Complementarity and Financial Systems

Individual financial systems can be understood as very specific configurations of certain key elements. Often these configurations remain unchanged for decades. We hypothesize that there is a specific relationship between key elements, namely that of complementarity. Thus, complementarity seems to be an essential feature of financial systems. Intuitively speaking, complementarity exists if the elements of a (financial) system reinforce each other in terms of contributing to the functioning of the system. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an analytical clarification of the concept of complementarity. This is done by modeling financial systems as combinations of four elements: firm-specific human capital of an entrepreneur, the ability of a bank to restructure the borrower's firm in the case of distress, the possibility to appropriate private benefits from running the firm, and the bankruptcy law. A specific configuration of these elements constitutes one financial system. The bankruptcy law and the potential private benefits are treated as exogenous. They determine the bargaining power of the contracting parties in the case that recontracting occurs. In a two-stage game, the optimal values for the other elements are determined by the agents individually - by investing in human capital and restructuring skills, respectively - and jointly by writing, executing and possibly renegotiating a financing contract for the firm. The paper discusses the equilibria for different types of bankruptcy law and demonstrates that equilibria exhibit the sought-after feature of complementarity. Three particularly significant equilibria correspond to stylized accounts of the British, German and the US-American financial system, respectively

Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if compensated through options. Compensation through restricted company stock reduces the uptake of excessive risks. Even under stock-ownership, however, experimental executives continue to take excessive risks—a result that cannot be accounted for by classic incentive theory. We develop a basic model in which such risk-taking behavior is explained based on a richer array of risk attitudes derived from Prospect Theory. We use the model to derive hypotheses on what may be driving excessive risk taking in the experiment. Testing those hypotheses, we find that most of them are indeed borne out by the data. We thus conclude that a prospect-theory-based model is more apt at explaining risk attitudes under different compensation regimes than traditional principal-agent models grounded in expected utility theory

A Strategic Approach to Agricultural Research Program Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa

Recent studies have shown that agricultural research can have high payoffs in Africa, but impact depends on how well technology fits with evolving needs and capacity in the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy. Structural adjustment policies (e.g., market liberalization, currency devaluation) and political change are transforming user demands for new technology and the economic environment in which technology must perform. The challenge is how to design agricultural research as a strategic input to promote broad-based economic growth, structural transformation, and food security in the increasingly market-driven, but fragile, economies of Africa.Food Security, Food Policy, Agricultural Research, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Downloads May 2008-July 2009: 44, Q18,

Liquidity Risk and Monetary Policy

This paper provides a framework to analyse emergency liquidity assistance of central banks on financial markets in response to aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The model combines the microeconomic view of liquidity as the ability to sell assets quickly and at low costs and the macroeconomic view of liquidity as a medium of exchange that influences the aggregate price level of goods. The central bank faces a trade-off between limiting the negative output effects of dramatic asset price declines and more inflation. Furthermore, the anticipation of central bank intervention causes a moral hazard effect with investors. This gives rise to the possibility of an optimal monetary policy under commitment

Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if compensated through options. Compensation through restricted company stock reduces the uptake of excessive risks. Even under stock-ownership, however, experimental executives continue to take excessive risks—a result that cannot be accounted for by classic incentive theory. We develop a basic model in which such risk-taking behavior is explained based on a richer array of risk attitudes derived from Prospect Theory. We use the model to derive hypotheses on what may be driving excessive risk taking in the experiment. Testing those hypotheses, we find that most of them are indeed borne out by the data. We thus conclude that a prospect-theory-based model is more apt at explaining risk attitudes under different compensation regimes than traditional principal-agent models grounded in expected utility theory.prospect theory; expected utility theory; risk attitude; executive compensation; reference dependence; experimental finance

Spillovers Reconsidered: Analysing Economic Welfare under complementarities in R&D

We analyse economic welfare in R&D intensive industries under varying assumptions on the spillover process. The focus lies on spillover processes with complementary R&D investments such as those modelling absorptive capacity. There spillovers give rise to both negative and positive externalities. We show that the rationale for public policy intervention is strengthened where spillovers also have positive effects. This conclusion is based on the supermodularity of the spillover process and the investment game. We characterise a large class of spillover processes with similar implications for public policy. We show that results of much empirical work on absorptive capacity extend to this class of models

Optimal project rejection and new firm start-ups

Entrants are typically found to be more innovative than incumbent firms. Furthermore, these innovative ideas often originate with established firms in the industry. Therefore, the established firm and the start-up firm seem to select different types of projects. We claim that this is the consequence of their optimal project allocation mechanism, which depends on their comparative advantage. The start-up firm may seem more "innovative" than the established firm because the comparative advantage of the start-up firm is to commercialize "innovative" projects, i.e. projects that do not fit with the established firms' existing assets. Our model integrates various facts found in the industrial organization literature about the entry rate, firm focus, firm growth, industry growth and innovation. We also obtain some counter-intuitive results, such as that a reduction in the cost of start-ups may actually slow down start-ups, or that the firm may voluntarily give away the property rights to the inventions discovered within the firmManagement; Innovation management;

The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game

This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm's income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability (strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure-strategy play but will switch to mixed-strategy play. There is one exception, though: when the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch to mixed-strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager's choice of whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed information sharing. © 2013 Copyright European Accounting Association