The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities

This paper presents a new approach to the theory of the firm by identifying factor complementarities as central to the determination of the firm's boundaries. The factor complementarities may take a variety of forms: technological and informational complementarities, as well as economies of scale and scope. We examine the tradeoff between the gains from these complementarities and transactions costs. In so doing, we must abandon the standard dichotomy between the determinants of plant size and firm size. The influence of factor complementarities on firm size is examined in partial and general equilibrium frameworks.Boundary of Firm; Complementarities of Production; Transaction Costs

The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities

This paper presents a new approach to the theory of the firm by identifying factor complementarities as central to the determination of the firm’s boundaries. The factor complementarities may take a variety of forms: technological and informational complementarities, as well as economies of scale and scope. We examine the tradeoff between the gains from these complementarities and transactions costs. In so doing, we must abandon the standard dichotomy between the determinants of plant size and firm size. The influence of factor complementarities on firm size is examined in partial and general equilibrium frameworks.

European integration and complementarities driven network alignment: the case of ABB in Central and Eastern Europe

The depth of industry integration between European ‘West’ and ‘East’ depends on the simultaneous existence of several factors, which, through mutual complementarities, align global and local networks. This paper takes the case of Asea Brown Bowery (ABB), one of the first large investors in central and eastern Europe (CEE), to show that the successful penetration of this company into CEE was the result of the simultaneous occurrence of several factors, which had mutually reinforcing complementarities. Changes in the strategy of ABB towards knowledge-based services may be weakening these complementarities and dis-aligning local and global networks in CEE. By integrating the insights of Milgrom and Roberts (1995) on complementarities the paper further develops the ‘network alignment’ perspective (Kim and von Tunzelmann, 1998) on growth

Games of strategic complementarities: An application to bayesian games

Games of strategic complementarities are those in which any player increases his action in response to an increase in the level of actions of rivals. This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games.Strategic complementarities; games theory;

Industrial Deregulation, Skill Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in India

We investigate the relationship between economic deregulation (delicensing), skill upgrading, and wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s in India. We use a unique dataset on India's industrial licensing regime to test whether industrial deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s played a role in generating demand for skilled workers, as measured by the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers, and in raising the returns to skilled labor, as measured by the skill premium. Our analysis focuses not only on the difference between licensed and delicensed industries but also on the comparison of these differences during the 1980s, when India's external sector remained relatively closed to the world economy, and the 1990s, when India underwent massive liberalization reforms and became increasingly integrated with the global economy. We identify two main channels through which industrial delicensing affects the demand for skills and wage inequality: capital- and output-skill complementarities. Our analysis finds two important results. First, capital- and output-skill complementarities existed for firms in both licensed and delicensed industries but were stronger in delicensed industries both before and after 1991. The exception is output-skill complementarities with respect to the skill premium, where delicensed industries experienced lower output-skill complementarities compared to licensed ones both before and after 1991. Second, the contribution of industrial delicensing to both types of complementarities was considerably higher during the 1980s and much smaller after 1991. These results suggest that industrial delicensing benefited skilled labor via capital- and output-skill complementarities during the 1980s, the decade before India liberalized it's trade and investment regime. Thus, much of the increase in the demand for and returns to skill as a result of capital- and output-skill complementarities can be attributed to domestic reforms during the pre-1991 period in India.Capital-skill complementarities, industrial delicensing, trade liberalization, India

Collusion via signaling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities

Collusive equilibria exist in open ascending auctions with multiple objects, if the number of bidders is sufficiently small relative to the number of objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Hence the complementarities are not realized

A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. This is a negative result because it implies that the predictive power of complementarities alone is very weak. As an application of my results I show that generic 2 X 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or are GSC.

Complementarities and Costly Investment in a One-Sector Growth Model

The presence of complementarities generally makes a growth model nonlinear, hence delivering multiple equilibria. Introducing internal investment costs in the R&D-based growth literature, we develop a growth model which combines the assumptions of complementarities between capital goods in the production function and of internal costly investment in capital. We find that with such combination of complementarities and costly investment, the growth model delivers a single equilibrium.Complementarities, Costly Investment, Economic Growth

A Model of Growth with Intertemporal Knowledge Externalities, Augmented with Contemporaneous Knowledge Externalities

The present model is essentially Romer’s (1990) model of endogenous growth with intertemporal knowledge externalities, augmented with contemporaneous knowledge externalities to give a richer explanation of the growth process. Both types of knowledge spillovers seem essential to capturing the features of knowledge in a model of growth. Introducing synchronic complementarities and knowledge externalities across inventive firms immediately creates the possibility of multiple equilibria and threshold effects in the present model. Another advantage of this theoretical formulation is that it allows for an analysis of the effects on steady-state growth of a variety of technology policies relying on changing knowledge complementarities parameters.Endogenous growth, innovation, knowledge complementarities, knowledge externalities, general equilibrium