Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.

In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and $52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success. We examine Coase‘s seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note the importance of its analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight has had enormous influence within the economics profession, yet is often lost in current analyses. This analytical insight had its beginning in his acclaimed early article on the firm (Coase 1937), and continued into his subsequent treatment of social cost (Coase 1960). Second, we investigate why spectrum policies have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rent-seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase‘s property framework. One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license awards. By rule of thumb, about$17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.

The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/71559/1/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x.pd

A View of the Dutch IPO Cathedral

This is the Keynote Address for IPOs and the Internet Age: The Case for Updated Regulations, a symposium held at The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. Initial public offerings ( IPOs ) are an exercise in asymmetrical valuation. One mechanism for bridging these asymmetries is a private financial intermediary to conduct price discovery by meeting with preferred investors. An alternate mechanism is an auction, such as a descending-bid or Dutch procedure, to conduct price discovery by soliciting bids from all prospective investors. Recent disenchantment with the relationship between issuers and intermediaries has prompted some to hail (online) auction-based IPOs. This switch, however, incurs a variety of legal costs that may justify broader mandatory disclosure and state intervention. The legal costs of auction-based IPOs can be gleaned from examining various international regulatory regimes. To comparatively evaluate these regimes, this article introduces a paradigmatic framework derived from the classic tri-tiered schema that Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed formulated for legal entitlements. By conceptualizing IPOs as a problem of asymmetrically-valued shares, different kinds of regulations can assume the form of property, liability, and inalienability rules. The distinctions between these rules explain variations within the regulatory schemes of France, Israel, and Taiwan, the last bastions of auction-based IPOs, and evince the legal price that must be paid for the United States to offer an auction-based alternative to bookbuilding

Liberty and Property in the Patent Law

Patents have seldom troubled civil libertarians. A specialized form of property, patents seemed pertinent to the technologies of traditional industry but little else. Patent instruments offered their readers mere technical documentation; patent cases presented no more than the mapping of a text onto an instantiated artifact; patent policy was principally oriented toward economic optimization of the length and scope of protection. Unbound from technology, contemporary patent law now seems a more robust discipline. Modern patent instruments appropriate a diverse array of techniques that span the entire range of human endeavor. Patent claims, cut loose from physical moorings, have grown more abstract and oriented toward human behavior. We have yet to realize fully the consequences of postindustrial patenting, but the potential impact of the patent law upon personal liberties is becoming more apparent and more worthy of concern. Although the principles of the patent canon demonstrate sufficient flexibility to regulate uses of such inventions as software, business methods, and genetic fragments, they persist in bearing little regard for civil rights. The private rule making, made possible through the patent law, holds the potential to impinge upon individual liberties in ways not previously considered possible

Spartan Daily, September 15, 1977

Volume 69, Issue 8https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/6231/thumbnail.jp

Economic Valuation of Black-faced Spoonbill Conservation in Macao

The general objective of this study is to estimate the economic benefits of black-faced Spoonbill conservation in Macao based on public preferences. The specific objectives are as follows to investigate the public's awareness, attitudes and behaviors regarding black-faced Spoonbill conservation in Macao; to estimate the public's willingness to pay (WTP) for the conservation of black-faced Spoonbills in Macao; to identify the factors that affect the WTP; to determine the cost and benefits of a conservation program for black-faced Spoonbills in Macao, to recommend potential funding mechanisms; to run an experiment on hypothetical and real WTP in Macao to validate the large scale CVM study.economic valuation, Macao

Digital Money: Bitcoin\u27s Financial and Tax Future Despite Regulatory Uncertainty

Bitcoin, a virtual currency created in 2009, has resulted in the unlikely pairing of the underworld criminals with the Harvard educated Winklevoss brothers. The online currency can be obtained by “mining” through solving complex equations, and can be bought and sold on Bitcoin Exchanges. It is primarily utilized for investment in Bitcoin financial products as well as speculating on the value of the currency. It is also used as a method of payment for legal and illegal goods and services. This comment addresses the regulatory issues Bitcoin faces, namely the regulation and taxation of financial products. After providing a fundamental definition of Bitcoin and how it operates, this Comment explores issues stemming from anonymity, price volatility, and use in criminal activity. It then provides an analysis of classifying and regulating Bitcoin as currency and examines how FinCEN and Treasury Regulations issued by the IRS will reduce criminal activity stemming from anonymity. Next, it discusses how SEC and CFTC regulations could stabilize Bitcoin’s volatile market value, and explains why the IRS was incorrect to classify Bitcoin as property. It concludes by addressing the policy implications of classifying Bitcoin as currency under various regulatory laws