128 research outputs found

    Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage

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    Privacy of users in P2P networks goes far beyond their current usage and is a fundamental requirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal usage. In a climate of cold war between these users and anti-piracy groups, more and more users are moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide their identity. However, when not designed to protect users information, a P2P protocol would leak information that may compromise the identity of its users. In this paper, we first present three attacks targeting BitTorrent users on top of Tor that reveal their real IP addresses. In a second step, we analyze the Tor usage by BitTorrent users and compare it to its usage outside of Tor. Finally, we depict the risks induced by this de-anonymization and show that users' privacy violation goes beyond BitTorrent traffic and contaminates other protocols such as HTTP

    Bitcoin over Tor isn't a good idea

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    Bitcoin is a decentralized P2P digital currency in which coins are generated by a distributed set of miners and transaction are broadcasted via a peer-to-peer network. While Bitcoin provides some level of anonymity (or rather pseudonymity) by encouraging the users to have any number of random-looking Bitcoin addresses, recent research shows that this level of anonymity is rather low. This encourages users to connect to the Bitcoin network through anonymizers like Tor and motivates development of default Tor functionality for popular mobile SPV clients. In this paper we show that combining Tor and Bitcoin creates an attack vector for the deterministic and stealthy man-in-the-middle attacks. A low-resource attacker can gain full control of information flows between all users who chose to use Bitcoin over Tor. In particular the attacker can link together user's transactions regardless of pseudonyms used, control which Bitcoin blocks and transactions are relayed to the user and can \ delay or discard user's transactions and blocks. In collusion with a powerful miner double-spending attacks become possible and a totally virtual Bitcoin reality can be created for such set of users. Moreover, we show how an attacker can fingerprint users and then recognize them and learn their IP address when they decide to connect to the Bitcoin network directly.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, 4 table

    Improving Content Availability in the I2P Anonymous File-Sharing Environment

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    International audienceAnonymous communication has gained more and more interest from Internet users as privacy and anonymity problems have emerged. Dedicated anonymous networks such as Freenet and I2P allow anonymous file-sharing among users. However, one major problem with anonymous file-sharing networks is that the available content is highly reduced, mostly with outdated files, and non-anonymous networks, such as the BitTorrent network, are still the major source of content: we show that in a 30-days period, 21648 new torrents were introduced in the BitTorrent community, whilst only 236 were introduced in the anonymous I2P network, for four different categories of content. Therefore, how can a user of these anonymous networks access this varied and non-anonymous content without compromising its anonymity? In this paper, we improve content availability in an anonymous environment by proposing the first internetwork model allowing anonymous users to access and share content in large public communities while remaining anonymous. We show that our approach can efficiently interconnect I2P users and public BitTorrent swarms without affecting their anonymity nor their performance. Our model is fully implemented and freely usable

    RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor

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    The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show that prior attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. We present a suite of new attacks, called Raptor, that can be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes) to compromise user anonymity. First, AS-level adversaries can exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet routing to increase the chance of observing at least one direction of user traffic at both ends of the communication. Second, AS-level adversaries can exploit natural churn in Internet routing to lie on the BGP paths for more users over time. Third, strategic adversaries can manipulate Internet routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using specific Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform traffic analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of Raptor attacks by analyzing historical BGP data and Traceroute data as well as performing real-world attacks on the live Tor network, while ensuring that we do not harm real users. In addition, we outline the design of two monitoring frameworks to counter these attacks: BGP monitoring to detect control-plane attacks, and Traceroute monitoring to detect data-plane anomalies. Overall, our work motivates the design of anonymity systems that are aware of the dynamics of Internet routing

    ATTACKING ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS THROUGH PORT REDIRECTION

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