Intransitivity in Theory and in the Real World

This work considers reasons for and implications of discarding the assumption of transitivity, which (transitivity) is the fundamental postulate in the utility theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, the adiabatic accessibility principle of Caratheodory and most other theories related to preferences or competition. The examples of intransitivity are drawn from different fields, such as law, biology, game theory, economics and competitive evolutionary dynamic. This work is intended as a common platform that allows us to discuss intransitivity in the context of different disciplines. The basic concepts and terms that are needed for consistent treatment of intransitivity in various applications are presented and analysed in a unified manner. The analysis points out conditions that necessitate appearance of intransitivity, such as multiplicity of preference criteria and imperfect (i.e. approximate) discrimination of different cases. The present work observes that with increasing presence and strength of intransitivity, thermodynamics gradually fades away leaving space for more general kinetic considerations. Intransitivity in competitive systems is linked to complex phenomena that would be difficult or impossible to explain on the basis of transitive assumptions. Human preferences that seem irrational from the perspective of the conventional utility theory, become perfectly logical in the intransitive and relativistic framework suggested here. The example of competitive simulations for the risk/benefit dilemma demonstrates the significance of intransitivity in cyclic behaviour and abrupt changes in the system. The evolutionary intransitivity parameter, which is introduced in the Appendix, is a general measure of intransitivity, which is particularly useful in evolving competitive systems. Quantum preferences are also considered in the Appendix.Comment: 44 pages, 14 figures, 47 references, 6 appendice

The future of the Dutch egg processing industry

This research examines the competitiveness of the Dutch egg products industry, as well as the consequences of tightening up the laws concerning layer poultry on the competitive position of the Dutch egg production industry. A tightening of the laws has, in fact, the effect of raising the production cost, and in this research the central question revolves around whether animal welfare-friendly egg products are perceived as products with added value by the buyers of egg products (mainly industrial buyers) and will thus also be offered for sale at a higher price. Furthermore, it will be investigated what the probable developmental directions are in the egg products industry if this higher price cannot be realise

Contracts for uncertain delivery

We propose the notion of objects of choice as uncertain consumption bundles, extending the formulation of Arrow (1953). Agents sign “contracts for uncertain delivery”, which specify a list of alternative bundles, instead of a single one. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty and asymmetric information in the model of Arrow-Debreu. Relatively to the model of Radner (1968), efficiency of trade is increased and some “no trade” situations are avoided, while the classical results still hold: existence of core and competitive equilibrium, core convergence, welfare theorems, etc.Uncertainty, Asymmetric information, Private information, Contingent delivery, Radner equilibrium.

Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian al- locations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The main novelty of the result is twofold: (1) it holds for any number of agents; (2) it is robust to di¤erent speci�cations of the bargaining process.strategic bargaining; Walrasian Equilibrium