describo la «transvaloración » que del conatus de Hobbes y de Spinoza, así como de las regulae motus de Huygens, trató de hacer Leibniz: por una parte, de la resistencia o inertia naturalis de los cuerpos a la vis insita rebus: i. e. potentia absoluta corporum; y por otra parte, de la relatividad del movimiento de los experimentos mecánicos a la universalidad del principio de la equipolencia de la causa plena y del efecto entero, cuyo último fundamento es el principio de individuación: la universalidad de todas las leyes mecánicas y la singularidad de cada suceso del universo.Després de recordar en la primera part alguns vestigis de l'herència neoplatònica i cabalística de la tradició animista en les obres de Spinoza i del jove Leibniz, analitzo en la segona part aspectes del conatus, que són comuns a ambdós filòsofs: mens idea corporis i mens harmonia conatuum respectivament. Finalment, en una tercera part, descric la «transvaloració» que del conatus de Hobbes i de Spinoza, així com de les regulae motus de Huygens, va tractar de fer Leibniz: d'una banda, de la resistència o inertia naturalis dels cossos a la vis insita rebus: i. e. potentia absoluta corporum; i de l'altra, de la relativitat del moviment dels experiments mecànics a la universalitat del principi de l'equipol·lència de la causa plena i de l'efecte enter, l'últim fonament del qual és el principi d'individuació: la universalitat de totes les lleis mecàniques i la singularitat de cada succés de l'univers.Remembering in the first part some vestiges of the neoplatonic and kabbalistic heritage of the animistic tradition in the work of Spinoza and the young Leibniz, I analyze in the second part the common aspects of the conatus in both philosophers: mens idea corporis and mens harmonia conatuum, respectively. Finally, in the third part, I describe the "transvaloration" of Hobbes's and Spinoza's conatus and Huygens's regulae motus Leibniz intended to add: from the "resistance or inertia naturalis" of bodies to the vis insita rebus (i.e., potentia absoluta corporum) and from the "relativity" of motion of mechanical experiments to the "universality" of the principle of equipolentia causae plenae et effectus integri grounded in the principle of individuation, that is, the universality of all mechanical rules and the singularity of every fact of the universe

Time, History, and Providence in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa

Although Nicholas of Cusa occasionally discussed how the universe must be understood as the unfolding of the absolutely infinite in time, he left open questions about any distinction between natural time and historical time, how either notion of time might depend upon the nature of divine providence, and how his understanding of divine providence relates to other traditional philosophical views. From texts in which Cusanus discussed these questions, this paper will attempt to make explicit how Cusanus understood divine providence. The paper will also discuss how Nicholas of Cusa’s view of the question of providence might shed light on Renaissance philosophy’s contribution in the historical transition in Western philosophy from an overtly theological or eschatological understanding of historical time to a secularized or naturalized philosophy of history

The ‘Dynamics’ of Leibnizian Relationism: Reference Frames and Force in Leibniz’s Plenum

This paper explores various metaphysical aspects of Leibniz’s concepts of space, motion, and matter, with the intention of demonstrating how the distinctive role of force in Leibnizian physics can be used to develop a theory of relational motion using privileged reference frames. Although numerous problems will remain for a consistent Leibnizian relationist account, the version developed within our investigation will advance the work of previous commentators by more accurately reflecting the specific details of Leibniz’s own natural philosophy, especially his handling of the dynamical interactions of plenum bodies

“When having too much Power is Harmful? - Spinoza on Political Luck”

Spinoza’s celebrated doctrine of the conatus asserts that “each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (E3p6). Shortly thereafter Spinoza makes the further claim that the (human) mind strives to increase its power of acting (E3p12). This latter claim is commonly interpreted as asserting that human beings (and their associations) not only strive to persevere in their existence, but also always strive to increase their power. Spinoza’s justification for E3p12 relies (among others) on E3p6. For this reason, it seems reasonable that we strive to increase our power because having more power is likely to help us persevere in our being. The more power we have, the less likely we are to be out-powered by external causes that may conflict with our striving for persevering in our existence. The logic here is quite sound. Insofar as human beings are mere finite modes, i.e., entities whose existence is not guaranteed by their mere essence, and are distinct from other finite modes with whom we interact in various manners, it would seem that our striving for power should be insatiable. No finite degree of power can ever guarantee the continuation of our existence. On one occasion, Spinoza even defines good and evil as “what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting” (E4p8d). Having this sound logic in mind, we should be taken aback by a brief claim Spinoza makes in passing in the seventh chapter of Political Treatise. In this passage, Spinoza seems to assert that the stability of a state – which is one of the chief political virtues for Spinoza – is a function of having just the right degree of power, not less, but also, not more. The passage seems to imply that having too much power might be detrimental to the state. But how can such a view be consistent with Spinoza’s assertion and approval of our constant “will to power” in the Ethics? In the current paper, I will explain the tension between these two strands in Spinoza’s thought, and attempt to reconcile them. I will begin with a close examination of the passage from the seventh chapter of the TP, and its apparent contrast with Spinoza’s claim in the Ethics about our striving to increase our power of acting. I will then turn, in the second part, to consider whether Spinoza’s claims in TP Ch. 7 – a chapter dedicated to the exploration of the nature of non-tyrannical monarchy – are valid only with regard to a monarchic state, or whether we may generalize the claim that having too much power might be harmful to other forms of the state or even other kinds of individuals. In the third and final part I will attempt to solve the tension between Spinoza’s apparently conflicting claims by looking more closely at Spinoza’s understanding of human power, and its political dimensions