CoRide: Joint Order Dispatching and Fleet Management for Multi-Scale Ride-Hailing Platforms

How to optimally dispatch orders to vehicles and how to tradeoff between immediate and future returns are fundamental questions for a typical ride-hailing platform. We model ride-hailing as a large-scale parallel ranking problem and study the joint decision-making task of order dispatching and fleet management in online ride-hailing platforms. This task brings unique challenges in the following four aspects. First, to facilitate a huge number of vehicles to act and learn efficiently and robustly, we treat each region cell as an agent and build a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework. Second, to coordinate the agents from different regions to achieve long-term benefits, we leverage the geographical hierarchy of the region grids to perform hierarchical reinforcement learning. Third, to deal with the heterogeneous and variant action space for joint order dispatching and fleet management, we design the action as the ranking weight vector to rank and select the specific order or the fleet management destination in a unified formulation. Fourth, to achieve the multi-scale ride-hailing platform, we conduct the decision-making process in a hierarchical way where a multi-head attention mechanism is utilized to incorporate the impacts of neighbor agents and capture the key agent in each scale. The whole novel framework is named as CoRide. Extensive experiments based on multiple cities real-world data as well as analytic synthetic data demonstrate that CoRide provides superior performance in terms of platform revenue and user experience in the task of city-wide hybrid order dispatching and fleet management over strong baselines.Comment: CIKM 201

Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games (stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks; analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains. It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There are certain common computational principles underlying different types of equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP. Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational principles and the corresponding classes

Reinforcement Learning: A Survey

This paper surveys the field of reinforcement learning from a computer-science perspective. It is written to be accessible to researchers familiar with machine learning. Both the historical basis of the field and a broad selection of current work are summarized. Reinforcement learning is the problem faced by an agent that learns behavior through trial-and-error interactions with a dynamic environment. The work described here has a resemblance to work in psychology, but differs considerably in the details and in the use of the word ``reinforcement.'' The paper discusses central issues of reinforcement learning, including trading off exploration and exploitation, establishing the foundations of the field via Markov decision theory, learning from delayed reinforcement, constructing empirical models to accelerate learning, making use of generalization and hierarchy, and coping with hidden state. It concludes with a survey of some implemented systems and an assessment of the practical utility of current methods for reinforcement learning.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

Efficient Ridesharing Order Dispatching with Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

A fundamental question in any peer-to-peer ridesharing system is how to, both effectively and efficiently, dispatch user's ride requests to the right driver in real time. Traditional rule-based solutions usually work on a simplified problem setting, which requires a sophisticated hand-crafted weight design for either centralized authority control or decentralized multi-agent scheduling systems. Although recent approaches have used reinforcement learning to provide centralized combinatorial optimization algorithms with informative weight values, their single-agent setting can hardly model the complex interactions between drivers and orders. In this paper, we address the order dispatching problem using multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), which follows the distributed nature of the peer-to-peer ridesharing problem and possesses the ability to capture the stochastic demand-supply dynamics in large-scale ridesharing scenarios. Being more reliable than centralized approaches, our proposed MARL solutions could also support fully distributed execution through recent advances in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and the Vehicle-to-Network (V2N). Furthermore, we adopt the mean field approximation to simplify the local interactions by taking an average action among neighborhoods. The mean field approximation is capable of globally capturing dynamic demand-supply variations by propagating many local interactions between agents and the environment. Our extensive experiments have shown the significant improvements of MARL order dispatching algorithms over several strong baselines on the gross merchandise volume (GMV), and order response rate measures. Besides, the simulated experiments with real data have also justified that our solution can alleviate the supply-demand gap during the rush hours, thus possessing the capability of reducing traffic congestion.Comment: 11 pages, 9 figure

Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money

Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced exploration of different a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in the long-term welfare of a population of agents who arrive one by one in a multi-armed bandit setting. However, each agent is myopic, so in order to incentivize him to explore options with better long-term prospects, the principal must offer the agent money. Frazier et al. showed that a simple class of policies called time-expanded are optimal in the worst case, and characterized their budget-reward tradeoff. The previous work assumed that all agents are equally and uniformly susceptible to financial incentives. In reality, agents may have different utility for money. We therefore extend the model of Frazier et al. to allow agents that have heterogeneous and non-linear utilities for money. The principal is informed of the agent's tradeoff via a signal that could be more or less informative. Our main result is to show that a convex program can be used to derive a signal-dependent time-expanded policy which achieves the best possible Lagrangian reward in the worst case. The worst-case guarantee is matched by so-called "Diamonds in the Rough" instances; the proof that the guarantees match is based on showing that two different convex programs have the same optimal solution for these specific instances. These results also extend to the budgeted case as in Frazier et al. We also show that the optimal policy is monotone with respect to information, i.e., the approximation ratio of the optimal policy improves as the signals become more informative.Comment: WINE 201