Commuters route choice behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments with a two route choice scenario. In each session 18 subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity of M was larger. Feedback was given in treatment I only on the subjects' own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. The main results are as follows: • Mean numbers on M and S are near to pure equilibrium. • Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions. • The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I. • Subjects' road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated. • A direct response mode results in more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions. • Simulations of an extended payoff sum learning model fits the main results of the statistical evaluation of the data

An Extended Reinforcement Algorithm for Estimation of Human Behaviour in Experimental Congestion Games

The paper reports simulations applied on two similar congestion games: the first is the classical minority game. The second one is an asymmetric variation of the minority game with linear payoff functions. For each game, simulation results based on an extended reinforcement algorithm are compared with real experimental statistics. It is shown that the extension of the reinforcement model is essential for fitting the experimental data and estimating the player\'s behaviour.Congestion Game, Minority Game, Laboratory Experiments, Reinforcement Algorithm, Payoff Sum Model, Game Theory, Experimental Economics

Le cybertransport : une clé pour un développement responsable

International audienceLes cybertransports sont une avenue pour améliorer la mobilité des marchandises et des personnes. Parmi les technologies disponibles, la Serpentine, en tant que système de transport cybernétique, se distingue par ses propriétés structurelles et sa capacité intrinsèque à répondre collectivement à des besoins individuels. Dès lors, le mode opératoire des véhicules doit être développé afin d'exploiter ces propriétés. L'analogie avec les réseaux électriques ainsi que l'intégration du principe d'entropie permet de définir une règle comportementale du système pour répondre à la demande des usagers. Le scénario synthétique développé pour le centre-ville de Montréal montre que le modèle dynamique permet, lors d'une forte demande, d'assurer la pérennité du service et l'intégrité du système. Par ailleurs, l'intégration de la Serpentine dans un milieu urbain comme Montréal permet, comparativement au tramway, d'améliorer l'offre de service par une mobilité de proximité de type multiples-multiples. De plus, le partage de l'infrastructure pour la livraison des marchandises permet de répartir les charges et ainsi offrir un service disponible à tous

Emergence of System Optimum: A Fair and Altruistic Agent-based Route-choice Model

AbstractThe System Optimum, an optimal traffic assignment that minimizes the total travel costs on the road network is usually only referred to as a comparison to self-emerging user equilibrium. In this paper we investigate how different behavioral aspects of drivers can self-organize towards a system optimum that minimizes travel costs while providing benefits and preserving equity among drivers. We present a simple binary route-choice Agent-Based Model that provides a disaggregated view of driver behavior and a unique understanding of the potential of cognitive reinforcement models to effect a convergence to user equilibrium and a shift in driver behavior toward a system optimum without the need for an enforcing traffic policy such as tolls

Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice

. This study applies experimental methods to analyze travel mode choice. Two different scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, subjects have to decide whether to commute by car or by metro. Metro costs are fixed, while car costs are uncertain and determined by the joint effect of casual events and traffic congestion. In the second scenario, subjects have to decide whether to travel by car or by bus, both modes in which costs are determined by the combination of chance and congestion. Subjects receive feedback information on the actual travel times of both modes. We find that individuals exhibit a marked preference for cars, are inclined to confirm their first choice and demonstrate travel mode stickiness. We conclude that travel mode choice is subject to heuristics and biases that lead to robust deviations from rational choice.travel mode choice, learning, information, heuristics, cognitive biases.

Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice

This study applies experimental methods to analyze travel mode choice. Two different scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, subjects have to decide whether to commute by car or by metro. Metro costs are fixed, while car costs are uncertain and determined by the joint effect of casual events and traffic congestion. In the second scenario, subjects have to decide whether to travel by car or by bus, both modes in which costs are determined by the combination of chance and congestion. Subjects receive feedback information on the actual travel times of both modes. We find that individuals exhibit a marked preference for cars, are inclined to confirm their first choice and demonstrate travel mode stickiness. We conclude that travel mode choice is subject to heuristics and biases that lead to robust deviations from rational choicetravel mode choice, learning, information, heuristics, cognitive biases

Response modes and coordination in a traffic context, an experimental comparison of Chinese and German participants

This paper reports results of laboratory experiments about traffic behavior of participants with different cultural backgrounds. We conducted the minority game as an elementary traffic scenario in which human participants of a German and Chinese subject pool had to choose over 100 periods between a road A and a road B. In each period, the road which was chosen by the minority of players won, these participants got a payoff. The payoff in the majority group was 0. An important observation is that the number of road changes of a participant is negatively correlated with her cumulative payoff. The Chinese participants reacted differently to the payoffs of preceding periods than the German participants

Public Transit Capacity and Users' Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox

We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacitycan cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfarefor transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entrygame (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimizecapacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacitycompared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe theDowns-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causesshift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary isnot true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is incontradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen byoperator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signi…cantly higher than those predictedby our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry ratewhile capacity has been chosen by operator.traffic equilibrium, congestion, market entry game, coordination, experimental economics

Public Transit Capacity and Users Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox

We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacitycan cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfarefor transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entrygame (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimizecapacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacitycompared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe theDowns-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causesshift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary isnot true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is incontradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen byoperator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signi…cantly higher than those predictedby our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry ratewhile capacity has been chosen by operator.traffic equilibrium, public transit, congestion, experimental economics, market entry game