Shared Agency Without Shared Intention

The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna by developing a reductive account of the social capacities of non-planning agents, which I argue supports the conclusion that they can enjoy shared agency. The resulting discussion offers a fine-grained account of the psychological capacities that can underlie shared agency, and produces a recipe for generating novel hypotheses concerning why some agents do not engage in shared agency

Credal pragmatism

According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief. According to an alternative but yet unrecognised version of doxastic pragmatism, practical factors affect credence rather than the threshold on credence. Let’s call this alternative view credal pragmatism. In this paper, I argue that credal pragmatism is more plausible than threshold pragmatism. I show that the former view better accommodates a cluster of intuitive and empirical data. I conclude by considering the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense

The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning

I study the robustness of Rubinstein´s (1989) E-Mail Game results towards rough inductive reasoning. Rough induction is a form of boundedly rational reasoning where a player does not carry out every inductive step. The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein´s results hold. Rough induction generates a payoff dominant equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continously in the probability of "faulty" communication. The article follows one of Morris´(2001a) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge".

Default Logic in a Coherent Setting

In this talk - based on the results of a forthcoming paper (Coletti, Scozzafava and Vantaggi 2002), presented also by one of us at the Conference on "Non Classical Logic, Approximate Reasoning and Soft-Computing" (Anacapri, Italy, 2001) - we discuss the problem of representing default rules by means of a suitable coherent conditional probability, defined on a family of conditional events. An event is singled-out (in our approach) by a proposition, that is a statement that can be either true or false; a conditional event is consequently defined by means of two propositions and is a 3-valued entity, the third value being (in this context) a conditional probability

Can Atheism Be Epistemically Responsible When So Many People Believe in God?

Nowadays the argument for the existence of God based on the common consent of mankind is taken to be so bad that contemporary atheists do not even bother to mention it. And it seems very few theists think that the argument is worth defending. In this paper I shall argue to the contrary: not only is the argument better than usually thought, but widespread belief in God constitutes a prima facie defeater for every reasonable atheist