RATIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT STANDARDS

This paper considers the incentives of firms to conform to an exogenous international product standard. Product standardization enables traditional, price-based international competition. But the existence of redesign costs or network effects creates market frictions that diminish the incentive to standardize if there already exists a different technology in an established market. This leads to multi-attribute competition between products and will generally reduce trade flows. Not only do incumbent firms using a different technology have an incentive to deviate from the international standard, but a host country government that is also concerned for the welfare of consumers who own the old technology has no incentive to enforce the international standard. Indeed, the government may value deviation from the international standard more than the firm does, thereby creating incentives to adopt and enforce technical barriers to trade. The results highlight the challenge lock-in effects pose to the international standard-setting process.compatibility, international standardization, network effects, redesign costs, technical barriers to trade, International Relations/Trade, F02, F13, F15, L11, L13, L51,

RATIONAL INCOMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT STANDARDS

International Relations/Trade,

Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study

Pan-European industrial networks as factor of convergence or divergence within Europe

Book description: European integration can no longer be understood as a west European experiment mainly focused on functional and economic policy cooperation. The issues addressed include security and defence, as well as core concerns of European society. This volume explores three interlocking dimensions of integration; functional, territorial, and affiliational. Each dimension influences how countries across the continent engage with European integration. This first volume in the One Europe or Several? series identifies the agenda of a research programme, funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council

Product line design

We characterize the product line choice and pricing of a monopolist from the upper envelope of net marginal revenue curves to the individual product demand functions. The equilibrium product line constitutes those varieties yielding the highest upper envelope. In a generalized vertical differentiation framework, the equilibrium line is exactly the same as the first-best socially optimal line. These upper envelope and first-best optimal line findings extend to symmetric Cournot oligopoly

The Economics of Traceability for Multi-Ingredient Products: A Network Approach

The consumption of multi-ingredient foods is increasing across the globe as consumers spend less time preparing meals. Traceability is now extensively used to reduce information imperfections in food markets and recent EU law suggests it will be implemented for manufactured meals as well. We present a model developed to understand how information on different ingredients flows through supply chains for multi-ingredient food products. The network model has three tiers linked by contracts for levels of quality and information. The model is useful for analyzing tradeoffs and network effects emerging in the choice of traceability levels.Traceability, multi-ingredient foods, network models, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Triple Play Time

Abstract: Digital convergence thrusts telephony, television and the internet into the socalled 'triple play' offerings, creating new forms of rivalry between cable operators and telephone companies. Markets participants feel compelled to enter new industries to survive, even though their core competencies are limited to their primary market. The outcome of triple play competition is likely to depend on the speed of the development of new technologies and the adaptation of the regulatory environment. In the short run, telephone companies will enjoy an advantage attributable to switching costs. However, this advantage will erode as younger subscribers switch to telephony on the internet.triple play; bundling; digital convergence; broadband access; television and telephone