4,540 research outputs found

    Competitive division of a mixed manna

    Get PDF
    A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes) and bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homogeneous of degree 1 and concave (and monotone), the competitive division maximizes the Nash product of utilities (Gale–Eisenberg): hence it is welfarist (determined by the set of feasible utility profiles), unique, continuous, and easy to compute. We show that the competitive division of a mixed manna is still welfarist. If the zero utility profile is Pareto dominated, the competitive profile is strictly positive and still uniquely maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero profile is unfeasible (for instance, if all items are bads), the competitive profiles are strictly negative and are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficiency frontier. The latter allows for multiple competitive utility profiles, from which no single-valued selection can be continuous or resource monotonic. Thus the implementation of competitive fairness under linear preferences in interactive platforms like SPLIDDIT will be more difficult when the manna contains bads that overwhelm the goods

    Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna

    Get PDF
    We study the fair division problem of allocating a mixed manna under additively separable piecewise linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A mixed manna contains goods that everyone likes and bads that everyone dislikes, as well as items that some like and others dislike. The seminal work of Bogomolnaia et al. [Econometrica'17] argue why allocating a mixed manna is genuinely more complicated than a good or a bad manna, and why competitive equilibrium is the best mechanism. They also provide the existence of equilibrium and establish its peculiar properties (e.g., non-convex and disconnected set of equilibria even under linear utilities), but leave the problem of computing an equilibrium open. This problem remained unresolved even for only bad manna under linear utilities. Our main result is a simplex-like algorithm based on Lemke's scheme for computing a competitive allocation of a mixed manna under SPLC utilities, a strict generalization of linear. Experimental results on randomly generated instances suggest that our algorithm will be fast in practice. The problem is known to be PPAD-hard for the case of good manna, and we also show a similar result for the case of bad manna. Given these PPAD-hardness results, designing such an algorithm is the only non-brute-force (non-enumerative) option known, e.g., the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm (1964) for computing a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player game is still one of the most widely used algorithms in practice. Our algorithm also yields several new structural properties as simple corollaries. We obtain a (constructive) proof of existence for a far more general setting, membership of the problem in PPAD, rational-valued solution, and odd number of solutions property. The last property also settles the conjecture of Bogomolnaia et al. in the affirmative

    Dividing bads under additive utilities

    Get PDF
    We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other

    Effect of Training on Physiological and Biochemical Variables of Soccer Players of Different Age Groups

    Get PDF
    Purpose: To find out the effect of training on selected physiological and biochemical variables of Indian soccer players of different age groups.\ud \ud Methods: A total of 120 soccer players volunteered for the study, were divided (n=30) into 4 groups: (i) under 16 years (U16), (ii) under 19 years (U19), (iii) under 23 years (U23), (iv) senior (SR). The training sessions were divided into 2 phases (a) Preparatory Phase (PP, 8 weeks) and (b) Competitive Phase (CP, 4 weeks). The training program consisted of aerobic, anaerobic and skill development, and were completed 4 hrs/day; 5 days/week. Selected physiological and biochemical variables were measured at zero level (baseline data, BD) and at the end of PP and CP.\ud \ud Results: A significant increase (P<0.05) in lean body mass (LBM), VO2max, anaerobic power, grip and back strength, urea, uric acid and high density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C); and a significant decrease (P<0.05) in body fat, hemoglobin (Hb), total cholesterol (TC), triglyceride (TG) and low density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) were detected in some groups in PP and CP phases of the training when compare to BD. However, no significant change was found in body mass and maximal heart rate of the players after the training program.\ud \ud Conclusion: This study would provide useful information for training and selection of soccer players of different age groups.\u
    corecore