Modeling customer bounded rationality in operations management: A review and research opportunities

Many studies in operations management started to explicitly model customer behavior. However, it is typically assumed that customers are fully rational decision-makers and maximize their utility perfectly. Recently, modeling customer bounded rationality has been gaining increasing attention and interest. This paper summarizes various approaches of modeling customer bounded rationality, surveys how they are applied to relevant operations management settings, and presents the new insights obtained. We also suggest future research opportunities in this important area

Are we strategically naïve or guided by trust and trustworthiness in cheap-talk communication?

Cheap-talk communication between parties with conflicting interests is common in many business and economic settings. Two distinct behavioral economics theories, the trust-embedded model and the level-k model, have emerged to explain how cheap talk works between human decision makers. The trust-embedded model considers that decision makers are motivated by nonpecuniary motives to be trusting and trustworthy. In contrast, the level-k model considers that decision makers are purely self-interested but limited in their ability to think strategically. Although both theories have been successful in explaining cheap-talk behaviors in separate contexts, they point to contrasting drivers for human behaviors. In this paper, we provide the first direct comparison of both theories within the same context. We show that, in a cheap-talk setting that well represents many practical situations, the two models make characteristically distinct and empirically distinguishable predictions. We leverage past experiment data from this setting to determine what aspects of cheap-talk behavior each model captures well and which model (or combination of models) has better explanatory power and predictive performance. We find that the trust-embedded model emerges as the dominant explanation. Our results, thus, highlight the importance of investing in systems and processes to foster trusting and trustworthy relationships in order to facilitate more effective cheap-talk interactions

An Investigation of Buyers’ Forecast Sharing and Ordering Behavior in a Two-Stage Supply Chain

Profitably balancing demand and supply is a continuous challenge for companies under changing market conditions, and the potential benefit of collaboration between supply chain partners cannot be overlooked by any firm who strives to succeed. One of the key elements to successful collaboration is sharing of forecast information between supply chain partners. However, when supply shortage is expected, buyers may inflate order quantities and/or order forecasts to secure sufficient supply. An important question that arises is how the supplier should allocate inventory to customers when shortage exists. Literature shows that certain allocation policies can reduce buyers’ order inflation behavior. However, this has not yet been empirically shown for order forecast inflation behavior, nor incorporating the behavioral aspects of decision makers. In this dissertation, through behavioral experiments using a supply chain simulation game, we investigate the impact of different capacity allocation mechanisms and information disclosures of a supplier on buyers’ forecast sharing and ordering behavior. We first investigate the buyers’ order forecast sharing behavior in a single-suppliertwo- buyer supply chain. Our behavioral study shows that forecast-accuracy based allocation, where the supplier allocates more capacity to the buyer with better forecast accuracy, can significantly improve order forecast accuracy relative to uniform allocation, where the supplier equally allocates capacity to the buyers. Under both policies, particularly uniform allocation, the order forecast accuracy is improved with the supplier’s information disclosure on the policy. Next, we focus on buyers’ ordering behavior, and formulate a single-supplier-single-buyer base-stock inventory model under constrained supply. We validate our analytical results through numerical simulation, which is then extended to the single-supplier-two-buyer case. We next compare the buyers’ optimal decisions from the simulation with the actual decisions in our behavioral study, and find that buyers in the experiment show a significantly lower profit performance ranging from 0.8% to 14.1%. Using structural estimation modeling techniques, we estimate the buyers’ perceived overage/underage cost ratios from the experiment, and conclude by conducting a detailed analysis on the factors that affect buyers’ ordering decisions. In addition to academic contributions, our results provide insights for practitioners to understand buyers’ strategic behavior and help with designing capacity allocation strategies

Enhancing Managerial Decision-Making Through Multicriteria Modeling

The monograph constitutes a crowning of research led in the field of particular methodology of management science, in the field of enhancing managerial decision-making sub-discipline in frames of the practical stream of the management science discipline. The monograph is a development of the research project in which the elaboration of a scientific method for the enhancement of managerial decision-making processes through the Modular Multicriteria Managerial Decision-Making Model (MMUMADEMM) has been proposed