Defining a relevant architecture in South Africa

Architecture in South Africa is at a crossroads. Afteryears of repression and isolation during which contemporary architecture lost its way, there is now a desperate need for architects to respond to the social a nd cultural challenges of a society riven by massive material contrasts. Within architecture schools, a student body more representative of society than hitherto is engaged in projects which reflect the very diverse needs of the community. Central to the effectiveness of such teaching programmes is the presence of teachers fully engaged in practice, creating a responsible architecture fora renewed nation

Abuse of dominance under the Egyptian Competition Law: investigating peculiarities that may have special effects in the economy

This paper investigates peculiarities in the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian Competition Law and evaluates their potential effects in the economy. Particularly, it recognizes the lack of excessive pricing prohibition and the deployment of effects-based approach to abuse of dominance at the present stage as likely peculiarities in Egyptian Competition Law that may harm the economy. It is specifically argued that the success of the practice of excessive pricing, at least in exceptional circumstances, may become more plausible at this stage in Egypt, as an emerging economy, since it lacks the necessary competition culture and, as such, its market is highly concentrated. The paper, furthermore, finds that employing an effects-based approach at this early stage of competition law enforcement may not be suitable due to the understandable lack of experience that may increase the likelihood of committing judicial errors. It is, however, perceived that investigating the practice of excessive pricing is quite complex and, as such prohibiting it may not be the best initiative at this stage. Moreover, it is suggested that employing an effects-based analysis, as opposed to per se approach, may help avoid type II errors (erroneously condemning pro-competitive practices). It is, hence, suggested to stick by this approach at the current stage; so long as caution is taken in relation to practices that generate questionable anti-competitive effects. Whether for introducing an excessive pricing prohibition in the future (should the practice continue to pose a threat) or employing effects-based approach, it is argued that increasing economic expertise in the field of competition law and cooperating with competition authorities of the developed world remains central

Competition

Competition has been modelled in the literature in a number of ways.What do these different parametrizations of competition have in common?For instance, it turns out that it is not always the case that a rise in competition reduces price cost margins, industry wide profits or concentration.All parametrizations of competition, considered here, have two features in common.First, the reallocation effect: a rise in competition raises the profits of a firm relative to the profits of a less efficient firm.Second, a rise in competition reduces the profits of the least efficient firm active in the industry.competition;industrial concentration;profit

Competition for status acquisition in public good games

This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contri- butions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in standard models where status is not considered, and their donation is increasing in the value they assign to status. In addition, players'contributions are increasing in the value that their opponents assign to status, reflecting donors' intense competition to gain social status. Furthermore, I consider contributors'equilibrium strategies both in simultaneous and sequen- tial contribution mechanisms. Then, I compare total contributions in both of these mechanisms. I find that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total contributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are sufficiently homogeneous in the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest contributions. Updated 6-03-09.Public goods games, Status acquisition, Competition.

Courtroom Competition

Long hours and lost weekends can\u27t deter members of the School\u27s trial teams. Their hard work is paying off with regional titles and national recognition

Competition of Salts with Sulfamethoxazole in an Anionic Ion Exchange Process

Author Ana Maria Lopez Fernandez acknowledges a Ph.D. fellowship from the Severo Ochoa Programme (Gobierno del Principado de Asturias, Spain)

Training Costs and Wage Differentials in the Theory of Job Competition

A labor market is considered that is characterized by job competition over job ladders. Firms paying more for comparable jobs can attract workers with better background characteristics (with general human capital) and will lose fewer trained workers (with general and firm-specific human capital). Optimizing behavior on the side of the firms gives rise to a wage structure that shows similar correlations between training and wages as would emerge in a human capital framework, but for different reasons. Further, the wage structure responds to other influences, like the degree of labor mobility

Improving competitive ability of chickpea with sowthistle

An experiment was conducted to examine the extent of root and canopy interference of chickpea (Cicer arietinum L.) with sowthistle (Sonchus oleraceus L.). Sowthistle was surrounded with either two or eight chickpea plants. There were different types of competition: no competition, shoot competition, root competition and full competition (root and shoot). The performance of sowthistle grown in full competition with two chickpea plants was the same as that grown with root competition only. Also, there were no significant differences between sowthistle grown with chickpea canopy shade and the control, where there was no competition. On the other hand sowthistle grown with eight neighbours was significantly suppressed in full, canopy or root competition

Hotelling tax competition

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling’s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which can occur, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated

The Competition between Competition Rules

Open borders imply systems competition. This paper studies the implications of systems competition for the national co mpetition rules. It is shown that an equilibrium where all countries retain their antitrust laws does not exist, since abolishing this law makes it possible for a single country to establish a cartel that successfully appropriates foreign business profi t s. Instead of such an equilibrium, a deregulation race is likely to emerge in which all but the last country repeal their antitrust laws. The deregulation race results in a chain of Stackelberg leadership positions taken over by national cartels that rend ers lower profits and higher consumer rents than would have been the case with harmonization of the antitrust laws.