Egalitarianism in the rank aggregation problem: a new dimension for democracy

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no univocal criteria for the selection of the winning (consensus) ranking and the outcome is known to depend sensibly on the adopted rule. Building upon XVIII century Condorcet theory, whose idea was to maximize total voter satisfaction, we propose here the addition of a new basic principle (dimension) to guide the selection: satisfaction should be distributed among voters as equally as possible. With this new criterion we identify an optimal set of rankings. They range from the Condorcet solution to the one which is the most egalitarian with respect to the voters. We show that highly egalitarian rankings have the important property to be more stable with respect to fluctuations and that classical consensus rankings (Copeland, Tideman, Schulze) often turn out to be non optimal. The new dimension we have introduced provides, when used together with that of Condorcet, a clear classification of all the possible rankings. By increasing awareness in selecting a consensus ranking our method may lead to social choices which are more egalitarian compared to those achieved by presently available voting systems.Comment: 18 pages, 14 page appendix, RateIt Web Tool: http://www.sapienzaapps.it/rateit.php, RankIt Android mobile application: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sapienza.informatica.rankit. Appears in Quality & Quantity, 10 Apr 2015, Online Firs

Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?

For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly discusses about 20 systems, though over 50 are known to exist.Comment: 41 pages, no figures. The Introduction has been changed. Also fixed some version 6 errors in referencing subsection numbers in section

Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method

We study computational aspects of a well-known single-winner voting rule called the Schulze method [Schulze, 2003] which is used broadly in practice. In this method the voters give (weak) ordinal preference ballots which are used to define the weighted majority graph (WMG) of direct comparisons between pairs of candidates. The choice of the winner comes from indirect comparisons in the graph, and more specifically from considering directed paths instead of direct comparisons between candidates. When the input is the WMG, to our knowledge, the fastest algorithm for computing all winners in the Schulze method uses a folklore reduction to the All-Pairs Bottleneck Paths problem and runs in $O(m^{2.69})$ time, where $m$ is the number of candidates. It is an interesting open question whether this can be improved. Our first result is a combinatorial algorithm with a nearly quadratic running time for computing all winners. This running time is essentially optimal. If the input to the Schulze winners problem is not the WMG but the preference profile, then constructing the WMG is a bottleneck that increases the running time significantly; in the special case when there are $m$ candidates and $n=O(m)$ voters, the running time is $O(m^{2.69})$, or $O(m^{2.5})$ if there is a nearly-linear time algorithm for multiplying dense square matrices. To address this bottleneck, we prove a formal equivalence between the well-studied Dominance Product problem and the problem of computing the WMG. We prove a similar connection between the so called Dominating Pairs problem and the problem of finding a winner in the Schulze method. Our paper is the first to bring fine-grained complexity into the field of computational social choice. Using it we can identify voting protocols that are unlikely to be practical for large numbers of candidates and/or voters, as their complexity is likely, say at least cubic.Comment: 19 pages, 2 algorithms, 2 tables. A previous version of this work appears in EC 2021. In this version we strengthen Theorem 6.2 which now holds also for the problem of finding a Schulze winne

A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The complete case

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair of options. The proposed method is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet-Smith principle, and a property of clone consistency. One can view this rating method as a complement for the ranking method introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze. It is also related to certain methods of one-dimensional scaling or cluster analysis.Comment: This is part one of a revised version of arxiv:0810.2263. Version 3 is the result of certain modifications, both in the statement of the problem and in the concluding remarks, that enhance the results of the paper; the results themselves remain unchange

Co-operatives as an Aid to Small Business in Germany

Tridiagonal parametrizations of linear state-space models are proposed for multivariable system identification. The parametrizations are surjective, i.e. all systems up to a given order can be described. The parametrization is based on the fact that any real square matrix is similar to a real tridiagonal form as well as a compact tridiagonal form. These parametrizations has significantly fewer parameters compared to a full parametrization of the state-space matrices

Analysis of a Voting Method for Ranking Network Centrality Measures on a Node-aligned Multiplex Network

Identifying relevant actors using information gleaned from multiple networks is a key goal within the context of human aspects of military operations. The application of a voting theory methodology for determining nodes of critical importance—in ranked order of importance—for a node-aligned multiplex network is demonstrated. Both statistical and qualitative analyses on the differences of ranking outcomes under this methodology is provided. As a corollary, a multilayer network reduction algorithm is investigated within the context of the proposed ranking methodology. The application of the methodology detailed in this thesis will allow meaningful rankings of relevant actors to be produced on a multiplex network

Coupled dynamics of node and link states in complex networks: A model for language competition

Inspired by language competition processes, we present a model of coupled evolution of node and link states. In particular, we focus on the interplay between the use of a language and the preference or attitude of the speakers towards it, which we model, respectively, as a property of the interactions between speakers (a link state) and as a property of the speakers themselves (a node state). Furthermore, we restrict our attention to the case of two socially equivalent languages and to socially inspired network topologies based on a mechanism of triadic closure. As opposed to most of the previous literature, where language extinction is an inevitable outcome of the dynamics, we find a broad range of possible asymptotic configurations, which we classify as: frozen extinction states, frozen coexistence states, and dynamically trapped coexistence states. Moreover, metastable coexistence states with very long survival times and displaying a non-trivial dynamics are found to be abundant. Interestingly, a system size scaling analysis shows, on the one hand, that the probability of language extinction vanishes exponentially for increasing system sizes and, on the other hand, that the time scale of survival of the non-trivial dynamical metastable states increases linearly with the size of the system. Thus, non-trivial dynamical coexistence is the only possible outcome for large enough systems. Finally, we show how this coexistence is characterized by one of the languages becoming clearly predominant while the other one becomes increasingly confined to "ghetto-like" structures: small groups of bilingual speakers arranged in triangles, with a strong preference for the minority language, and using it for their intra-group interactions while they switch to the predominant language for communications with the rest of the population.Comment: 21 pages, 15 figure

Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Data to Estimate the Nonmarket Value of Ecological Services: An Assessment of the State of the Science

This paper reviews the marketing, transportation, and environmental economics literature on the joint estimation of revealed and stated preference data. The revealed preference and stated preference approaches are first described with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing these strengths and weaknesses, the potential gains from combining data are described. A classification system for combined data that emphasizes the type of data combination and the econometric models used is proposed. A methodological review of the literature is pursued based on this classification system. Examples from the environmental economics literature are highlighted. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of jointly estimated model is then presented. Suggestions for future research, in particular opportunities for application of these models to environmental quality valuation, are presented.Nonmarket Valuation, Revealed Preference, Stated Preference